Tbilisi’s Counterintelligence Drive Strains Western Ties
Nicholas Chkhaidze
Executive Summary:
Georgia’s State Security Service (SSSG) made four high-profile counterintelligence arrests between April and May. On June 3, the French outlet Intelligence Online reported that France’s Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) recalled two intelligence officers from Tbilisi after the SSSG claimed to have exposed a DGSE operation to recruit Giorgi Udzilauri.
Each arrest followed a particular sequence: an SSSG announcement that did not name the Georgian suspect or country in question, pro-government media outlets naming the suspects and publishing leaks, and public statements from the state minister and former chief of SSSG, Mamuka Mdinaradze, suggesting a coordinated information campaign and efforts to undermine Western intelligence operations.
Georgia’s pressure on Western intelligence services and its employees coincided with frustration in Washington over how Tbilisi handled sanctions evasion and Iranian financial networks, raising questions about the possibility of the ruling party, Georgian Dream, renewing its partnership with the West.
On June 3, French outlet Intelligence Online reported that France’s Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) recalled two intelligence officers from Tbilisi after the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) claimed to have exposed a DGSE operation to recruit Giorgi Udzilauri (Intelligence Online, June 3). Before his arrest on May 5 on espionage charges, Udzilauri was head of the Public Relations Department at the Georgian Ministry of Finance’s Investigative Service. Udzilauri formerly headed public relations for the Cartu Group, a financial conglomerate owned by Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili. Four days after Udzilauri’s arrest on May 9, the Georgian government issued a public ultimatum to Western countries to recall their intelligence officers from Georgia, threatening to expose their identities if they refused. According to Intelligence Online’s reporting, the DGSE withdrew its officers so that they would not be formally declared persona non grata, since such a designation would have caused an even bigger diplomatic rupture between Georgia and the West (Intelligence Online, June 3; DFWatch, June 5).
The reported DGSE recall is the most consequential result of the SSSG’s large-scale counterintelligence campaign in progress since late April. The SSSG has been arresting individuals spanning Georgia’s full ideological spectrum. Though these counterintelligence operations may have been successful, the pattern and timing of arrests suggest that Georgia’s security services are working as a political instrument to manage the relationships of Georgia’s authorities with its domestic critics and foreign partners.
The campaign began on April 22 with the arrest of Tamaz Goloev, a resident of Russian-occupied Akhalgori, Tskhinvali region (also known as South Ossetia). The pro-Georgian Dream Rustavi 2 channel identified Goloev as acting on behalf of Russia (Civil Georgia, April 25). Despite the leak, the SSSG did not name which country Goloev was accused of engaging in espionage for, a pattern of silence that also characterized subsequent arrests.
Udzilauri’s arrest is the most consequential espionage arrest in recent months. He was very close to Ivanishvili and held senior positions inside institutions closely connected to Ivanishvili’s inner circle. According to Intelligence Online, Udzilauri was recruited by the DGSE to provide classified material—details on political and economic events, law enforcement dynamics, and about ethnic and religious minorities—through encrypted communications methods or in-person meetings (Intelligence Online, June 3). Udzilauri’s lawyer has stated that his client denies the charges and sees his arrest as retaliation for his criticism of Georgian Dream’s current leadership, whom he described as opportunists, condemning their “isolationist” foreign policy and “cowardly attitude toward Russia” (OC-Media, June 4).
On May 30, the SSSG made two additional arrests. The SSSG charged the founder of the pro-Russian Eurasia Institute, Gulbaat Rtskhiladze, with espionage and accused him of cooperating with two countries. Georgian media previously reported that Rtskhiladze’s organization received funding from PravFond, a foundation linked with the Russian state. It is officially named the Fund for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, and is designed to promote Russian narratives about history and cultural affairs (iFact, November 20, 2025). His lawyer stated that Rtskhiladze denies the charges and linked the arrest to his recent development of a council aimed at preventing “Russophobia” in Georgia. Irakli Chikhladze, founder of the Caucasian Center for Civil Hearings, an organization that focused on regional conflict resolution, was also accused in May of supervising an intelligence network on behalf of an unnamed nation (Civil Georgia, May 30). Chikhladze says the charges are absurd and that he has no connection to espionage.
These four cases span the breadth of Georgia’s civil and political spectrum. The arrested include a resident of the Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region, a founding-era Georgian Dream insider, a pro-Russian campaigner, and a civil society figure focused on regional issues. Focusing fully on ideology cannot, therefore, explain the counterintelligence campaign. Proximity to sensitive information, and in some exceptional cases, political alignment, determined SSSG’s targets.
