Turkmenistan Becoming More Active on World Stage
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Turkmenistan has become more active on the international stage in the past few years, breaking from the borderline isolationist foreign policy that it pursued for most of its independent existence and attracting more attention from the major powers.
Turkmenistan’s increased international presence is driven by factors including its natural gas reserves, location on the Caspian bordering Afghanistan and Iran, and position astride both east–west and north–south trade corridors.
Tribalism, neo-Sovietism, and the government’s commitment to Turkism rather than Islam are among the factors likely to shape Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as its profile rises in global forums.
At the end of June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Ashgabat, Iran Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had a telephone conversation with Meredov (U.S. State Department, June 24; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 25; The Times of Central Asia, July 2, 3). This flurry of diplomatic outreach highlights Turkmenistan’s growing presence on the international stage. Turkmenistan is garnering more attention from outside powers and becoming more active in regional politics, a departure from its long-standing commitment to neutrality (Stan Radar, January 29). Turkmenistan’s increased international involvement has its roots in earlier decades, but gained momentum with the election of a new president in 2022, when Serdar Berdimuhamedov succeeded his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (see EDM, December 17, 2021; Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, March 18, 2022; see EDM, December 15, 2022). Three long-standing, powerful, and ethnically Russian advisors to the Turkmenistan government departed from politics in 2023, paving the way for further changes in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy (Window on Eurasia, November 27, 2023; Stan Radar, November 28, 2023). Most recently, heightened tensions between the United States and Russia, as well as between the West and Iran, have provided an opportunity for Turkmenistan to leverage its historical and regional connections to play a role in international affairs.
Turkmenistan’s increased international presence was practically inevitable due to its immense natural gas resources, its location on the Caspian Sea, bordering Afghanistan and Iran, and its position astride east–west and north–south trade corridors (see EDM, January 28; Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 4). It essential to better understand the unique aspects of Turkmenistan’s domestic politics and culture that will shape its growing international involvement, features including tribalism, neo-Sovietism, and a commitment to Turkism rather than Islam (Stan Radar, May 13, 2020; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 15, 2023; Kharbin, June 7).
Ashgabat’s flurry of diplomatic activity with Moscow, Washington, and Tehran is striking because it involved the most senior diplomats of all three countries. Russia hopes to restore its influence in Turkmenistan. The United States is interested in developing an economic and, possibly, a security relationship with Turkmenistan, including the potential use of an airport in Turkmenistan by the U.S. military. This may be precluded, however, by Washington’s new restrictions on Turkmen travel to the United States (Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan, June 10; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 23). Turkmenistan, for its part, has shown a willingness to play a role in dealing with tensions surrounding Iran, even opening its borders to foreign citizens looking to escape Israeli air strikes (The Times of Central Asia, July 3).
Turkmenistan’s relative openness is a continuation of a trend that began in 2022 when Serdar Berdimuhamedov took office. He appears committed to opening his country to the world and using its geographic position and natural resources to advance Turkmenistan’s interests. His government has expanded ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a country that asks no questions about Turkmenistan’s authoritarianism (see EDM, January 12, 2023). Serdar’s government has also promoted itself as a north–south and east–west transit hub, serving as an alternative to other international trade routes to expand its economic influence (see EDM, May 11, 2023, May 18, 2023, July 23, 2024, October 28, 2024, January 28). Serdar is developing close ties with Türkiye as an outpost of the Turkic world, raising the possibility that Ashgabat will follow Azerbaijan in adopting a “one nation, two states” policy regarding Türkiye (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 15, 2023).
Turkmenistan’s tightly controlled society and extremely authoritarian government make it fundamentally different from the other “stans.” Research on Central Asia often only includes data from the region’s other four countries, yet refers to “Central Asia” in its analysis, contributing to the notion that Turkmenistan is similar to the rest of its region. This conflation makes it difficult to understand Turkmenistan’s isolationism and why, now that it is becoming more internationally engaged, it is still likely to behave differently from the other countries in the region.
There are three major differences between Turkmenistan and its neighbors. First, it remains a far more tribal society. The regime is controlled by one tribal group, rendering the government’s hold on power fragile and leading the regime to use repression to stay in power. Opposition voices claim that Ashgabat must continue to tightly control its people to avoid serious unrest stemming given the poverty of its people and its location next to Afghanistan (Stan Radar, May 13, 2020). The fact that the Turkmen government is engaging with the rest of the world suggests that the regime is either more confident of its control or fears that it must work with other countries to counter the challenges it faces. If the former view dominates, Ashgabat may open up quickly; if the latter, it will remain cautious.
Second, Turkmenistan is far more committed to Turkism than to Islam. Few Turkmens go abroad as migrant workers, and ever more non-Turkmens are leaving the country, making the country more mono-national (Turkmen News, January 1, 2022; Khronika Turkmenistana, November 14, 2023). Ashgabat is working to restrict Islam while promoting the Turkmen language and culture, promoting Russian or Turkish as a second language. At the same time, the rest of Central Asia is turning to English or Chinese for second or third language instruction (Q Monitor, March 29, 2023; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 15, 2023; Orda, April 16). Moreover, Ashgabat repressed Islam far more harshly than any other Central Asian government (Window on Eurasia, February 26, 2023).
Third, Turkmenistan has organized itself as a neo-Soviet regime, with much of the same nomenklatura-style power structure as in the Soviet Union, albeit without communist values. One Russian émigré analyst, Dimitriy Savvin, argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin has followed Turkmenistan’s model in constructing his power vertical (Kharbin, June 7). That disposes some in Ashgabat to defer to Moscow or possibly the PRC as a neo-communist regime, but the government’s pro-Turkic and pro-Turkish position pushes it the other way. As Ashgabat assumes a more prominent position on the world stage, the former position will remain strong, but the latter will grow in importance. This position makes predicting Ashgabat’s next step difficult, but could make predicting its long-term path easier, especially as it works closer with Türkiye and the West.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. He regularly writes about Russia and Central Asia for the Eurasia Daily Monitor.