Kremlin Increases Cossack Forces in Ukraine
Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
The All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) continues to encourage both registered and non-registered Cossacks to participate in Russia’s war against Ukraine, pulling on Kremlin propaganda about the purpose of the war and the Cossack mythos of the tradition of ancient warriors.
The Russian government is working closely with VsKO, passing a law that gives registered Cossacks the ability to stay in the mobilization reserve of the Russian Armed Forces through “voluntary” contracts.
The VsKO and the Kremlin have emphasized that they “work for the unity of the Cossacks,” aiming to merge non-registered and registered Cossacks into one category and promote the revival of the traditionally militaristic Cossack culture in Russian society.
In response to the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk oblast, Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) Vitaly Kuznetsov ordered “the atamans of all 13 Cossack hosts in Russia” to provide “humanitarian aid for the civilian population of Kursk oblast and [to form] columns within the special Russian humanitarian convoy” (VsKO, August 13). Surprisingly, the Russian Cossacks have not played a larger role in defending against the Ukrainian offensive. Kursk is not a traditional Cossack region, so the extent to which the Cossacks have a stake is unclear. It may be that case that the Cossacks loyal to the Kremlin have become an increasingly significant component of Russian forces in Ukraine, and Moscow does not want to divert them from the front. As the “long war” continues, the VsKO has become increasingly involved in combat, pushing Kremlin propaganda and promoting Cossack history and mythos to encourage both registered and unregistered Cossacks to participate in the war.
At least 50,000 Cossack servicemen have now been rotated through the combat zone in Ukraine (VsKO, July 16). At the beginning of August, Kuznetsov wrote that “on the line of military contact are 16,000 of our brother Cossacks in 24 Cossack volunteer units. They are risking their lives daily, they are worthy of the memories of their ancestors” (VsKO, August 1). Just over two weeks later, the number had apparently increased to 18,000 (VsKO, August 20). The sharp increase in total fighters and those on the frontlines suggests an elevated role for these Cossack forces in the Russian war machine.
Earlier, in March, the law “On the State Service of Russian Cossacks” to create a Cossack reserve was passed. The text amends a previous law from December 2005 and gives registered Cossacks the ability to stay in the “mobilization human reserve of the Russian Armed Forces” by “voluntarily concluding a contract” to do so. Although the extent to which this will be truly voluntary and not a matter of undue social influence is up for debate, most registered Cossacks would likely enlist anyway. The latter clauses of the law’s first article represent an attempt by the government to force more Cossack societies into the register or be “liquidated” (Normativ.kontur.ru, March 23). Technically, those Cossack hosts (voiska) that do not wish to enter the state register can become “a union or autonomous non-commercial association” instead, though these are presumably less attractive options than remaining non-registered hosts.
Some developments reflect that Moscow may be pushing the narrative that the two sides of the movement are merging. The VsKO reported that “on the front lines, there is not and never will be any divisions between ethnic and ancestral, registered and unregistered, service Cossacks and social ones. Nothing divides us, we work for the unity of the Cossacks” (VsKO, July 10). Similarly, a meeting designed to promote the revival of the Central Cossack Host brought together “leaders of regional working groups for the development of Cossackdom, representatives of territorial organs of the [Internal Affairs Ministry, Emergency Situations Ministry], Rosgvardia, and unregistered social Cossack organizations” (VsKO, July 1). In demonstration of this narrative of unity, Kuznetsov used the commemorations for the victims of the Beslan siege of 2004 to urge that “in front of our elders and grandfathers, we need to forget the division into registered and non-registered. We need to let the feats of the fighters defending the interests of the Motherland in the zone of the [special military operation] unite us” (VsKO, April 20). Kuznetsov’s consistent promotion of Moscow’s war in Ukraine and encouragement for Cossacks to participate demonstrate that both he and the VsKO have become mouthpieces for the Kremlin.
This behavior helps explain why the Kremlin is investing so heavily in Cossack organizations in the occupied territories of Ukraine (see EDM, January 25, April 10). Beyond a new Cossack society in Kherson that will require all fighting-age males to register as Cossacks, but Moscow is also putting many resources into the construction of a Zaporozhian Cossack host (CEPA, August 14). Zaporizhzhia was the Cossack archerype’s ostensible birthplace and home of the Sich [Palisade] on the river island of Khortytsa, made famous by Gogol’s novel Taras Bul’ba. The debate over whether Gogol was a Ukrainian or Russian literary icon continues today, and the contest over the current status of Zaporizhzhia is not surprising.
The VsKO and Kremlin’s efforts to create Cossack hosts in Ukraine’s occupied territories are increasingly ceremonial and official, drawing attention to their establishment. At the service for the transfer of banners of the Zaporizhzhian Cossack detachment in August, Kuznetsov stated, “Before our eyes, we are witnessing history. A strong, loyal [i.e., pro-Russian] Zaporozhian Cossack army is reborn. The Cossacks of the new territories have played and will make a great contribution to the defense of the peaceful population of the Donetsk and Luhansk national republics [DNR/LNR], Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and the destruction of Ukrainian Nazism” (VsKO, August 19). This follows working groups “to establish structures of Cossack societies on the territories of the DNR, LNR, and Zaporozhian and Kherson oblasts” (VsKO, October 19, 2023) [and] the carrying of icons into the new Russian Orthodox Churches in the four territories (VsKO, April 9). Such rhetoric and the new BARS-32 battalion in Zaporizhzhia, named after the Cossack hero Pavel Sudoplatov, demonstrate how the Kremlin is increasingly relying on ancient historical legacies to legitimate its war and co-opt the Cossack movement for its own designs (VsKO, August 19).
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network. He is the author of Russian Nationalism and Ethnic Violence: Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre (Routledge, 2016) and the editor of Russia and the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Routledge, 2021).