Péter Magyar’s Historic Victory Holds Implications for Russia and Ukraine
Péter Fazekas
Executive Summary:
Péter Magyar’s Tisza party has won a landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, ending Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule and ousting Russia’s top EU ally.
Russia’s political influence is poised to decrease as Magyar looks to investigate the previous government’s links to Moscow. The Kremlin’s economic influence, however, is unlikely to fade away anytime soon.
Hungary’s long-term relations with Ukraine remain complex as Magyar opposes fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU accession due to economic concerns and domestic skepticism fueled by years of pro-Kremlin disinformation. There is openness to dialogue, however, which will improve bilateral relations.
Péter Magyar’s pro-European Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) scored a landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, ending Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule. Tisza not only won the popular vote but is on course to secure a constitutional majority in Hungary’s National Assembly, thanks to the same electoral system that has kept Orbán’s Fidesz-KDNP alliance in power for 16 years (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, accessed April 15).
The result could mean a significant shift for Hungary’s relations with Russia and Ukraine. Orbán was notably the Kremlin’s top ally in the European Union and has frequently represented Russian interests, including through vetoing EU measures critical toward Russia and lobbying on Moscow’s behalf (see EDM, December 11, 2023, June 20, 2024, May 14, June 25, 2025). Hungary has also remained deeply dependent on Russia for energy, maintaining a 15-year gas contract with Gazprom while leveraging EU exemptions to import crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline. In parallel, Hungary–Ukraine relations reached a historic low under Orbán due to his decision to demonize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukraine as a whole for electoral gain, while pushing for a Russian–Ukrainian ceasefire or peace deal unfavorable to Ukraine, again benefiting the Kremlin (see EDM, March 25).
For Russia, the election result is an obvious blow, even as the Kremlin rushed to downplay Orbán’s loss as an ally after his electoral defeat (Népszava, April 14). Magyar, whose Tisza party was targeted with Russian-style dismantling tactics by Hungarian secret services before the election, has vowed to investigate Russian influence in Hungary (Direkt 36, March 25). Specifically, it has committed to investigating outgoing Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, who has become one of the Kremlin’s top EU advocates in recent years. Recent Hungarian investigative reporting and leaked conversations between Szijjártó and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirm that he discussed confidential materials with his Russian counterpart before and after critical EU meetings; lobbied on behalf of the Kremlin for delisting Russians from EU sanctions lists; and even passed on confidential EU materials to the Kremlin through the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow (Washington Post, March 21; Telex, March 31; VSquare, April 8).
Consequently, the incoming Tisza government is widely expected to purge the Hungarian state apparatus of Fidesz-linked figures. These purges will particularly include officials in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and a restructuring of Hungary’s secret services, some of which have become tools for electoral interference. This push is also signaled by incoming Hungarian Foreign Minister Anita Orbán, who joined Tisza’s ranks in early 2026 from Fidesz’s once prominent Euro-Atlantic wing.
Not all is lost for the Kremlin. During his first international press conference as the incoming prime minister, Magyar underlined Hungary’s “geographical realities.” While he aims to fully diversify Hungary’s energy imports, his government will seek to secure “the cheapest and most secure oil” (444.hu, April 13). His incoming economy and energy minister, former global Shell executive István Kapitány, calculates that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end by the end of 2027, so they would not abandon Russian fossil fuels completely (24.hu, February 18). This could easily contradict Tisza’s earlier election promise to end Hungary’s dependence on Russian oil by 2035, which, by any measure, would take years and face some level of opposition from the Kremlin. It is also yet to be seen what Tisza will do with Hungary’s unfinished nuclear power plant expansion at Paks, which Rosatom is building (see EDM, December 18, 2025). Furthermore, Magyar also wants to see EU sanctions against Russia abolished once the war against Ukraine is over.
For Ukraine, the result offers cautious optimism, at least in the short term. Magyar said he is aiming for “allied relations” with all of Hungary’s neighbors, with Ukraine policy to be driven by the protection of the local Hungarian minority (Telex, April 13). While Magyar expressed his desire to quickly end the war, he underlined Ukraine’s right to defend its sovereignty and its territory. He also signaled that he would end Hungary’s veto on the EU’s 90 billion euro ($106 billion) Ukraine aid package, which Orbán has blocked over the disruption of oil shipments via the Druzhba pipeline, as long as Hungary is not part of the loan package that EU leaders had originally agreed on. In turn, Zelenskyy also reaffirmed that Kyiv aims to restart oil shipments via the pipeline by the end of April.
The long-term outlook remains uncertain. Even though he is not necessarily opposed to full membership in the long run, Magyar is notably opposed to fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU accession. In 2025, he promised to put the question to a referendum (Népszava, May 2, 2025). It is yet to be seen, however, whether this would happen at all. While Magyar may be less obstructionist in Brussels on Ukraine-related issues, his Ukraine policy could also be driven by electoral considerations, particularly if Fidesz regains strength and becomes an electoral challenge. While recent surveys show a slim majority of Hungarians could support Ukraine’s EU membership, a considerable part of the politically active population has become skeptical of strengthening ties with Ukraine due to years of pro-Russian disinformation narratives spread by the Orbán government (see EDM, May 14, 2025; Telex, January 30).
Budapest’s being open to dialogue with Kyiv to reset bilateral ties offers Ukraine a chance to secure a partnership with a country that has been politically hostile for years, even if Ukraine may not be among Magyar’s immediate policy priorities. Under any scenario, resetting relations with Budapest will require Kyiv to provide meaningful guarantees for the protection of the language and educational rights of Hungarians in Ukraine’s Zakarpattya oblast, which are politically acceptable to Magyar domestically.
Securing Budapest’s support for Ukraine’s EU membership remains a distant possibility as Magyar does not expect Ukraine to be ready to join the European bloc in the next 10 years (444.hu, April 13). Even if the minority issue is settled, Hungary under Magyar will continue to have several economic concerns over Ukraine’s prospective EU membership. These include fears driven by Ukraine’s potential to flood the EU market with low-cost agricultural products, less support for Hungarian farmers through EU agricultural funds, less development funding for Hungarian regions, and a negative effect on Hungary’s logistics and transport sectors, over fears that Ukrainian competitors would undercut Hungarian businesses, among other concerns.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.