Putin’s Moves Against Internet Alienate Russians
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s moves against Telegram channels and the Internet more generally have alienated many Russians, angered regime allies in business and government who depend on the web, and undercut the Kremlin leader’s own goals.
This alienation and anger have not led to massive protests because the regime has shown it is ready to repress anyone who takes part and because of the widespread sense among Russians that nothing they do will change Kremlin policies.
This trend leaves Putin with a shallower and softer reserve of support. In the event of some future shock, he might have to rely on repression alone—a conclusion some in the Kremlin already share—thus limiting Putin’s options in the future.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been making moves against Telegram channels and restricting the Internet in recent months, especially in the last few weeks (see EDM, March 19; Important Stories, March 30). These moves have alienated many Russians and angered regime allies in business and government who depend on the web and who—in a sign of opposition—have not come to the defense of these Kremlin policies (Kommersant, March 11; Telegram/@agentstvonews, March 23; Verstka, March 27; Russian Field, accessed April 2). A new poll confirms that Russians are overwhelmingly opposed to many of the steps Putin has already taken (Novaya Gazeta, April 1 [1], [2]). In addition and likely even more important, many in the Kremlin appear to recognize that moves against the Internet are increasingly undercutting the Kremlin leader’s own goals both in the short term regarding prosecuting the war against Ukraine and in longer term regarding ensuring that his regime can continue to reach the population via the media and boosting the birthrate (Novaya Gazeta, March 20; Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, March 19; Noviye Izvestiya, March 30, 2026). So far, this alienation and anger have not led to massive protests. When these have been attempted, the regime has responded harshly (7x7 Gorizontal’naya Rossiya; Agenstvo; Radio Svoboda, March 30). There is also a still-widespread sense among Russians that nothing they do will change the Kremlin’s direction (Novaya Gazeta, March 17). Because this trend leaves Putin with a shallower and softer reserve of support, he might have to rely solely on repression in the event of a future shock. This situation could limit his freedom of action in Russia by increasing pressure on him from within the elite to change policy (Meduza, March 26, 30).
Putin’s attack against internet access now involves far more targets than just Telegram channels. He fears that the Internet could be used to mobilize opposition to him, as opposition groups in other countries with authoritarian rulers have done. Close observers of the Russian scene suggest that the Kremlin leader has good reason for such fears. Putin’s war against Ukraine has dragged on and increasingly come home via caskets and drone attacks. Because of this, ever more Russians who had been prepared to give lip service to the Kremlin are now reexamining their positions and beginning to actively listen to opposition groups (Vot Tak, March 13). As a result, the Kremlin began moving against the Internet in its typical step-by-step way, hoping that each restriction or ban would make additional ones more acceptable to the Russian population and Russian elites and draw less criticism.
To date, Putin and the Russian security services’ plans have not worked as they had hoped. Polling data, almost certainly limited because of what initial polls found, has shown that Putin’s attacks on the Internet are widely unpopular among the population, especially among the politically sensitive urban youth (Meduza, March 26; Russian Field, accessed April 2 [1], [2]). Putin and his regime may not care all that much about this still inchoate movement, but the Kremlin has launched a media campaign to justify these actions in terms of national security and even mental health (RG.RU, November 17, 2025; Vedomosti, March 24). Opposition from other elite groups and concerns about how internet restrictions are affecting the Kremlin’s own goals, however, are another matter altogether.
Business, political, and military leaders are also opposed. Business leaders oppose internet shutdowns because they are costing them money; political leaders have grown accustomed to using the Internet as a tool in their daily work; and military leaders have been using Telegram channels during Putin’s war against Ukraine. Business outlets have been explicit about just how much money internet restrictions are costing them (Kommersant, March 11). Political elites have acknowledged how much they rely on the Internet to do their jobs and have not spoken out in any numbers in favor of restrictions, as one would have expected (Meduza, March 26). Finally, military commanders in Ukraine have also complained, albeit via backchannels rather than public declarations, because they have been using the Internet in their work as well (Carnegie Politika, February 23; Novaya Gazeta, March 16; The Kyiv Independent, March 24).
Putin—with his security officer origins—and others with similar backgrounds and responsibilities may be willing to ignore such opposition. When they cannot, they may take measures to suppress it. Thus far, they demonstrated this with their crushing of a protest against internet restrictions on March 29 in several Russian cities (7x7 Gorizontal’naya Rossiya; Agenstvo; Radio Svoboda, March 30). They also appear willing to ignore business and military complaints about what such restrictions or shutdowns mean for those groups, at least for the time being (Meduza, March 26). The Kremlin leader and his team, however, cannot easily ignore how restricting or blocking internet channels is negatively affecting their own goals. Three cases have already emerged. First, preliminary figures show that Moscow’s decision to block Telegram channels is costing pro-Kremlin media outlets more viewers than it is taking away from opposition ones. This is exactly the opposite of what Putin obviously wants and is making it more difficult to deliver signals to Russian television outlets far from Moscow (Novaya Gazeta, March 21; Kommersant, March 30).
Second, senior officials in the Putin regime, especially in federal subjects far from Moscow, are now so dependent on the Internet that restricting it or blocking it entirely will keep them from implementing the will of the center. Some of these officials are already ignoring Kremlin injunctions against using the Internet because of these needs, and it is highly unlikely that everyone in the Kremlin will want to fragment the power vertical, even in the name of saving it (Meduza, March 26). Third—which could be the straw that broke the camel’s back—there is mounting evidence that restricting the Internet is likely to send Russian birth rates plummeting further. This would kill off any chance that Putin could slow, let alone reverse, their current decline. Where high-speed Internet is available in homes, researchers say, birth rates are higher than where it is not because such connections allow people to work at home and supervise children. If Moscow does seriously restrict the Internet, fewer people will be able to work from home, and the number willing to have children will drop (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, March 19). There are, of course, workarounds, such as providing more preschool facilities, but these are expensive and unlikely to be considered by the cash-strapped Russian government.
The Meduza news agency reports that these considerations, along with polls showing the low popularity of internet restrictions among regular Russians and business elites, may be driving down support for the regime. They are already prompting a portion of the Presidential Administration to resist security service demands to shut down the Internet (Meduza, March 26). This resistance so far slowed moves against the Internet and could kill it altogether if polls continue to show declining support for Putin and his war. That could happen even more quickly if Putin concludes that anger about what he is doing to the Internet may cost his United Russia Party support in the upcoming Duma elections (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 31). All this could generate more real resistance to Putin and restrict his options—exactly the opposite outcomes that led him to start this process in the first place.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.