Russian Position Weakening in Central Asia
Kassie Corelli
Executive Summary:
Amid the ongoing conflict in Iran, Russian analysts are concerned with the loss of Moscow’s influence in Central Asia, which is steadily weakening as Russia fails to meet regional investment, infrastructure, and security needs.
Economic strain from Russia’s war spending and sanctions limits its ability to fund projects in the post-Soviet space, making it a less viable partner for Central Asian governments seeking stability and development.
Regional states are diversifying through projects such as the Middle Corridor and new partnerships with the West, the People’s Republic of China, and Türkiye, especially as Russia-led organizations have proven ineffective.
At the end of March, Russian military analysts said that the United Kingdom is “taking advantage of fading Iranian influence in Central Asia” to expand its presence there. The analysts state the United States is “occupied with Iran,” but the authors note that the United Kingdom has been in talks with Central Asian countries for several years to promote its influence in the region, which is “quieter, but deeper,” than Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the European Union, or the United States. They say that London wants to take control of trans-Eurasian logistics routes and the upper end of the energy production chain (Topwar.ru, March 20).
Experts from the Valdai Discussion Club—a think tank close to Russian President Vladimir Putin—accused the West, especially the United States, of trying to strengthen its influence in the former Soviet space at the beginning of February. In the words of Valdai Club Program Director Timofey Bordachev, the primary objective of U.S. policy toward Europe is the establishment of a “territorial base for the deployment of its forces in Eurasia” (Valdai Club, February 3).
At the beginning of 2025, the Financial Times reported that the Kremlin was concerned with the West’s increasing influence in Central Asia (Financial Times, February 10, 2025). Independent commentators have noted that these concerns are not without foundation. In November 2025, Ukrainian observer Roman Pryadun asserted that, since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the countries of the region began distancing themselves from Moscow. Pryadun said:
Kazakhstan demonstratively refused to recognize the occupied territories of Ukraine, while its President [Kassym-Jomart] Tokayev, at the St. Petersburg Forum in the presence of Putin, spoke of respect for territorial integrity. Kyrgyzstan canceled joint military exercises with Russia, and Uzbekistan refused to participate in Moscow’s integration projects. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are seeking new security partners (Oboz.ua, November 10, 2025).
Pryadun also notes the growing presence of the PRC and Türkiye in Central Asia, as well as the U.S. “return to the region” (Oboz.ua, November 10, 2025).
At the beginning of the Iran conflict, Valdai experts noted new risks in Russian relations with Central Asian countries, though they did not consider them fundamental. They pointed out the danger of Iran slipping “into political chaos, which would spread … to Central Asia,” but they said that this is ultimately unlikely. The Valdai Club is most concerned that the Iran conflict demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Russia-led international organizations—including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS— because Tehran has received no support from its partners (Valdai Club, March 30). [1]
The Kremlin’s inability to meet Central Asian demands is a more fundamental issue. Valdai Club analysts from Kyrgyzstan, Alibek Dzhekshenkuov and Kubatbek Rakhimov, enumerated these demands for assistance regarding water shortages, electricity issues, and the degradation of Soviet infrastructure. Accordingly, some experts want Russia to assist Central Asia in constructing nuclear power plants, boosting industry, and improving food security (Valdai Club, March 27).
Russia has not indicated an intention to reinvest in Central Asian projects. Some independent analysts say that the Iran conflict, triggering a sharp surge in oil prices and consuming much of U.S. foreign policy attention, has emboldened Putin to press ahead with his war against Ukraine. The Kremlin has consequently abandoned its plans to cut expenditures. Moscow did not lower the projected oil “cut-off” price in next year’s budget and therefore did not reduce spending plans. During a closed-door meeting with Russia’s oligarchic elite, Putin announced his determination to seize Northern Donbas at any cost and called upon them to “chip in” additional funds for military needs (Re: Russia, March 27). Russia’s military spending is punishing its economy. In some regions, delays in the payment of salaries and pensions are already emerging (see EDM, March 16; BBC-Russian Service, March 26). Investment in neighboring states is simply not a priority.
The governments of Central Asian countries sense this as well. Even authors writing for media outlets loyal to the Kremlin—when describing, for instance, Uzbekistan’s policy—acknowledge that “relying entirely on Russia is risky due to sanctions … consequently, attention is focused on the Trans-Caspian [International Trade] Route,” also known as the Middle Corridor (Vedomosti, March 29). Uzbekistan is entering into agreements with its neighbors to “development of cargo transportation, digitalization, and infrastructure diagnostics for the Middle Corridor.” In January, Tashkent signed an agreement with Türkiye to streamline transportation along this route. Uzbekistan is also investing $84 million in a joint Uzbek–Kazakh–PRC logistics center in the Tashkent region (Vedomosti, March 29). Regardless of Western involvement in the region, Central Asian countries are seeking partners beyond Russia. In recent years, this trend has become so persistent that Moscow has virtually no chance of reversing it.
Note:
[1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa, but now comprising 11 member states (BRICS Info, accessed April 13).
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.