Xi Signals Reassessment of Senior Generals
K. Tristan Tang
Executive Summary:
Xi Jinping’s distrust of senior military cadres was on display on April 8, as he presided over the opening ceremony of the first session of a senior officer training program—the first time he has chaired this kind of event.
Xi’s remarks, which emphasized political theory and regulations, suggest that he will use the training program to evaluate whether his remaining generals are suitable for promotion or whether they require further investigation.
Large-scale promotions remain unlikely in the near term, and those in most key positions will likely continue to operate in an acting capacity for at least the next several months, given Xi’s lack of trust in senior cadres.
On April 8, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) convened the first session of a training program for all senior officers (第一期全军高级干部培训班). General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening ceremony that emphasized “political rectification” (政治整训), and he imposed a series of requirements on cadres’ modes of thinking and patterns of behavior (Xinhua, April 8). Together with recent trends, these developments indicate that Xi is personally signaling to the PLA that senior commanders must undergo retraining and evaluation. As a result, many officers may continue to hold key leadership positions in a temporary capacity until evaluations are completed.
Xi’s Attendance Marks an Exception
Xi’s presence at the session indicates its importance. It is the first that he has personally attended since coming to power in 2012. He had previously only attended cadre training programs (培训班) held at the Central Party School. In the military domain, he had generally only conducted inspections, and for earlier senior officer seminars (专题研讨班) at the National Defense University he merely “personally approved” (亲自批准/审定) their contents. At most, he issued work instructions, while vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC) attended and delivered speeches, such as at the 2021 PLA Equipment Work Conference and the 2023 PLA Party Building Conference (Xinhua, October 26, 2021; July 21, 2023).
The significance of this year’s training program may be comparable to the 2024 CMC Political Work Conference (中央军委政治工作会议), which authorities have since treated as a reference point for military discipline work (Xinhua, June 19, 2024). Following the conference, the PLA discipline system explicitly declared that it would severely punish officers who continue to engage in misconduct. Several key PLA officers have faced formal purges since, including CMC member Miao Hua (苗华) and CMC vice chairmen He Weidong (何卫东) and Zhang Youxia (张又侠) (PLA Daily, January 21, 2025).
War Preparedness Receives Unusual Emphasis
A PLA Daily editorial on Xi’s speech identifies four areas in which the PLA must continue to improve (PLA Daily, April 9). First, it says that the PLA must be “strong politically” (在政治上强). It notes that the Party’s leadership in the military, though once weakened, has grown stronger through rectifying deviations and restoring principles. Second, the PLA must focus on war preparedness, treating serious preparations for war and planning for victory as a “baseline state” (基本态). Third, it argues that the anti-corruption campaign, whose success was once thought impossible (被认为刹不住), has achieved major results. And fourth, it notes that focusing on “managing and governing the Party” (管党治党) has allowed the authorities to root out weak Party governance and reverse a deteriorating political environment. Although the editorial frames these as areas in which the PLA has now resolved all outstanding issues, their inclusion in the article implies that problems persist.
The emphasis on war preparedness, which is listed before—and therefore prioritized above—corruption and management issues, is unusual for a training program focused on political rectification and strengthening loyalty to Xi Jinping. This could suggest that recent problems of political loyalty may correlate strongly to force building and war preparedness, or even that problems of political loyalty are downstream of those areas, as reflected in the purges of Zhang Youxia and CMC Joint Staff Department head Liu Zhenli (刘振立) (China Brief, January 26, February 3).
Xi Still Distrusts Senior Military Cadres
By leading this training session, Xi signaled that he seeks to expand supervision of cadres, including down to the grassroots level. This entails the continuation of military–political work reforms launched in 2025 that emphasized accepting evaluation from the grassroots (China Brief, October 17, 2025). Xi specifically stated that leading military cadres, especially senior officers, must accept—and not suppress—criticism directed at them, advocating “taking the lead in ensuring the seriousness of intra-Party political life, setting an example in speaking the truth, cultivating tolerance toward others, and fostering a strong atmosphere of reporting real conditions, offering candid advice, and daring to struggle” (带头严肃党内政治生活，当好讲真话的表率，涵养能容人的雅量，营造说实情、建诤言、敢斗争的浓厚氛围) (Xinhua, April 8).
Xi’s remarks are intended in part to encourage senior officers to accept suggestions and criticism from their subordinates—evidence that he still holds a high degree of distrust toward senior cadres, even after multiple rounds of purges of generals and admirals. This was underscored by his conduct at the Two Sessions in March, where he accepted proposals from non-senior cadres to a greater extent than in the past (China Brief, March 20).
Xi Signals Reassessment of PLA Generals
Evaluation of officers could be central to the new training program. As Xi emphasized at the opening ceremony, participants must seriously study, grasp, and live in accordance with the Party’s ideological precepts and its rules of conduct, and ensure no privileges in observing or enforcing them (Xinhua, April 8). This aligns with the PLA’s political work in 2025, which emphasized reforms in the personnel management system and a greater role for the military discipline inspection commission in managing personnel.
Participants in the program include a large number of generals, and units at the corps level and above are required to organize separate sessions for remote participation. The inclusion of the entire cohort of surviving generals—whether in this stage or in future iterations—could suggest that Xi does not trust them fully. Many served during Miao Hua’s tenure running PLA personnel affairs, and so were evaluated and likely recommended for promotion by him (China Brief, May 23, 2025; October 17, 2025). By using the training program to assess their familiarity with the political theory and regulatory system that Xi prioritizes, he may be better able to gauge whether to promote or retain them.
Conclusion
The new PLA senior officer training program may represent a turning point after recent purges of PLA generals. As Xi seeks to strengthen political training and evaluation of the remaining senior cadres, he will likely use this process to identify suitable generals for promotion to fill the current large number of key vacancies.
Public details about the program hint at Xi’s pervasive distrust toward remaining cadres, even after multiple rounds of high-level purges. Instead of declaring a political victory and promoting remaining generals, he continues to emphasize grassroots supervision of cadres. Defense Minister Dong Jun’s (董军) ongoing wait for a promotion to the CMC may serve as a clear example. Current key vacancies are therefore unlikely to be filled in the near term, and many key positions will continue to be held on a temporary basis.
This article originally appeared in China Brief Notes. Check it out here!
K. Tristan Tang is a co-founder of the Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative (TDSI) and serves as Project Lead for Wargaming, as well as the designer of KTT’s Wargame. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research and a Nonresident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at the Pacific Forum. In addition, he serves as an Associate Fellow at the Secure Taiwan Associate Corporation and an Associate Fellow at the Center for China Studies at National Taiwan University. His research focuses on China’s defense industry, the People’s Liberation Army, and Chinese foreign policy. You can connect with him on X: @KTristanTang.