TTP and the Escalating Islamabad-Kabul Security Crisis
Rahim Nasar
Executive Summary:
The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 has led to the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which presents a growing threat as a strong militant force along Pakistan’s western border.
Pakistan has launched aerial strikes against alleged TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan—a shift from its traditional counterinsurgency practices—in response to the group’s more frequent cross-border attacks.
The Afghan Taliban’s persistent denial of TTP’s presence and refusal to take counter-measures has exposed a deeper ideological alignment between the Afghan Taliban and TTP. Current tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are no longer limited to militancy but are evolving into a structured inter-state conflict.
On March 16, Pakistan conducted aerial strikes on the Omid Rehabilitation Center in Kabul. The strikes led to at least 143 deaths, explicitly revealing Pakistan’s changing behavior towards the Afghan Taliban. Global media and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) termed it a blatant attack on the civilian population and demanded a fair investigation. Pakistan rejected all these allegations and asserted that it conducted precision aerial strikes against militants (UNAMA, March 17, 2026). Pakistan’s strikes followed a series of cross-border attacks. On February 6, a blast in Tarlai Imambargah killed around 30 people. Then, on February 16, a suicide attack on a border security check-post killed 11 and injured dozens (Al Jazeera, February 17). Despite a temporary ceasefire, the situation remains volatile.
Islamabad’s decades-long policy of supporting the Afghan Taliban seems to have reached an end. In 2025, Field Martial General Asim Munir declared his preference for making Pakistan a “hard state” that responds to internal and external aggression with strong military retaliation (orfonline.org, May 28, 2025). In October of that year—following escalating militant attacks—Pakistan carried out strikes on the outskirts of Kabul to target the TTP leadership, particularly Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud (Al Jazeera, October 15, 2025). With mediation by Qatar and Türkiye, the temperature was subsequently lowered, but only temporarily. Pakistan’s heightened focus on the Afghan Taliban and recent strikes against the group, therefore, have come to represent a “new normal” in the country’s security posture (X/@MoIB_Official, February 21, 2026).
Background to the Conflict
In 2004, Pakistan relocated its military to tribal areas in the country to assist the United States and counter Islamist militants. Pakistan concluded several peace agreements with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistani Taliban), including the Shakai Agreement (2004), the Srah Rogha Peace Agreement (2005), and the Waziristan Pact (2006). The Waziristan Pact was also mediated by the Afghan Taliban, particularly Mullah Dadullah and Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani. Many within Pakistan, however, criticized the agreement as a “brazen surrender before the terrorists” (Dawn, February 3, 2014).
From 2007 to 2018, the TTP faced serious challenges, including the killings of key leaders such as Abdullah Mehsud (2007), Baitullah Mehsud (2009), Hakimullah Mehsud (2013), and Mullah Fazlullah (2018). The group resurged after the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, however, and is now led by Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.
The escalating attacks by the TTP form the basis of the current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad continuously asserts that Kabul is supporting TTP militants in its cross-border attacks in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, on its part, has repeatedly rejected these allegations and labeled the attacks as a Pakistani internal security issue (Tribune, November 12, 2023).
Return of the Afghan Taliban
Around 55 percent of Pakistanis celebrated the return of the Afghan Taliban, according to an August 2021 survey by Gallup and Gilani Pakistan (Gallup, September 14, 2021). Contrary to these hopes, Pakistan began to face serious, continued security issues soon after the Taliban’s takeover. The Afghan Taliban’s immediate release of around 2,300 TTP militants—coupled with 100 militants by the Pakistani government in November 2021 as a goodwill gesture—only encouraged the TTP in its war against the state of Pakistan (NJIPS, July 31, 2022; Dawn, July 12, 2024). In 2025 alone, Pakistan witnessed more than 1,000 deadly attacks by TTP militants, resulting in 667 deaths of security personnel and 580 of civilians (PICSS, January 5, 2026).
Strategic Miscalculations
Pakistan’s engagement with the Afghan Taliban turned into a clear strategic miscalculation. At the heart of this engagement was the belief that the Afghan Taliban’s rise to power would help Islamabad enhance its regional influence. Pakistan invested in the Afghan Taliban through logistic support, provision of sanctuaries, and diplomatic backing for years. Instead of securing strategic alignment, however, Pakistan has increasingly been targeted by the Afghan Taliban (Dawn, June 23, 2014, see Terrorism Monitor, February 12).
Many in Pakistan also wrongly believed that the return of the Afghan Taliban would help to counter the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). For example, during peace talks in 2022, the Afghan Taliban did not force TTP leadership to negotiate. Even interior minister Siraj-ud-Din Haqqani stated that the Afghan Taliban can only request the TTP to negotiate, “but cannot force them” (X/@kabulnewstv, June 4, 2022). Beliefs about resolving the Durand Line have remained another miscalculated assumption. Contrary to Pakistan’s expectations, the Afghan Taliban has prioritized territorial nationalism. The Taliban now claim Afghanistan’s territorial boundary extends up to the Indus River near Attock—bordering the districts of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawn, January 12, 2025).
Conclusion
If recent mediation efforts by the People’s Republic of China fail, both states are expected to move closer to overt war. This has the potential to reshape the regional order, potentially expediting the growing Kabul–Delhi strategic partnership. A new alignment that may pose serious threats to Pakistan’s national and regional security interests. The extension of the conflict between the two states will further tighten economic strains along the border. For example, the closure of the Torkham border and other crossing points is also affecting Pakistani industries and trade. Instability is also likely to provide a strategic advantage to Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The possibility of war with Afghanistan will only serve to widen the scope for the militants to operate against Pakistan.
This article was originally published in Terrorism Monitor.
Rahim Nasar is a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Rahim focuses on regional political, security, & strategic affairs. He also appears on National and International media as a security & political analyst. He posts on X/ @RahimNasari, and can be reached at Rahim.nasar@yahoo.com