Moscow-Centric Russian Future Risks Perpetuating Putin’s Power Vertical
Vadim Shtepa
Executive Summary:
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s highly centralized vertical of power reflects a long-standing imperial tradition rooted in Moscow’s self-appointed mission to unite and control surrounding lands.
Some Russian opposition figures’ ideas for a post-Putin Russia envision Moscow-centric governance, advocating a strong central authority that risks reproducing imperial structures rather than enabling genuine federalism and regional self-determination.
Other Russian opposition figures argue that a durable post-Putin Russia would require subsidiarity, freely elected regional governments, and voluntary federal arrangements, potentially including the option for independence, rather than preserving Moscow’s political and economic dominance over Russia’s regions.
During his 26 years in power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has built a rather rigid imperial vertical of power regime in Russia. The Kremlin appoints all governors, and regional political parties that could challenge this hyper-centralism by expressing the views of local civil societies are banned (see EDM, April 9, 2014, November 20, 2017, September 19, 2018, May 9, 2022, April 28, May 22, June 5, 2025). [1] This policy can hardly be called a purely Soviet legacy. It follows the much older doctrine of “Moscow is the Third Rome,” which dates back to the 16th century. This doctrine ascribed to Moscow the “holy” right to unite and control the Slavic lands (see Bugajski, Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture, 2022; see EDM, October 14, 2025). This ideology explains the centuries-old rivalry between Moscow and Kyiv, whose first architectural monuments emerged when Moscow’s lands were dense forests. The recent Russian drone strike on the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, seems highly significant and symbolic (Radio Svoboda, June 15). Nevertheless, Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, actively supports the war against Ukraine, calling it “sacred,” feeding into the narrative of Russia’s holy right to invade Ukraine (see EDM, January 30, 2023, February 13, April 10, 18, 2024; DW, March 28, 2024).
This state of affairs has prompted criticism of aggressive Moscow imperialism among some Russian opponents of this war, who now mostly live in political exile. This has not been the case with all, however. Many of these oppositionists are Muscovites themselves and envision a metropolitan, centralist vision for a post-Putin Russia. One aspect of this is that a post-Putin transition requires a “strong center.” This center would not be strong in the Putin sense, but rather would ensure democracy, “maintain a common legal space, and guarantee uniformity of rules” (The Moscow Times, May 25)
This idea is somewhat reminiscent of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1991 project of a New Union Treaty. That project was fully democratic, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and envisioned maximum self-government for the republics (see EDM, September 19, 2022, June 5, 2025). It cemented Moscow’s previous role as capital.. Most of the republics, however, no longer wanted to see a common capital in this city, as in the historical symbol of imperial “unification of lands.”
Today, many opposition politicians and researchers in exile emphasize “all-Russian” themes, even though the structural composition of post-Putin Russia remains entirely unclear. In considering what a post-Putin Russia may look like, encouraging the regions to participate could facilitate a smoother transition. One aspect of this would be to ensure that regions gain political sovereignty through the free election of their own parliaments. Then, social and economic interconnectedness would inevitably raise the question of a new federative treaty. In most other global federations—including Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Switzerland—the capital is not the largest city. If Moscow-centrism remains the fundamental principle in a post-Putin Russia, it could amount to the deliberate political and economic dominance of one metropolis over other entities, which has been the case in Russia, not equal federalism. Some regions may seek to remain independent and not join the new federation in part due to unique ethnocultural characteristics or other factors (see Promethean Liberation, May 30, 2025). Without this option, a post-Putin Russia could be considered by those seeking independence as a return to the imperial track of Russian history. A self-sufficient, strong center, implicitly assumed in Moscow, could suppress the treaty space.
The idea of Moscow-centrism being self-evident while seeking a true federative system may hold contradictions. Some in the Russian opposition working abroad discuss the future need for a “budget agreement with the regions,” but warn against “full federalization with a weak center” (The Moscow Times, April 16). Under true federal principles, having a strong center could be counterproductive. In a post-Putin Russia operating as a true federation, some argue that Moscow, although the largest in population, would ideally have the power of one of many equal regions.
If independent researchers and opposition politicians in exile were truly proposing post-imperial projects, their Moscow-centrism would not be at all unconditional. During the founding of the European Union, its members agreed that the political center would not be a former imperial capital like Berlin or Paris, but rather the relatively small city of Brussels. If Russia truly de-imperializes, something similar should be expected. In principle, Moscow-centrism symbolizes the preservation of the imperial paradigm.
Subsidiarity is a term rarely used in Russian political discourse. It is a fundamental principle, however, in European law (European Parliament, accessed June 24). This principle entails building policy from the bottom up, with most issues resolved at the level closest to citizens, and only those that local administrations cannot handle being escalated to higher levels. Municipal governments would address basic social issues for their residents, but delegate inter-municipal communication issues to the regional level. Accordingly, regional parliaments pass numerous local laws but leave matters of interregional cooperation to the federal authorities—provided, of course, that they are freely elected and accountable to citizens. This is not the case under Putin’s vertical of power, in which all power stems from Moscow and his mandates. The vision of a Moscow-centric post-Putin Russia risks perpetuating a power vertical from Russia over the regions.
Note:
[1] Putin’s vertical of power is system of centralized control through his appointment of regional governors and other leaders who are not elected by the people (see Monitor, May 11, 2000; see EDM, February 25, 2009).