Ukrainian Military Offers Lessons Learned to NATO (Part One)
Taras Kuzio
Executive Summary:
In March, a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military delegation led by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier visited Kyiv, highlighting a new phase of military cooperation between Ukraine and the alliance.
Ukraine is gaining the status of a military innovator as Kyiv heads its own military training, increases success on the frontlines, expands medium and long-range missile attacks against Russia, targets Russian energy infrastructure, and receives urgent demand from Europe and the Gulf states for its military technology.
Battlefield-tested drone tactics, advanced command-and-control systems, and a rapidly expanding private defense sector have made Ukraine one of the world’s leading laboratories for modern warfare, positioning it as a future hub for Western military innovation.
The first visit of a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military team to Kyiv, led by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier, took place on March 22 (Facebook/Pavlo.Palisa; Ukrainska Pravda, March 22). During the visit, Vandier said that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine proved that Europe cannot sustain industrial-scale war. Ammunition is being consumed faster than it can be produced, and European stockpiles, industry, and planning were built for limited operations, not prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Ukraine is expected to produce nearly 10 million drones this year. NATO must similarly shift to mass drone production at scale, where affordability and the ability to ramp up production matter as much as the technological advancement of systems. Vandier believes there is an urgent need for NATO members to increase their air defenses because large-scale modern warfare, as seen in Russia’s war against Ukraine and the conflict in and around Iran, involves strikes on energy infrastructure, data centers, and logistics nodes in addition to conventional military targets.
The visit reflects Ukraine’s unique military experience and expertise, and occurred as Ukraine begins to lead its own military training; increases success on the frontlines; expands medium- and long-range missile attacks against Russia; targets Russian energy infrastructure; and receives urgent demand for its military technology from the Gulf states and U.S. investors. The NATO team that visited Kyiv in March discussed Ukraine’s increased participation in NATO exercises as a hypothetical enemy, or “Red Team.” Operations conducted by the NATO–Ukraine Joint Training Center (JATEC), which opened in 2025, will be expanded.
Ukraine “defeated” NATO forces in the May 2025 “Hedgehog-25” exercise in Estonia (Militarnyy, February 13). Four Ukrainian combat veterans from the Nemesis brigade taught 13 NATO armies how drone warfare works. NATO forces in the exercise parked their armored vehicles “as if on a parking lot,” concealed equipment in forests, assuming they would remain concealed—they were not—and did not check roads for mines, which Ukrainian drones had earlier mined. NATO officers sent runners with paper maps to deliver coordinates to the Ukrainians. After the fourth delivery, the Ukrainians refused to accept further paper maps and showed NATO armies how to use the Ukrainian Delta communications system. Over three days, the Ukrainians launched 29 drone flights, which “destroyed” seven armored personnel carriers, one tank, three cars, two command posts, and one bridge (Oboronka, February 28). One NATO commander observing “Hedgehog-25” reportedly reacted with “We are f—ed” (Euromaidan Press, February 13).
Over the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has shifted from training the Ukrainian military to receiving training from Ukrainian forces. NATO members who led sessions for Ukrainian troops primarily have experience with counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO member countries have not fought a full-scale war against a major industrial military since World War II and the Korean and, debatably, Vietnam wars.
Two years ago, then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said, “Europe does not know how to fight wars” (Kyiv Independent, December 27, 2023). In August 2025, Colonel Markus Reisner, head of the Officer Training Institute at Austria’s Theresian Military Academy, said that the European defense industry has produced nothing comparable to Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile since 2022 (Euromaidan Press, August 22, 2025). Former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhnyy, currently Ukrainian ambassador to the United Kingdom, claims that only three countries are prepared for large-scale modern warfare—pro-Western Ukraine and anti-Western Russia and Iran (Telegraph, March 21).
Western military instructors lack experience in full-scale 21st-century combat against a major military power. Latvia adopted Ukrainian military experience into its training at its annual joint multinational exercises in January, where “For the first time in the history of these exercises, the program was entirely based on presentations” by Ukraine’s Azov 12th Special Forces Brigade (Facebook/Azov 12th Special Forces Brigade, February 9; Euromaidan Press, February 10). Ukrainian military specialists also advised Nordic forces in the September 2025 joint “Wings of Defense” counter-drone exercises in Denmark (Kyiv Independent, September 30, 2025).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that Poland, NATO’s highest military spender as a share of its gross domestic product, could only shoot down four out of 19 drones during Russia’s September 2025 incursion (Ukrainska Pravda, September 16, 2025). In the first few days of the current Iran conflict, the United States and its Gulf allies used nearly 1,000 Patriot interceptor missiles, which cost approximately $3–4 million each, against Iranian Shahed drones, which cost $20,000–$50,000 each. In four years of war, Ukraine has received only 600 Patriot interceptor missiles. Ukraine has signed defense contracts with three Gulf states and Jordan to supply Ukrainian anti-drone interceptors, which cost $1,000–3,000 each. Two further contracts are currently being negotiated.