Each of those arrests followed a specific sequence of events and operational progression. The SSSG organized media briefings where they did not name either the suspect or the foreign country allegedly involved. Pro-government media outlets then published details identifying the suspect and foreign nation, often within hours, with information they most likely received from the SSSG. Mamuka Mdinaradze, a former SSSG chief who now serves as State Minister for Coordination of Law Enforcement Bodies, also made public statements where he hinted at the foreign countries involved. This sequencing allows Tbilisi to publicly demonstrate its dissatisfaction toward specific foreign nations while avoiding a costly diplomatic scandal. It also allows Georgian Dream to target foreign nations and domestic critics with the same instrument.
On May 9, Mdinaradze addressed the intelligence services of European partners. He said, “What our country does not do in their countries, they should not do in our country” (DFWatch, May 9). He also stated that the counterintelligence efforts of SSSG are working at tenfold intensity, and warned that there would be consequences if these foreign security services did not withdraw their personnel. On June 1, after several arrests were made, Georgia’s most prominent pro-government television channel, Imedi, asked Mdinaradze if Russia, Iran, Poland, or France were the foreign countries that recent detainees acted on behalf of. Mdinaradze then replied, “Poland has nothing to do with this,” which narrowed speculation to the countries that remain (OC-Media, June 4).
SSSG’s current leadership reflects the personal loyalty network established by Ivanishvili. Tbilisi appointed Mdinaradze, a former influential member of parliament for Georgian Dream who had zero experience in issues of intelligence, as the chief of SSSG in September 2025. Mdinaradze replaced a predecessor who was also appointed on the grounds of loyalty and held the position for only five months before being dismissed (Intelligence Online, September 22, 2025). The government created a new post for Mdinaradze, state minister for Coordination of Law Enforcement Bodies, in late April after he resigned as the SSSG chief a few days prior. His successor at the agency, Gela Geladze, previously served as Georgia’s minister of Internal Affairs, keeping the security apparatus under the oversight of an individual who has an institutional tie to Ivanishvili’s government (Interpressnews, April 21; Intelligence Online, June 3).
France has historically viewed Tbilisi as an important post for monitoring developments in the region. Paris is specifically interested in Russian activity in the region—Georgian Dream has been deepening ties with Moscow for the last couple of years. The DGSE station in Tbilisi, which closed in the late 1990s and reopened in 2003, became more important after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Intelligence Online, June 3). One of the officers that was recalled by DGSE had served as the deputy head of the Russian mission center at the agency, which is considered one of its most prominent departments, and France’s ambassador to Georgia as of 2025, Olivier Courteaud, was previously the chief of counterterrorism at the DGSE (Intelligence Online, June 3).
This episode solidified the trend of strained French–Georgian relations. In April, France’s minister for European Affairs, Benjamin Haddad, canceled a visit to Tbilisi because of “organizational issues” (Intelligence Online, June 3). Even though the relations were not at their peak, France has still been engaging with Georgia over the past year. In November 2025, the French Ministry of Defense sent a military-industrial delegation to discuss potential arms sales to Georgia, a step not typical of other European partners. Tbilisi’s decision not to officially name the foreign nation involved in the alleged intelligence operation is likely aimed at preserving its working relationship with Paris while also signaling its dissatisfaction. DGSE Director Nicolas Lerner requested more clarity about this issue, so that bilateral discussions and cooperation formats would continue (Intelligence Online, June 3).
This pressure campaign on foreign nations’ intelligence presence in Georgia followed months of documented frustration between Washington and Tbilisi. In February, according to Intelligence Online, when Mdinaradze visited Washington for the first time in his capacity as the chief of SSSG, officials from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told him that their patience with Georgia was running out for reasons including the trafficking of sanctioned Russian oil and the expansion of Iranian financial networks in the country (Intelligence Online, March 31). The number of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence staff in Georgia has also reportedly declined dramatically (Intelligence Online, March 31).
The withdrawal of DGSE officers following months of documented frustration from U.S. officials regarding Georgia’s role in Russian sanctions evasion and Iranian financial networks demonstrates a pattern that goes well beyond a single dispute. Georgia’s pressure on its traditional Western partners and their intelligence services unfolded alongside Tbilisi’s stated ambition to renew relations and restore partnership with Washington. The actions of the Georgian authorities raise questions about whether the measures taken by the SSSG and its leadership are compatible with Tbilisi’s stated foreign policy objective of repairing relations with those same partners who were targeted.