Moscow Finds No Escape From Predicament in Partnership With PRC
Pavel K. Baev
Executive Summary:
Russia’s usually close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appears to be experiencing a distinct lull. Russia’s continued dependence on the PRC implies a reconfiguration of their partnership.
The conflict in the Persian Gulf has highlighted this development, as Russia’s attempts to be involved in the mediation process have been futile, while the PRC’s position appears to have been seriously considered by all parties.
The value of Russia’s partnership for the PRC is diminishing, while one of the few possibilities for Russia to regain strategic initiative in its war against Ukraine lies in expanding its reliance on drone components and communication technologies from the PRC.
The intensity of various communications between major world powers in the past few weeks has been so high that it was easy to miss a distinct lull in Russia’s usually close relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Russian President Vladimir Putin made many phone calls to Middle Eastern leaders, but his last conversation with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping was in early February, during the Lunar New Year (Vedomosti, February 4). The last meeting was in early September 2025, when Putin was one of many guests at the military parade in Beijing marking the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II (President of Russia, September 2, 2025). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Beijing in April was meant to signal the stability of bilateral ties, but the date of Putin’s visit, scheduled for the first half of this year, has not been confirmed (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Izvestiya; RIA Novosti, April 15).
The content of Lavrov’s talks with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Xi was conveyed in a traditionally elliptical manner. One point on which the Chinese side was insistent, however, was the proposal to raise Russia and the PRC’s partnership to a new level (RBC, April 15). Lavrov, describing the results of his visit, opted not to elaborate on this. It is rather clear that the new quality of Russia’s dependence on the PRC implies a reconfiguration of the partnership, which could only be pro forma formatted as one between equals (Vedomosti, April 15). The depth of the economic crisis in Russia cannot be a secret to PRC leadership, even if Putin tries to downplay its scope and berate his ministers for failures in implementing their plans to stimulate economic growth (Kommersant, April 15). After the 2025 slump in bilateral trade, PRC exports to Russia increased by nearly 20 percent in the first two months of this year, but investment activity remains insignificant, leaving the root causes of Russia’s recession unaddressed (Rossiiskaya gazeta, April 17).
Experts in Moscow suggest, without any disagreeable conclusions, that the Chinese vision of its leadership in global affairs is rather different from Russia’s claims of great-power status, and that the gap is widening (RIAC, April 3). This difference is particularly apparent in engagements with the conflict in the Persian Gulf, where Russia’s attempts to make a difference have been futile, while the PRC’s position appears to have been seriously considered by all parties (see EDM, April 6; The Insider, April 16). Russian observers presume that the PRC is using its ties with Pakistan to monitor and even influence mediation between Iran and the United States, while refraining from any assertive moves (Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 9; Kommersant, April 15). The blockade of the PRC’s oil imports from the Gulf could have benefited Russia, but recent Ukrainian strikes on oil terminals in the Baltic and Black seas—which caused a significant drop in export volumes—have damaged its reliability as a major supplier (Kommersant, April 16). The extension of the relaxation of U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, reportedly negotiated by Putin’s special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, who traveled to the United States last week, is a bit of good news for Moscow. The opening of the Strait of Hormuz, however, is set to drive oil prices down, curtailing the hopes for a prolonged windfall of revenues (Forbes.ru, April 17; Kommersant, April 18).
One case where Russia, the PRC, and the United States appeared to be on the same page was the elections in Hungary. Beijing appeared to be careful not to interfere in them, but Wang’s visit last February left little doubt about its preferences (Novaya gazeta Europe, April 13). Russian commentators try to be philosophical about the crushing defeat of Putin’s loyal partner, outgoing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, but the resonance of this loss is certain to be profound (Rossiiskaya gazeta, April 13; Re: Russia, April 14). Beijing, by contrast, appears to have good reason to expect that its strategic partnership with Hungary—established during Xi’s visit to Budapest in May 2024—will be sustained by the new government, which emphasizes its seemingly pragmatic approach (Meduza, April 14). The expected improvement in Hungary’s relations with the European Union, however, will be detrimental for Russia’s positions in the escalating confrontation with the West (TopWar.ru, April 13; Radio Svoboda, April 15).
One step in this escalation was the Russian Defense Ministry’s publication of a list of European companies and enterprises involved in joint drone production projects with Ukraine, intended as a warning against such cooperation (RBC, April 15; TopWar.ru, April 16). The new quality of military-industrial integration that Kyiv has achieved by sharing its technology and experience with states such as Germany, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom—who are no longer just sponsors of Ukraine’s air defense system but also partners in building collective capabilities—likely prompted such an extraordinary attempt at scaring presumably risk-averse Europeans (Vzglyad, April 17). This upgraded cooperation has helped Ukraine in gaining a new edge in drone warfare, so that tactical dominance over the battlefields in Donbas is reinforced by mid-strikes on Russian reserves and logistics (The Insider, April 14). The Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems, created by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outside the traditional command structure, cannot match these Ukrainian capabilities, while releasing a stream of reports on its victories (MK.ru, April 1; Lenta.ru, April 17).
Russia’s only hope of regaining the strategic initiative lies in expanding supplies of drone components and communication technologies from the PRC. The necessary high-level consent for such support, however, is by no means certain. Beijing has made it appear that it does not want to see Russia’s defeat, but an escalation of its confrontation with Europe also serves the PRC’s interests. The value of Russia’s partnership in this geoeconomic maneuvering is diminishing, and Putin can hardly expect that his forthcoming visit will yield much tangible fruit in the form of the PRC’s help in overcoming economic recession and strategic deadlock. The Kremlin may instead get a message on the PRC’s attitude about ending the war against Ukraine, and not necessarily through making a peace deal, but rather through reconciling with the reality of self-defeating attrition.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).