With a shortage of Patriot missiles, Firepoint, Ukraine’s producer of Flamingo missiles and drones, is cooperating with European countries to produce a low cost air defense system against missiles to rival the U.S. Patriot system by 2027 (Kyiv Post, April 6). Now-retired U.S. general Christopher G. Cavoli said, “Ukrainians are even better at using the Patriot than the Americans. In my opinion, this is a true success story. Frankly, at first, I was a little skeptical that Ukrainians would be able to master the Patriot quickly. Now we’re learning from the Ukrainians” (X/@UkrReview, March 26).
Some analysts have argued that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in the attritional war with Russia since late 2025. Ukraine’s success on the battlefield is becoming recognized by NATO and the Gulf states. As of late March, Ukraine had been killing Russian soldiers at a faster rate than the Kremlin’s recruitment. Russian President Vladimir Putin is fearful that moving from voluntary recruitment to mobilization would be politically destabilizing (see EDM, November 5, 2025, March 19). Ukraine has increased the volume of its drone attacks and changed to targeting soldiers rather than military equipment. Ukraine’s top drone commander, “Madyar” Brovdi, claims that one Ukrainian can kill 400 Russians using unmanned systems for just $878 per kill in materials (Economist, March 22). Throughout the war, Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded at more than twice the rate of Ukrainian soldiers (Ukrainska Pravda, January 28). In March, Ukraine killed or wounded over 6,000 Russian troops in only four days (Ukrainska Pravda, March 23). In March, Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported halting Russia’s biggest mechanized push, killing 405 Russian troops and destroying a large amount of military equipment (Telegram/@shturmmotherf—er, March 20).
Ukraine’s recent battlefield gains have been facilitated by the denial of Starlink access to Russia and Putin’s decision to ban the Telegram social media app in Russia (see EDM, February 10, March 19). Both steps have empowered Ukraine’s military and security forces and undermined Russian military communications. In August 2024, during Ukraine’s military intervention into Russia’s Kursk oblast, Kyiv pioneered the combination of electronic warfare to disable Russian drones and the deployment of swarms of drones to target Russian forces, followed by ground forces moving in and securing territory. In the past three months, Ukrainian forces have recaptured most of Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Russia and retaken lost territory in Zaporizhzhia oblast. In Kharkiv oblast, fighting continues without major Russian gains, with the liberation of Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces are preventing significant Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia’s 2026 offensive has been slowed along the long front line—this year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive has yielded Kyiv its largest territorial gains since 2023.
Since late 2025, Ukraine has expanded medium and long-range drone and missile attacks against Russian forces. Ukraine is targeting Russian staging areas and military bases, repair facilities, military factories and warehouses, air defense (accounting for half the attacks), Black Sea Fleet vessels, aircraft, helicopters, and energy facilities. Ukraine is destroying more Russian air defense than it can build, and their destruction opens the path to subsequent attacks against other military targets. Ukraine is using domestically produced drones BULAVA (built by Doviro) and RAM-2X (built by a consortium including Doviro, CDET, Ukrainian Armor, UDI, and SpetsTechnoEksport) that have smaller payloads and are decimating Russian air defense systems, including Buk, Tor, Strela, and ZU-23. Ukraine’s longer-range RUBALKA (its producer is classified) and FP-2 (built by Firepoint) have larger payloads (Doviro, accessed April 9). These strikes have long been conducted by Ukrainian military intelligence (HRU). Now, they are also being directed by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operation Forces, and Unmanned Systems Forces (Ukrainska Pravda, March 22).
Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are having a greater impact than Western sanctions, particularly after the United States eased sanctions on Russia following its conflict with Iran. Ukraine is attacking energy facilities thousands of miles inside Russia, along with Russian shadow fleet tankers in the Mediterranean Sea and from bases in Libya (Euromaidan Press, April 3). Russian oil exports through Baltic Sea ports have been completely halted after daily waves of Ukrainian drone strikes on the Leningrad oblast closed the Russian Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga (The Moscow Times, March 31; Ukrainska Pravda, April 2).
