Moscow Losing Out to Criminals in Russian Regions Along Ukrainian Border
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Violent attacks on people and property in the Russian regions bordering Ukraine are threatening Moscow’s control there. The attackers, many of whom are Russian veterans with criminal pasts, are better armed and sometimes outnumber the local police.
These veterans are often joined by others who have obtained weapons meant for the war against Ukraine. Some Russians who live near Ukraine have lost confidence in the willingness and ability of the police to protect them and are increasingly taking matters into their own hands.
The violence in Russian regions bordering Ukraine is likely a bellwether of what will occur across Russia when the rest of those fighting against Ukraine return home.
Russian authorities are losing control to armed criminals in regions of Russia bordering Ukraine. Veterans of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, many of whom have criminal pasts or engaged in looting during their time in Ukraine, are returning home with their weapons and posing a threat to local authorities (Telegram/kurpepel, August 8, 2024; Mediazona, November 14, 15, 2024). Some locals have also been arming themselves with weapons that bled into the Russian Federation from the Russian army in Ukraine (see EDM, November 29, 2022, February 25). In places where the financial and personnel demands of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine have decimated the local police force, armed veterans and locals have new opportunities to act outside of the law with decreased fear of retribution.
Moscow is concerned about this situation worsening as more veterans of its war against Ukraine return home. Only 140,000 of the estimated 700,000 Russian soldiers who have fought against Ukraine have returned so far, and more weapons will find their way from the battlefield into Russia as the war continues (Chernovik, December 10, 2024; TASS, June 26). The Kremlin may be especially concerned about this trend in regions that will have more soldiers return. The poorer Russian regions and non-Russian republics from which Moscow has recruited its army most heavily may be particularly dissatisfied with Moscow’s rule (Argumenti i fakti Stavropol; Chernovik, December 10, 2024).
Neither the veterans nor the Russians who have armed themselves are an organized force, and they are not aligned with the Ukrainian cause. As a result, they are typically dismissed as “marauders” or worse even by those who are sympathetic to Ukraine (Veter; Novaya Gazeta, July 5). Still, the crime wave sweeping Kursk oblast and other parts of Russia adjoining Ukraine unintentionally benefits Kyiv. Increased armed crime in these areas makes it harder for Moscow to supply its troops in Ukraine and to rely on these regions for support. Instead of dismissing these groups, it is important to consider the political impact of these armed Russians, however supportive of Putin’s policies both these criminals and their victims may be.
The crime increase is most dramatic in Kursk oblast because many police officers fled during the Ukrainian occupation, leaving more room for criminals to operate even now that the area is again under Russian control (Veter; Novaya Gazeta, July 5). Pavel Kuznetsov, a Russian journalist based in Germany, documented the many ways armed returning veterans and local Russians engage in criminal activity. Kaznetsov establishes how these criminals threaten Moscow’s order by limiting the Kremlin’s ability to establish safety and security (Veter; Novaya Gazeta, July 5). However angry Kursk residents are about the actions of the “marauders,” they view their lack of safety as a failure of Russian government agencies.
Kuznetsov’s analysis is applicable across other parts of Russia because the three sources of increased criminal activity in Kursk are also found elsewhere in the country. The first source of increased criminal activity, the shortage of Russian policemen, has become critical in the last three years as many militiamen gave up their positions in the police force to take higher-paying ones in the military. There simply are no longer enough officers to enforce the law in many places, and the criminals know that. Moscow has now decided to reduce the qualifications required for those who want to join the police, something that may fill the ranks at the cost of having an even less qualified police force (see EDM, March 11; Govorit Nemoskva, June 19).
The second source of growing criminal activity is veterans returning from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many will be able to reintegrate, but even a small percentage of veterans using their weapons to maintain the income they had while in the service would be a huge problem for law enforcement. Just 20 percent of the total number of soldiers who have fought in Ukraine have returned so far, and the crime rates across the Russian Federation are already soaring. The number of crimes, particularly violent ones, will likely rise further as another half million soldiers come back, and the Putin regime lacks the law enforcement needed to respond effectively. The Kremlin may utilize the military and the Federal Security Service (FSB) to maintain order, but lacks a sustainable long-term law enforcement strategy (Window on Eurasia, July 18, 2024; see EDM, February 25, May 29).
The image of Russia as a disarmed population was never accurate, and the increased flow of arms into Russia is the factor contributing most to violent crime. Before the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there were as many as 20 million guns in private hands, a majority of them not registered as required by law (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, April 2, 2024). Since the full-scale invasion, the number of guns Russians possess without registration has gone up dramatically, possibly approaching twice that number (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, April 2, 2024). Most of these newly acquired weapons are not registered with the authorities but were acquired directly or indirectly from veterans of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, November 29, 2022; Window on Eurasia, April 7, 2024).
Russians who feel the need to defend themselves at a time of rising crime and declining police presence may possess most of these weapons. Even if this is true, the sheer number of weapons held by Russians has the potential to change, if not transform, the balance of power between the regime and its citizens. The Kremlin unquestionably views these trends as worrisome for foreign and domestic policy reasons. The Kremlin’s concern has far wider implications than “fighting crime.”
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. He regularly writes about Russia and Central Asia for the Eurasia Daily Monitor.