Moscow Seeks to Retain Influence Over Moldova
Ksenia Kirillova
Executive Summary:
Russia appears to be intensifying hybrid operations against Moldova, leveraging disinformation and false narratives to portray Western alliances as instigators of conflict while planning destabilization tactics.
Moscow has repeatedly tried to destabilize Moldova to allow for pro-Russian regime change. The threat of Russian hybrid attacks is growing as Russian military analysts speculate that Russian military warehouses in Transnistria could fall into the hands of Ukraine.
Experts on Moldova expect Russian hybrid warfare in the run-up to their September parliamentary elections, but agree that the Kremlin will not be able to transfer enough troops to the area for military intervention.
Moscow appears to be conducting more direct hybrid attacks on Moldova. In early June, pro-Russian Moldovan political analyst Yuri Vasilevich gave an interview in which he repeated a familiar Kremlin narrative—that Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are attempting to drag Moldova into war (Novosti.rs, June 1). Russia has often accused the West of the kinds of influence operations actions it appears to be planning itself. As early as February 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West views Moldova as the “next Ukraine” (TASS; Meduza, February 2, 2023). Shortly thereafter, the Moldovan government announced it obtained evidence of Moscow’s plans to destabilize the country, confirming intelligence previously shared by Ukraine (President of Ukraine, February 9, 2023). According to Moldovan President Maia Sandu, at this time, Russia was preparing provocations meant to orchestrate a coup d’état that would overthrow the pro-EU government and install pro-Russian puppets in its place (Euractiv, February 13, 2023). This assessment was echoed by experts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), who believed the Kremlin was planning a “false flag operation” in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria (ISW, February 23, 2023).
Following these statements, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean’s address to parliament outlining Chișinău’s objectives and priorities concerning Transnistria may have provoked the escalation of threats from Moscow. Recean stated the intention to demilitarize Transnistria, demanding the complete withdrawal of illegally stationed Russian troops, weapons, and ammunition from Moldovan territory. Recean stressed that his country would take a diplomatic path “leading to the recovery of Moldova’s full sovereignty” (Ziarul National, February 16, 2023; see EDM, February 24, 2023). Despite Recean’s emphasis on a diplomatic solution, it is plausible that Russian President Vladimir Putin and his inner circle interpreted Chișinău’s position as an intention to resolve the frozen conflict through military force.
The Kremlin may fear Moldova seeking Ukrainian military assistance to demilitarize Transnistria (Izvestiya, March 2, 2023). Russian military analysts have been open about what troubles them most. Experts from “Military Review,” a website affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense, assert that Kyiv’s chief interest lies in “the vast stockpile of ammunition that has been stored for decades at the Kolbasna arsenal” in Transnistria (Military Review, March 1, 2023). The Kremlin appears seriously concerned that this arsenal could fall into the hands of the Ukrainian military. As early as 2015, Moldovan experts noted that the ammunition depot, located within the territory of the unrecognized republic of Transnistria, is considered one of the largest in Eastern Europe. The arsenal is estimated to hold around 20,000 tons of artillery and infantry ammunition, including shells, grenades, bullets, and aerial bombs (Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, December 3, 2015).
According to an investigation by the U.K.-based Dossier Center, in collaboration with RISE Moldova, published in 2022, Transnistria serves as a key operational hub for Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) (Dossier Center; RISE Moldova, October 31, 2022). The region hosts an FSB headquarters responsible for training and coordinating personnel involved in clandestine activities in southern Ukraine, including the preparation of sabotage units. Transnistria is also seen as a potential mobilization reserve should Russian forces achieve significant advances in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv and Odesa regions. The investigation reports that General Dmitry Milyutin, who oversees FSB operations in the “near abroad,” including Moldova, is a committed advocate for restoring the Soviet Union and does not envision post-Soviet states existing outside the sphere of Russian influence (Dossier Center; RISE Moldova, October 2022).
