The Myth of the PRC’s Overseas Energy Vulnerability
Daniel Fu
Executive Summary:
Experts in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) argue that the country’s energy system is resilient enough to withstand major external disruptions, including conflict in the Persian Gulf, repudiating Western claims of PRC vulnerability to strategic chokepoints.
Through supply route diversification via Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, potential blockades of the straits of Hormuz or Malacca now inflict less economic damage to the PRC’s energy supply. Global economic interdependence and the PRC’s growing domestic energy capacity further limit risk of disruption.
Strategic petroleum reserves, diversified imports, domestic production (especially coal), and rapid expansion of renewable energy have helped reduce the PRC’s reliance on seaborne oil and enhanced its long-term energy security.
The notion that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains excessively dependent on foreign energy imports has gained continued traction in Western policy discourse. Some analysts argue that U.S. military action against Iran would significantly undermine the PRC’s energy security, while others suggest that a U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca could serve as a credible instrument of military and economic deterrence against Beijing. Chinese scholars and policy experts largely perceive no such vulnerabilities. Few believe that any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be sustained over the medium, let alone long term, and many argue that the so-called “Malacca dilemma” (马六甲困境) has largely faded amid the PRC’s diversification of energy sources and rapid expansion of domestic energy capacity.
Even so, the PRC’s reliance on foreign energy remains substantial. According to World Bank data, China imported roughly 30 percent of its total energy consumption as of 2023, while the United States was a net energy exporter (World Bank, March 25, 2025). This structural dependence constitutes a real strategic vulnerability and helps explain Beijing’s sustained focus on energy security. The key issue, however, is not whether such vulnerability exists, but whether it is as acute or as exploitable through military or economic coercion as commonly assumed. Much of China’s energy strategy over the past two decades can be understood as an effort to mitigate this risk.
Hormuz is Increasingly Irrelevant for PRC Energy
Chinese experts generally argue that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is unsustainable and unlikely to critically threaten the PRC’s energy security. For instance, prominent political scientist Zheng Yongnian (郑永年) recently pointed to the diversification of global oil sources. He emphasized that Iran’s economy is to a large extent reliant on oil exports, so the Strait of Hormuz will have to open eventually (Greater Bay Area Commentary, March 9). Similarly, Liu Zhongmin (刘中民), vice president of the Chinese Middle East Society, has observed that Iran’s blockade is limited and not intended to block the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran is “selectively allowing certain [Chinese] vessels to pass” (有选择地放行部分船只) (Guancha, March 7). Adding to this perspective, Yan Yan (闫岩), the director of the Research Center of Oceans Law and Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, a foreign ministry-affiliated think-tank, writes that Iran is not capable of maintaining a long-term blockade of the strait, which is why it has targeted vessels rather than closing the strait entirely (China Media Group, March 7).
Chinese elites emphasize that the PRC possesses a robust and flexible toolkit to manage any potential energy disruptions. Dong Xiucheng (董秀成), a professor at the University of International Business and Economics and director of the Belt and Road Energy Trade and Development Research Center, has written that despite heightened tensions in international energy markets caused by the Iran crisis, PRC statecraft has already established an “energy security system” (能源安全体系) comprising strategic petroleum reserves, commercial reserves, domestic exploration, diversified imports, and the rapid growth of new energy (21st Century Economic Report, March 3). Moreover, even if Iranian oil imports were severed, these supplies account for less than 15 percent of the PRC’s total imports (FT Chinese, March 4). The PRC maintains over 1.3 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, equivalent to about 180 days of consumption, far exceeding the 150-day threshold recommended by the International Energy Agency. This also enhances the country’s resilience to supply shocks (Xingyuan Chemical Industrial Park Research Institute, November 11, 2025). In practical terms, one Chinese commentator has observed that coordination between the state and the “big three” oil companies—Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—effectively act as a buffer that can cover import gaps, helping to stabilize prices and prevent market panic. Combined with regional infrastructure and diversified sources, these measures help manage any supply disruption (Sputnik News, March 9).
Chinese elites express confidence that the economy is well-positioned to absorb the impact of any market shocks caused by the Iran conflict. Chen Shouhai (陈守海), director of the Oil and Gas Policy Law and Research Center at the China University of Petroleum, has noted that state-owned oil companies would absorb some of the market shocks and mitigate energy prices (Guancha, March 9). Deflationary pressures in the PRC also work in Beijing’s favor in hedging against oil-induced inflation. Chen Fengying (陈凤英), former director of the Institute of World Economic Studies at the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of State Security, contrasts this low-inflation environment with that of Japan and India, arguing it will help to manage price fluctuations, even if costs increase for corporations (ChinaNews, March 1).
Experts Reject the Malacca Dilemma
Chinese experts argue that the Malacca Strait is no longer a critical vulnerability, as the existence of other global chokepoints and the PRC’s diversification of energy sources reduce its strategic significance. As far back as 2015, Wang Peng (王鹏) of Tsinghua’s Institute of International Relations wrote that the Malacca dilemma is a “false proposition” (伪命题), arguing that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are dotted with U.S. naval and air bases, so the threat persists even without a blockade (Global Times, May 27, 2015). Similarly, Liang Yabin (梁亚滨), an associate professor of the Central Party School, noted in the same year that the Lombok, Sunda, and Miyako straits also would still pose threats, even if the PRC could break through the Malacca Strait (Pacific Journal, January 2015).
