Persistent Threat of Drone-Enabled Lone Actor Terrorism
Rueben Dass
Executive Summary:
Lone-actor terrorists and small cells—including Islamic State (IS) affiliates and right-wing extremists—are increasingly attempting to use commercial drones for remote surveillance, weapons transport, and attacks.
The threat is worsened by the easy procurement of drones, commercial 3D printers, and detailed online instructional manuals distributed by terrorist groups that lower the technical barriers to weaponization.
Although commercial drones have limited payload capacities, their use can generate substantial psychological panic, necessitating comprehensive countermeasures such as tighter legislation, user tracing mechanisms, and intelligence-led operations.
Drones are increasingly being used in terrorist plots around the world. Several recent plots in Europe, North America, and Asia, for example, have involved the attempted use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) drones by lone actors and small cells primarily linked to the Islamic State (IS). This is a concerning trend due to the relative ease with which drones can be procured. Additionally, the barriers to accessing the technical know-how to weaponize drones are being rapidly lowered, given the amount of information that is being disseminated by terrorist groups online.
Lone Actor Drone Use: Increasing Intent
Although most drone-linked lone actor terrorist plots have failed to materialize, recent trends point to an increasing intent to use these systems. In October 2025, Belgian authorities discovered a terror plot targeting Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever and other politicians (BBC, October 10, 2025). A drone was intended to deliver a “load,” and a 3D printer was used to manufacture “parts for the attack” (DW, October 9, 2025). Among the arrested suspects were Abdulla B., 23, a cybersecurity student, and Abdelmajid E.J., 18, a student in defense and security studies (HLN, October 11, 2025).
The Belgian plot mimicked an earlier plot in the United Kingdom involving a 27-year-old engineering PHD student named Mohamed Al Bared (BBC, September 28, 2023). Al Bared had built a drone prototype using 3D-printing and had intended to send it to IS militants in conflict zones (The Guardian, September 28, 2023). Both plots featured individuals proficient in technology.
In Türkiye, a 14-year-old was arrested after investigators found training manuals on bomb-making and drones on him not long after Al Bared’s plot was disrupted (The Times of Central Asia, October 8, 2025). In addition, in 2024, a small drone that purportedly resembled a DJI Mini and other weapons were found in a pro-IS plot in Indonesia to attack the Pope during his visit to the country (The Straits Times, September 6, 2024). The exact role of the drone was unclear, but it was likely intended for pre-attack surveillance. More recently, in March, Kuwaiti intelligence arrested an alleged Hezbollah cell that was plotting attacks against vital infrastructure in the country (Arab News, March 18). The cell had at least half a dozen small COTS drones in its possession.
The use of drones is not limited to Islamists, as right-wing extremists have also attempted to make use of them. In September 2025, 25-year-old Skylar Philippi pleaded guilty to planning an attack on a power station in Tennessee (Department of Justice [DOJ], September 9, 2025). He was preparing to fly a drone fitted with explosives into the power station when he was arrested (NBC, November 5, 2024). Phillipi himself was influenced by accelerationist ideology (GNET, January 27, 2025).
Why Drones are Attractive to Lone Actors
Drones offer several advantages to lone-actor terrorists. They allow an individual or a cell to conduct remote surveillance of a target before or during a ground attack. COTS drones are often small and have a low noise signature. This allows them to hover over target locations relatively unnoticed and discounts the need for an individual to infiltrate a particular location, especially restricted ones.
For example, in May 2025, Ammar Abdulmajid-Mohamed Said, a member of the Michigan National Guard, had planned a mass shooting on a U.S. military base in Michigan on behalf of IS (DOJ, May 14, 2025). Court documents suggested he had used a DJI COTS drone to conduct remote surveillance of entry and exit points and of vehicles accessing the facility (CNN, May 14, 2025). This exemplified how small COTS drones can be a useful tool for remotely gathering intelligence on target locations.
Drones also enable lone actors to carry out remote attacks without jeopardizing their own safety. The Philippi case is an example of how drones can be used to attack critical infrastructure and gain remote access to a secure location. Drones are also often used to remotely transport weapons across borders or into hostile areas. This was evident in a November 2025 terror plot in Gujarat, India, where an IS terror cell had received a weapons consignment from across the border that was dropped in Hanumangarh, Rajasthan, using COTS drones (Times of India, November 10, 2025).
Simple but Effective Improvisation Methods
Several improvisations can be applied to drones using relatively simple, commercial methods. COTS drones have been modified to carry and drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since the early 2010s by several terrorist groups. While manufacturing IEDs might require some skill and experimentation, attaching them to drones can be done relatively simply with basic hardware skills using commercially available reinforcements.
Payload drop mechanisms are sold on e-commerce sites and can be easily modified to carry IEDs. Drop mechanisms can also be 3D-printed alongside casings and tail fins for IEDs, highlighting the diffusion of both technologies as seen in the cases in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Like drones, 3D printers are commercially available and provide an alternative source of improvisation for weapons components.
Apart from IEDs, drones can be used to mount firearms. As early as 2008, a hobbyist in the US had mounted a .45 caliber Springfield handgun to a remote-controlled helicopter. He then successfully fired it (Gizmodo, December 10, 2008).
High Psychological Impact Despite Limited Lethality
One drawback of using COTS drones is their limited payload capacity. Most of these systems are small and can carry only 2 to 5 kilograms (about 4.4 to 11 pounds). The psychological impact of a drone attack, however, may far outweigh its physical impact. Due to the heavy media attention given to drones, their use in an ideologically motivated attack could cause a substantial amount of panic and terror, even though the physical impact may be small. For example, using a drone to spray an inert liquid or commercially available chemicals over a mass gathering could potentially create a major security situation despite limited physical impact.
IS’s Propaganda Push
Since April 2024, pro-IS encrypted messaging platforms have been releasing a series of drone manuals titled “Modern Warfare” (GNET, January 9). The manuals describe the entire process of weaponizing drones from the basics—including the different types of models and characteristics—through to their operation and weaponization. Methods for manufacturing improvised drop mechanisms for IEDs, camera systems, and building first-person-view (FPV) drones were provided with detailed, step-by-step instructions and photographs, making it easier for individuals to attempt to manufacture them. The release of these manuals highlights the group’s continued interest in motivating lone actors to adopt drones. IS had also released graphic posters encouraging the use of drones to attack the Paris Olympics in 2024 (The National, June 5, 2024).
Conclusion
The drone threat from lone actors is exacerbated by the commercial availability of these systems and the proliferation of information online. While these systems may be small and have a limited lethal capacity, they could potentially have far larger psychological impacts and may be used in an assistive capacity in attack planning and execution. A comprehensive approach that encompasses tighter legislation on the purchase and use of drones, tracing and record-keeping mechanisms to identify users, intelligence-led operations, and target hardening that incorporates counter-drone measures, particularly in high-risk areas, is needed to mitigate drone threats.
This article was originally published in Terrorism Monitor.
Rueben Dass is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a specialist unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and Fellow at the Conventional Arms and Ammunition Program at UNIDIR. He specializes in terrorist use of new technologies such as drones, 3D printing, and WMD.