Russian military officials have conceded that the so-called “Russian peacekeeping contingent” in Transnistria is incapable of defending the unrecognized republic. Russian sources admitted in 2023 that “three years ago, the number of peacekeepers was estimated at around 2,500 to 3,000 personnel. Structurally, this equates to five battalions … These units do not constitute a significant military force” (Military Review, March 1, 2023). They voiced a low opinion of Transnistria’s own armed forces and noted that the region’s youth have “adapted to new conditions,” showing little interest in military service (Military Review, March 1, 2023).
Recognizing this vulnerability, the Russian Foreign Ministry sought to intimidate Ukraine and Moldova by declaring that any threat to Russian peacekeepers, citizens, or military depots in Transnistria would be treated as “an attack on the Russian Federation” (Russian Foreign Ministry, February 24, 2023). Moscow continues to simultaneously explore avenues for replacing Moldova’s pro-Western government with one more aligned with its interests. In the spring of 2024, analysts from ISW warned that the Kremlin aimed to use Transnistria and Gagauzia for hybrid operations intended to destabilize Moldova (NewsMaker.md, March 9, 2024; see EDM, March 20, 21, 2024). In response to the mounting Russian threat, Moldovan authorities began restoring bomb shelters across the country (The Moscow Times, March 18, 2024). Tensions flared again in autumn 2024 ahead of the Moldovan presidential election, which pro-Western incumbent Maia Sandu ultimately won (The Moscow Times, October 25, 2024; see EDM, November 6, 2024).
Some experts warn that Russia may now be preparing to undermine Moldova once more in the run-up to the country’s parliamentary elections this September in hopes of pulling it back into Moscow’s sphere of influence. According to Justyna Prus, head of the international department at the Polish Press Agency, Putin aims to implement a “Georgian scenario” in Moldova, establishing a Kremlin-controlled parliament while creating a new military threat to Ukraine from Moldovan territory (Portal Polskiego Radia SA, May 1). This assessment is shared by Ion Manole, director of the Moldovan human rights organization Promo-LEX. Manole warns that if a pro-Russian government comes to power in Chișinău, Moldova could become a second Belarus—a venue for hybrid attacks or false-flag operations against Ukraine (Polska Agencja Prasowa, April 4). Both experts note that Russia currently relies on hybrid, non-military warfare tactics, including disinformation, propaganda, and bribery. Still, they do not rule out the possibility that the Kremlin could orchestrate an armed Donbas-style uprising within Moldovan territory if pro-Russian forces there suffer a political defeat.
In early June, Recean cited intelligence reports claiming that Russia plans to deploy 10,000 troops in the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR), which borders Ukraine’s Odesa region. “One can only imagine the pressure and influence that 10,000 soldiers would exert on southwestern Ukraine, as well as on Romania, a NATO member,” the prime minister added (The Moscow Times, June 4).
British analyst Edward Lucas cautions that even if such a plan exists, it would not be easy for Moscow to carry out. Lucas points out that Moldova is virtually landlocked, and its only port—Giurgiulești, located on a narrow 400-meter stretch of riverbank—operates in close coordination with Ukraine. Lucas asserts, “Even if the Kremlin succeeds in overthrowing Moldova’s pro-Western government in the parliamentary elections this September, it is hard to imagine that Kyiv would tolerate Russian military reinforcements entering the neighboring country by sea or air” (Center for European Policy Analysis, June 9).
Ukrainian expert on Moldova, Sergey Ilchenko, speaking with this author, confirmed that the transfer of such a large number of troops to Transnistria is unlikely (Author’s Interview, June 16). He added, however, that there are enough people within Transnistria and Gagauzia who could be mobilized to destabilize the entire country, especially if Moscow attempts to annul unfavorable elections. In any case, preparing to repel potential attacks under such circumstances is prudent. If these assessments of the Kremlin’s plans are accurate, preemptive security measures may be the only effective way to prevent destabilization.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Ksenia Kirillova is an investigative journalist and analyst focused on analyzing Russian society and mechanisms of action of Russian propaganda (including in the US) along with Russian “soft power,” “active measures,” and foreign policy.