Already by that time, other experts, such as deputy director of the Institute of Resource and Environmental Policy at the Development Research Center of the State Council Guo Jiaofeng (郭焦锋), calculated that the PRC had overcome the Malacca dilemma through domestic energy diversification efforts and the construction of new routes (21st Century Business Herald, July 5, 2016). Other experts widely emphasize that strong energy self-sufficiency, combined with diversified energy import routes, has greatly reduced the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait as a potential chokepoint. In 2023, Lu Ruqiang (陆如强), president of CNPC’s Economics and Technology Research Institute, saw no risk to Chinese energy security, assessing that the PRC could reach a self-sufficiency rate of 80 percent (People’s Daily, February 27, 2023). According to Tang Qifang (唐奇芳), senior fellow at the China Institute for International Studies, the PRC imports oil and gas from 55 different countries, and new import routes from Myanmar, Central Asia, and Russia have reduced dependence on maritime transport via the Malacca Strait (Global Times, July 30, 2024). Lu further notes that with Russian oil now “heading south” (南下) to the PRC and India, the PRC is no longer as vulnerable to external energy shocks (People’s Daily, February 27, 2023).
Experts also highlight that growing military coverage demonstrates that Beijing can effectively manage energy supply routes. Hao Yu (郝宇), a professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology, has stated that good relations with neighboring countries have produced new overland energy corridors, and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force operational radius now covers the Malacca Strait (People’s Tribune, February 1, 2023). With these factors in mind, he sees the Malacca Strait—and thus the Malacca dilemma—as increasingly insignificant. Some scholars have even argued that the Malacca Strait may not even constitute a chokepoint in the first place, as international legal regimes and the shared interests of major powers would preserve freedom of navigation there. Liang Yabin noted in 2015 that nearly all countries have a stake in the strait, and that no one country’s navy could block it (Pacific Journal, January 2015).
Maintaining Resilience and Bargaining Power
The PRC’s continued reliance on coal, combined with extensive domestic energy infrastructure, provides a resilient safety net that ensures continuity of supply even in extreme scenarios. Xiao Hongwei (肖宏伟), director of the Policy Simulation Laboratory in the Department of Forecasting at the National Information Center, recently stated that coal has “shouldered the political responsibility of ensuring supply” (扛起保供政治责任), and acts as the “ballast stone” (压舱石) of the energy system (State Information Center, November 12, 2025). Coal reserves, which account for over 90 percent of the PRC’s fossil fuel reserves, have reached 280 million tons, enough to meet 30 days of consumption by coal plants across the country (State Information Center, January 19, 2022; China Petroleum Enterprise, September 24, 2025). As Zhao Shuo (赵烁) has noted, the PRC is nearly self-sufficient in coal and has an extensive interprovincial railway-waterway coal transport network, which is “an important safeguard for energy security” (能源安全的重要保障) (Supply Chain Management, February 1, 2024).
Beyond domestic production, the PRC’s substantial domestic market strengthens its bargaining power with energy-producing countries, further mitigating the risks posed by potential chokepoints or external disruptions. Feng Yujun (冯玉军), the Vice Dean of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, has written that exporting countries need access to the PRC’s energy market (Fudan Development Institute, June 8, 2020). Zhang Weiwei (张维维), director of the China Institute at Fudan University, has noted that “the global energy market is a buyer’s market” (全球能源市场属于买方市场), a fact recognized across the world, including by President Trump (Fudan University, July 28, 2025). Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) echo this sentiment, recently writing that the size of the PRC market will translate to productive international relationships and maintained bargaining power (Song et al., 2026). [1]
In the long-term, the threat posed by blockades will further diminish as the PRC increasingly relies on renewable energy. Yuan Jingzhu (袁惊柱), vice dean of the Institute of Industrial Economics at CASS, wrote that between 2014–2024, the PRC’s increase in energy consumption was significantly slower than its increase in GDP. Consequently, disruptions to imports today cause less macroeconomic damage than they would have done a decade ago. During the same period, the share of total energy consumption accounted for by clean energy increased from less than 17 percent to more than 31 percent, reflecting a decreasing reliance on imported oil overall and making the PRC more resilient to energy shocks (CASS, January 30). Wang Haibin (王海滨), a senior economist at Sinochem Energy, has noted that new energy replaced 28 million tons of gasoline and diesel consumption in 2024, suggesting that domestic gasoline and diesel consumption may have already peaked. He believes that oil security pressure may decrease as well (China Petrochem, December 3, 2025).
Conclusion
The PRC’s energy security is far more robust than is often portrayed in Western policy discourse. While U.S. strategists and some analysts continue to emphasize chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca as potential levers of leverage over Beijing, Chinese experts reject the notion that these waterways constitute critical vulnerabilities. Despite continued reliance on foreign oil, Chinese scholars and policy analysts have argued that the PRC has diversified its import sources, expanded domestic production, and built strategic reserves to the extent that Beijing can absorb even a prolonged disruption. Additionally, the PRC’s investments in renewable energy, new energy vehicles, and overland pipelines further reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints. Its bargaining power with resource-producing nations also helps to effectively mitigate external threats. In short, the so-called “Malacca dilemma” and Strait of Hormuz anxieties are largely overstated, reflecting a Western perception gap rather than actual vulnerabilities.
This article originally appeared in China Brief. Check it out here!
Daniel Fu is a Research Associate at Harvard Business School where he studies Chinese businesses, US-China relations, and companies caught between the US-China geopolitical crossfire.
Notes
[1] Song Zhongwei [宋中炜], Zhao Yu [赵宇], Gao Xiang [高翔], and Pan Jiaofeng [潘教峰]. “Strategies for Enhancing China’s Energy Resilience: Trade-Offs between Diversification and Localization [中国能源韧性提升战略：多元化布局与本土化能力建设].” Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences [中国科学院院刊] 41, no. 1 (2026): 13–30.