Ukrainian military technology is in high demand on Wall Street and urgently in demand by the Gulf states in the U.S. conflict with Iran (see EDM, April 1). Swarmer, the first Ukrainian defense company to be listed on Wall Street, had an IPO value of $67 million and had a market cap of $670 million after trading was opened, with initially priced shares of $5 closing at $31 (Kyiv Independent, March 21). Deborah Fairlamb, a founding partner of Green Flag VC, a venture fund focused on Ukrainian defense companies and one of Swarmer’s earliest investors, said the listing “broke a barrier for the American investor, recognizing and understanding and having access to the talent of Ukrainian defense tech.” She added that Ukrainian defense startups “have the capability to take their tech globally, that there is interest, and that this now sort of sets a path for others in the market to emulate” (Kyiv Independent, March 21). Nicolas Owens, a defense sector analyst, said that Swarmer’s growth in value is “evidence of investors’ strong appetite for stocks or opportunities in this area” (Kyiv Independent, March 21).
Ukraine has sent 201 military experts to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to assist in countering Iranian attacks, with another 34 experts available for deployment (The Tribune, March 18). Zelenskyy said Ukraine produces 2,000 interceptors per day and only requires half of them to counter Russia’s daily drone attacks. Ukraine’s production could be increased if funding is made available (Radio Svoboda, April 6).
Ukrainian drone interceptors cost between $1,000 and $3,000 and are more economical than Patriot interceptors, which cost $3–4 million each. Ten Ukrainian companies produce drone interceptors which include the STRILA (produced by WIY), STING (Wild Hornets), OCTOPUS (Ukrspetsystems), P1-SUN (SkyFall) and BAYONET (Tenebris) with a range of up to 30 miles, carrying 0.5–1 kilogram (1.1–2.2 pounds) payloads, using artificial intelligence (AI)—which means they cannot be jammed as they do not use GPS—and flying at speeds of up to 250 miles per hour (Euromaidan Press, November 14, 2025). The new JEDI interceptor (Wild Hornets) is also AI-guided to targets but carries a heavier 4-kilogram (8.8-pound) payload and flies at a similar speed of 200 miles per hour.
Ukraine has reached this stage because of the legacy of its Soviet military-industrial complex, a large number of technology specialists, and its development in a fundamentally different way from Russia since its independence in 1991. For example, the first computer in Europe was invented in Kyiv in 1951. The Institute of Cybernetics within the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was launched in 1957. The first Encyclopedia of Cybernetics (Encyklopediyi kibernetyky) in the world was published in Kyiv in 1973 (Istorychna Pravda, February 7, 2011). The Ukrainian information technology sector is valued at over $7.8 billion (Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, April 7).
The war is being fought between Ukraine—whose democratic society is constructed horizontally, allowing for the flourishing of a competitive private defense sector, volunteer groups, and amicable society–business–government relations—and Russia, whose regime is built vertically and where the defense sector remains, as in the Soviet Union, state-controlled. Putin is fearful of losing control, as seen in his banning of social media. The Telegram ban has negatively affected the already low level of volunteer recruitment for the Russian army (see EDM, March 19, April 2).
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has mobilized within the country and abroad an army of hundreds of thousands of software developers and engineers who assist the development of military technology and undertake cyber warfare. Competing ideas developed by programmers are sent to tech labs, incorporated into prototypes for the Ministry of Defense, and then tested on the battlefield in a rapid turnaround, which NATO planners are closely studying.
Ukraine’s Delta communication system has been praised by NATO (Ukrainska Pravda, July 14, 2024). NATO armies have no equivalent and are plagued by secrecy between branches of the armed forces and between member states’ commands. As seen in the “Hedgehog-25” exercise in Estonia, Delta provides Ukrainian armed forces with a real-time display of air, land, and sea conditions on digital maps. Ukrainian forces can communicate with one another securely through Delta’s messenger, which allows for the sharing of intelligence within and outside brigades.
Zelenskyy’s goal is for Ukraine to become a hub for the development of military technology in the West. Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said he was “focusing on making Ukraine the arsenal of the free world” (Ministry of Strategic Industries, July 28, 2023). The investments of many European countries in Ukraine’s defense sector and the proliferation of joint military ventures are assisting Kamyshyn’s goal.
Ukraine’s new defense sector no longer resembles the Soviet military-industrial complex. It is dominated by the private sector with small defense start-ups brought together in the Brave 1 platform, which Kyiv founded in April 2023 to promote competition and innovation. In March, NATO and Brave 1 launched the first joint innovation program between Ukraine and NATO to bring together defense companies to build solutions tested in war, such as countering drones, strengthening SIGINT and electronic warfare, and autonomous targeting systems (Brave 1 Unite-Brave NATO, March 26). Joint ventures that bring together Western and Ukrainian defense companies are proliferating. In contrast, Russia retains its Soviet era state-controlled military industrial complex, with joint ventures only established with authoritarian Iran, the People’s Republic of China, and North Korea.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.