Moscow Church’s Loss in Lithuania Threatens Its Survival in Belarus
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
The Orthodox Church has two competing power centers: the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Constantinople church just achieved a small victory by enthroning a bishop as the resident head of an exarchate in Lithuania [1].
The Orthodox Church in Lithuania is small, but these moves are another step in the demise of the Moscow Patriarchate’s influence over Orthodoxy in the former Soviet space and in its reduction to the status of a national church. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople also granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019, giving it legitimacy independent from Moscow.
These developments set the stage for a new challenge to Moscow’s dominance of Orthodoxy in Belarus, a much larger church, as many of the Orthodox in Lithuania are Belarusian emigres and the Belarusian opposition backs precisely such a move.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has completed the process of restoring the Orthodox Church in Lithuania to Constantinople’s jurisdiction. It has welcomed dissident Orthodox priests from there, establishing an exarchate in that Baltic country and now enthroning a resident bishop (Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 13). Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has challenged the position of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) elsewhere most prominently by extending autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (see EDM, February 13, 2024). The Orthodox Church in Lithuania is small—it has fewer than 70 parishes in what is an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country—but these moves represent yet another step in the demise of the influence of the ROC MP over Orthodoxy in the former Soviet space and its reduction to the status of a national church of the Russian Federation alone (see EDM, April 13, 2023; Window on Eurasia, July 27, 2025). More importantly, however, they set the stage for a new challenge to Moscow’s dominance of Orthodoxy in Belarus, a far larger and more influential church. Many of the Orthodox in Lithuania are Belarusian emigres and members of the Belarusian opposition, inspired by what has happened in Lithuania, are increasingly promoting such a move. Such a development would seriously reduce the influence not only of the Russian church but of the Kremlin itself and transform the geopolitics of the region as a whole (Window on Eurasia, April 9, 2023; Telegram/@christianvision, July 25, 2025; Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 13).
During a trip to Lithuania on June 6 and 7, Patriarch Bartholomew of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople completed the process of restoring the Orthodox Church of Lithuania to his patriarchate’s jurisdiction. This effectively ended the dominance of the ROC MP and its claims there, which Bartholomew’s church never recognized. On May 31, Bartholomew named Archimandite Panaretos, who had been in charge of the Slavic-Turkish Orthodox congregation in Istanbul, as bishop of Tamassos and the non-resident exarch of Lithuania—which Bartholomew set up in Türkiye in 2023. On June 7, the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate presided over the bishop’s formal installation in Lithuania at the Church of the Holy Trinity in Vilnius. These moves, according to Lera Furman, a Russian-Ukrainian religious affairs specialist who left Russia in 2022 after Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine, have effectively ended Moscow’s role in the religious life of that Baltic country, thereby reducing its political influence as well (Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 13).
Bartholomew’s moves in Lithuania are important as a sign of the country’s own distancing of itself from Moscow and as an indication that Vilnius and the churches within its jurisdiction are now far more prepared than earlier to pursue policies regarding the ROC MP like those of its two Baltic neighbors (see EDM, February 13, 2024). Most, if not all, of the 65 Orthodox parishes in Lithuania are now likely to declare allegiance to the exarch bishop and Constantinople, especially because such a large share of their congregations consists of Belarusians and Ukrainians (Window on Eurasia, June 16). As important as that development is in its own right, it is even more significant as a harbinger of further developments in Belarus, where Moscow still dominates the large Orthodox church. Denis Kuchinsky, an advisor to Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tiskhanouskaya, attended the enthronement of Constantinople’s bishop in Vilnius and took advantage of the opportunity to release a statement declaring that what has happened in the Lithuanian capital “highlights the historical closeness of Belarus to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.” He said that Belarusian Orthodox should follow the course of the Orthodox in Lithuania and suggested that they could even seek autocephaly for the Orthodox Church of Belarus (Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 13).
The developments in Lithuania are having an immediate effect on Belarus, its church, and its relations with Moscow, shaping how people think about religious life in that country. According to Natallya Vasilevich, head of the Belarusian Christian Vision organization, it is widely believed that the ROC MP in Belarus consists of clergy and laity who support Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, while the Roman Catholic Church in that country is full of opponents of the dictator, but that is simply not the case. In fact, she says, in the two churches today “are an approximately equal number of those who are trying to find a middle path and not attract attention because they understand that for the time being there is no window of opportunity and that the task is to preserve oneself and one’s community.” She says that there are radicals in both groups, whose activities her organization does not always report lest it get those involved into greater difficulty. Along with other experts, she suggests that in a freer Belarus in the future, an Orthodox church could emerge and seek autocephaly and pursue a very different line than Moscow wants (Dekoder, January 7). This misconception about Orthodox Belarusians became prominent in 2020 when the Roman Catholic hierarchy backed the Belarusian opposition, something the Orthodox did not, and when some Belarusians changed denominations as a result (Current Time, September 4, 2020; see EDM, January 23, 2025).
Lukashenka’s authoritarianism has, in most cases, concealed the tensions between the Belarusian Orthodox Church and Moscow. These tensions have only grown over the last few years. They will certainly increase still further after what has happened in Lithuania and what appears to be happening in relations between Moscow and Minsk as Putin’s war against Ukraine grinds on (see The Growing Importance of Belarus on NATO’s Eastern Flank, December 22, 2020; see EDM, August 21, 2021; Window on Eurasia, March 1, 2022, April 9, 2023, July 27, 2025). All this may change and quickly if Lukashenka weakens or departs the scene or if the Belarusian dictator himself decides that seeking autocephaly for his church might help him keep power, a decision he is ever more likely to take if Russians criticize his country’s church and his position on issues such as the war against Ukraine (see EDM, August 21, 2021; Window on Eurasia, April 9, 2023).
The restoration of the Orthodox Church of Lithuania makes such a shift in Belarus all the more likely. Ever more Belarusian Orthodox will be in a church not under Moscow’s control and even more will be ready to support their national government. Additionally, the Belarusian opposition, as Kuchinsky’s words suggest, is now prepared to view Belarusian Orthodox as its allies. These shifts, in turn, will echo elsewhere in the former Soviet space, including, in the first instance, Moldova (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 19, 2024). They represent a new challenge to the Kremlin, one that, as developments in Lithuania show, it is already on the defensive and less capable of blocking.
Notes:
[1] An ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Eastern Orthodox Church that is directly administered directly by an appointed bishop (exarch), rather than operating as a fully self-governing (autocephalous) church.