Kremlin Uses Corruption Charges to Militarize Frontline Regions
Alex Horobets
Executive Summary:
Criminal cases related to embezzlement in defensive fortification construction in Russia’s Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts are systematically targeting contractors, officials, and governors, who are then replaced by military officers, figures from federal structures, or individuals connected to the state security services.
These anti-corruption prosecutions serve a political function, effectively wiping out independent regional actors and tightening centralized control over major financial flows.
The trend appears confined to border regions for now. The Kremlin’s internal logic suggests it could expand to other territories, especially if the war drags on, potentially resulting in a more rigid system with less effective governance.
Since 2025, Russian prosecutors have systematically brought criminal charges against governors and senior officials in Russia’s frontline regions: Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk. These charges have been for embezzlement and kickbacks in fortification projects. The process follows a consistent pattern in which authorities first arrest contractors and deputy governors and then implicate the governor, who either becomes a defendant in a criminal case or is forced to resign under circumstances that leave them facing a credible threat of prosecution.
This model was first tested in Kursk. In April 2025, authorities detained Governor Alexey Smirnov, who had been in office for roughly 200 days (Kommersant, April 16, 2025; see EDM, July 23, 2025). Months earlier, in August 2024, Ukrainian forces crossed into the region (see EDM, August 14, 2024). The heavily funded border defenses failed to stop the advance, and Smirnov failed to establish effective communication with residents in the border districts. His predecessor, Roman Starovoit, who had already become the Russian Minister of Transport, was also implicated through Smirnov’s testimony. Starovoit did not live to stand trial. According to official reports, he committed suicide in July 2025 shortly after his resignation (see EDM, July 23, 2025).
The process culminated on April 6, when a court sentenced the former governor to 14 years in prison for accepting a large bribe tied to these projects. He pleaded guilty, citing “emergency conditions” (BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, April 6). Russian observers have interpreted Smirnov’s situation not as an isolated corruption case, but as a successfully tested mechanism that security services can deploy against any border-region governor at a politically convenient moment (Chetyre Pera, April 17, 2025).
Smirnov was soon replaced by Alexander Khinshtein, a politician and former journalist closely aligned with the security services, particularly the National Guard and the Interior Ministry. Khinshtein has actively promoted their interests in parliament and the media. His role as governor has focused less on economic management and more on enforcing discipline, tightening information control, and suppressing criticism (1TV, December 9, 2024).
The Kremlin is now replicating the Kursk model in the Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts. Incoming replacements for the leadership of these regions share a common profile. They are military officers, veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine, or individuals closely tied to the state security apparatus. This wave looks less like a series of isolated anti-corruption campaigns and more like a deliberate strategy to purge civilian technocrats and replace them with figures from military or security backgrounds.
Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov’s case closely mirrors the Kursk pattern. The Prosecutor General’s Office has demanded compensation of nearly 1 billion rubles ($13 million) in damages allegedly caused during the construction of fortifications that, according to investigators, failed to meet defense security standards. Investigators detained his close associate and deputy, Rustem Zainullin, in June 2025 and charged him with large-scale fraud (RBC, April 2). Business figures close to Zainullin, as well as officials from the regional capital construction department, were also detained (Kommersant, July 20, 2025).
Approximately 20 billion rubles ($267 million) in federal funds have been allocated to these projects in the Belgorod oblast since 2022, meaning the case may expand further. Gladkov’s response echoed Starovoit’s defensive strategy. He gave a high-profile interview with Kremlin-aligned propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, in which the governor argued that civilian administrators perform a “more complex and more important task” than the military. He followed this by publicizing photographs from a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (Telegram/@neoreshkins, July 18, 2025). Whether such a strategy can provide long-term protection remains unclear.
In April, discussions intensified around the possibility of Gladkov’s resignation and a subsequent appointment as deputy minister of economic development. This move would formally constitute a promotion (Meduza, April 10). His likely successor is Alexander Shuvaev, a major general associated with presidential aide Alexey Dyumin. Shuvaev transitioned into civilian administration through the presidential “Time of Heroes” initiative—a fast-track program for participants in Russia’s war against Ukraine—and currently serves as deputy governor of Irkutsk oblast (Meduza, April 8).
Over the course of the war, Gladkov has emerged as a relatively independent political figure with strong regional approval ratings and potential federal ambitions (see EDM, May 3, 31, 2023; Meduza, June 8, 2023). His association with ongoing criminal investigations now constrains these ambitions. Even if he is appointed to a deputy ministerial post, the risk of prosecution is likely to remain.
In Bryansk oblast, the process is at an earlier stage but follows the same pattern. In July 2025, Deputy Governor Nikolai Simonenko was detained on charges of embezzlement related to fortification projects, with damages exceeding 1 billion rubles ($13 million) (TASS, July 22, 2025; Kommersant, February 10). Governor Alexander Bogomaz’s case appears to be following a similar trajectory, in which contractors are arrested first, then deputies, and eventually the governor himself.
The recent appointment of Russian Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) Colonel Andrei Frolenkov—reportedly linked to operations in Bucha and the seizure of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant—as deputy governor for sports appears to be an initial step toward the militarization of Bryansk’s regional administration (Verstka, April 9). Bogomaz may soon be replaced by either Alexander Sidyakin, head of the central executive committee of United Russia, or Mikhail Kuznetsov, head of the executive committee of the All-Russia People’s Front—figures drawn from federal structures rather than local elites (Novosti Bryanska, April 11).
The logic driving these processes goes beyond anti-corruption. The Kremlin continues to govern frontline regions according to peacetime administrative models under conditions resembling a prolonged low-intensity conflict (see EDM, April 28, 2025). The civilian bureaucratic apparatus has proven ill-suited to wartime demands. According to sociological data, residents of these regions have been dissatisfied with local administrators, despite relatively high approval ratings for certain governors, such as Gladkov (Bel.ru, March 5, 2025).
Replacing governors in frontline regions with military officers and war veterans serves several purposes. It reasserts centralized control over financial flows in regions receiving disproportionately large federal funding, provides political cover through military authority in areas where the costs of war are most acutely felt, and neutralizes figures who have developed independent political identities.
The militarization of regional governance is most likely a permanent reorientation and also a situational response to wartime pressures. The trend currently appears concentrated in border regions, where the effects of the war are most acute. The Kremlin’s internal logic, however, suggests the potential for broader expansion. If the war drags on and tensions between civilian elites and the military or security services intensify, a model of military-style administration could be extended to other politically sensitive regions, including those with high levels of protest activity.
Over the long term, the militarization of regional governance may weaken the effectiveness of civilian administration, making the system more rigid and less effective. This trend shows how the war is reshaping not only the battlefield but the internal architecture of power in Russia.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.