Ukrainian Drone War Shakes Up Russian Society
Vadim Shtepa
Executive Summary:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has turned into the first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is dominating this aspect of the conflict through its innovation and leadership in drone production.
Moscow is lagging behind in the drone war, relying on outdated Iranian drones and facing technological limitations due to global sanctions, despite efforts such as increased drone production and training programs.
While Ukraine leads in drone production and continues to attack Russia’s own infrastructure, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. For Ukraine to turn the tide of war, it needs to be able to target deeper into Russia more regularly.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has effectively become the world’s first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is winning, becoming the world leader in combat drone production (see EDM, October 8). This achievement did not come out of nowhere—even in Soviet times, the Ukrainian city of Dnepro (formerly Dnepropetrovsk) was the industrial heart of the Soviet space industry, where satellites and launch vehicles were produced (Nashemisto.dp.ua, April 12). This war has shown how new technology for producing combat drones can successfully be used with antiquated methods. Such a synthesis, however, has become a problem for Russia’s military factories since Moscow has lost access to many modern technologies due to global sanctions. Russia’s reliance on foreign weapons and Ukraine’s dominance in using drones against Russia, both against Russian targets within Ukrainian territory and on Russian soil against the country’s deteriorating military-industrial complex, demonstrates how Russia is falling behind in the battle of military innovation.
Today, Russia is primarily using technologically outdated Iranian “Shahed” drones and even has a plant for their production in Yelabuga, Tatarstan (see EDM, March 6, 2023, March 4, May 14, September 18). Ukrainian drones successfully attacked the plant, despite it being 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) from the Ukrainian border (BBC Russian Service, April 2; see EDM, April 11). More impressive was the Ukrainian drone attack on the Olenya military airfield in Murmansk oblast, an Arctic site where Russia had relocated its aircraft to avoid Ukrainian strikes. In terms of operational ranges, 1,800 kilometers (1,120 miles) has become a feasible distance for Ukrainian drone strikes (NV.ua, September 12).
Russian propaganda traditionally downplays the significance of Ukrainian drone attacks, calling the destruction of its facilities the result of “falling debris from downed drones” (see EDM, October 15). Russia’s avoidance of reporting on drone strikes creates more questions for the public. The most recent example of this concerned how a giant military warehouse in Toropets, Tver oblast, was destroyed by such “debris.” While the media claimed “falling debris” caused the building’s destruction, at the time of the attack, seismic laboratories recorded an earthquake in the region when there had never been an earthquake before (TASS, September 17; Region.expert, September 19). A seismic event of this level in a region without any recorded seismic activity would not have been able to occur simply from falling debris, laying bare the falsehoods in Russian media’s narrative regarding the situation.
Ukrainian drones have hit numerous Russian military and energy facilities over the course of the war. In recent weeks alone, in addition to the warehouse in Toropets, an equally large weapons storage facility in Yeysk, Krasnodar krai was destroyed (Svoboda, October 9). Similarly, a state of emergency was declared in Rostov oblast due to drone strikes, and the largest oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea burned down (RBC, September 30; Svoboda, October 9).
Ukrainian drone raids in various Russian regions have not caused a sense of unity in Russian society. This is in stark contrast to how attacks on Ukrainian cities are felt throughout the country. Even though Ukraine is a unitary state according to its constitution, practically speaking, it is much less centralized than Russia. The Russian Federation, on the contrary, is built on Moscow’s political, economic, and symbolic hyper-centralism. Therefore, only drone attacks on Moscow are likely to make a significant impression on the public, such as when Ukrainian drones attacked the Moscow City business center in July 2023, the largest capital oil terminal in Kapotnya in September 2024, or, most notably, when a Ukrainian drone sparked panic after it exploded over the Kremlin in May 2023 (BBC Russian Service, May 3, 2023; Forbes.ru, July 23, 2023; Svoboda.org, September 2). The Russian public will likely not have a significant reaction to such attacks unless the Kremlin itself collapses. The current Russian state is built on the “sacredness” of imperial power, and the destruction of its symbols could change political consciousness and attitudes toward war.
The Kremlin understands that it is losing the drone war. In addition to the technical lag, Russia’s deficiencies in drone warfare demonstrate the difference in social organization between Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, drones are not infrequently assembled by civil society organizations from parts provided by the state. Conversely, in Russia such an idea is impossible due to secrecy, high-level bureaucracy, and mutual distrust between various military structures (see EDM, June 20; Severreal.org, September 24). Russia, however, is trying to compensate for this lag by training schoolchildren to fly drones, even though this training is unlikely to be effective since technology is rapidly improving, and what is taught in schools may already be outdated by the time they are called up for military service (Svoboda.org, July 1; see EDM, September 9). While Russian President Vladimir Putin calls on Russian arms manufacturers to assemble 1.5 million drones annually, he himself hides from possible drone attacks by changing residences and turning off the transponders on his plane (Kasparov.ru, September 20; Svoboda.org, October 7). In addition, the Kremlin is now recruiting drone assemblers from Africa, clearly demonstrating the very “neocolonialist” tendencies it accuses Western countries of (The Moscow Times, May 28).
Whether Ukrainian drone attacks could turn the tide of this war is up for debate. The advantage of drones is that they are relatively easy to assemble, cost significantly less than the anti-aircraft missiles used to shoot them down, and can fly at low altitudes, remaining invisible to radar (Severreal.org, June 30). The main problem, however, is their low speed compared to manned jet aircraft, and attempts to increase this speed would lead to increased manufacturing costs (Forbes.ua, August 27).
For Ukraine, combat drones mainly provide a venue for tactical success and have a powerful psychological impact, specifically on Russians in the various targeted regions. These attacks deprive these Russian citizens of the idea “the war is somewhere far away,” since Ukrainian drones can now target nearly any city in the European part of Russia. Drones are still not capable, however, of moving the front line and liberating the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.
While the drone war is quantitative in nature, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. To achieve a qualitative transition, where Ukraine could have a meaningful advantage against Russia, Western countries would need to increase their supply of long-range missiles to Ukraine and remove restrictions on their use. These deliveries continue to be postponed, and permission to use these weapons on Russian soil is still being debated among Western leaders. While Ukraine is dominating the drone war, it still requires Western support and supplies to withstand the Russian storm.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Vadim Shtepa is the editor-in-chief of Region.Expert (www.region.expert), the only independent media outlet on Russian regionalism and federalism. Since 2015, he has been living in Estonia due to persecution in Russia for his political views.