‘Knowledge-Based’ Economy Facilitates Tech Transfers to Iran
Tuvia Gering
Executive Summary:
Iran’s network of state-run “innovation houses” and trade platforms is a main channel for acquiring sanctioned dual-use technology from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Like the oil trade, it is steered from the top on both sides and shielded by mutual deniability.
The Iranian Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST) and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked arm, embeds Iranian firms in the PRC’s military-civil fusion and united front systems, and steers them toward military-linked suppliers.
Throughput is still modest, but wartime devastation, a new U.S. oil-sanctions waiver, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s elevation as Iran’s special envoy for the PRC are hardening the network into a durable procurement pipeline, positioned to tap into the proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund.
At a press conference in April, Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang (张晓刚) denied allegations that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had sent air-defense systems and drones to Iran during its war with the United States and Israel (MND, April 30). The Foreign Ministry and Chinese ambassador to Israel were just as vehement when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Beijing of providing military support to Tehran’s missile program (Ynet, May 12). By the end of May, intelligence sources confirmed to U.S. media that the F-15 downed in early April was brought down by a Chinese-made Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), the first loss of an American fighter jet to enemy fire since the 2003 Iraq War (NBC, May 30).
The PRC’s clandestine defense and economic lifelines to Iran remain the Middle East’s worst-kept secret. On June 10, a week before the U.S.–Iran cease-fire was announced, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned nine Chinese and Hong Kong entities for exporting military technology to Iran (Department of the Treasury, June 10). Their names were added to the roster of more than 360 PRC- and Hong Kong-based entities that sit on the list of specially designated nationals (SDN) for Iran-related misconduct, from moving oil to supplying dual-use materials for weapons programs (USCC, November 14, 2025).
Investigations have detailed how PRC-Iranian cooperation relies on covert financial networks coordinated at the highest levels of both governments. These networks include the ghost armada of tankers, the de-dollarized barter system insured by the state, the movement of missile precursors through Chinese ports, and the loose ecosystem of nominally civilian Chinese firms running the supply chains behind Iran’s drone manufacturing (U.S. Department of State, April 10, 2025; Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2025; Jerusalem Post, March 9; China Brief, April 3).
One node in this tech-transfer ecosystem has gone largely understudied. In July 2025, after the 12-day war with Israel, Iran’s Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST-KBE) told state media that its newly-established Iran House of Innovation and Technology (iHiT) in Beijing stood ready to mobilize resources and secure industrial goods and technologies. The report described the iHiTs as “some of the most important executive arms of the VPST” for facilitating technology transfers between Iranian and foreign entities, with its PRC branches among “the most active of these centers” (Mehr News Agency, July 13, 2025).
Following the most recent round of the war, with much of Iran’s military-industrial base destroyed, the PRC-based fronts are set to play a central role in the regime’s reconstruction.
‘Knowledge-Based’ Connections Divert Sanctions Pressure
The institutional roots of the Beijing iHiT trace back to the early 2010s, when crippling sanctions drove Tehran toward new revenue sources. The VPST, a cabinet-level body under the Supreme Leader, was chosen to lead the charge on two fronts.
First, it was tasked with weaning the economy off its reliance on fossil-fuel exports, though results were mixed. By Tehran’s own count, knowledge-based firms jumped from 55 in 2013 to more than 10,000 by 2024, with revenue reaching 1,833 trillion toman ($18.3 billion) by March 2025, a 60 percent rise (VPST, September 5, 2025). Yet hydrocarbons still made up roughly 57 percent of exports in 2024, and knowledge-based goods just 5 percent (CITNA, December 15, 2024; GIS Reports, September 1, 2025).
The second goal was to maintain access to international markets, suppliers, and financing while avoiding sanctions. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s 2014 directive proclaimed Iran the “economy of resistance,” with the knowledge-based sector specifically designated for this purpose (Khamenei.ir, February 18, 2014). The vice presidency expanded its international footprint in response. The first branch opened in the PRC in 2015, and it took six more years for Tehran to open new branches in other countries, as well as its headquarters in Tehran. By 2024, iHiT had 12 branches in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (CITNA, February 14, 2024).
The three-story Tehran headquarters acts as an expo for up to 2,000 products and hosts delegations arranged by the Foreign Ministry and the Trade Promotion Organization under the Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade. A nominally private fund finances foreign-market entry and runs an online iHiT “market” whose catalogues list dual-use items, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and remotely operated underwater vehicles (Kharon, February 11, 2025). Abroad, the branches place Iranian firms in foreign markets, source components, vet suppliers, handle logistics and certification, and move money through channels sanctions would otherwise close.
Table 1: iHiT’s Global Reach
Both Nodes Linked to Sanctioned Entities
The first PRC-based branch opened in May 2015 at the Iran Nanotechnology China Center (INCC; 伊朗纳米技术中国中心), a government-to-government venture inside a state-owned park hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) called Nanopolis Suzhou (Suzhou Industrial Park, May 13, 2015). Under its long-serving director, nanoscientist Amir Ghorbanali, the office grew from a small shop into an export base for all Iranian knowledge-based products, with a second branch opening in Guangzhou in 2018 (Tehran Times, July 11, 2018). Over time, the VPST built six “brands” in the PRC: a biomedical engineering center; a permanent Iran High-Tech Pavilion at the China International Import Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai; a water-treatment center; the China–Iran Trade Promotion Center, which coordinates participation in Chinese trade fairs; and the China–Iran House of Innovation and Technology (CIHIT) in Suzhou (ODISTC, February 11, 2021). The new Beijing iHiT office is the sixth branch. It is physically located at CITIC Tower, and is fronted by the VPST’s Arvand Business Group, which also runs Iran’s CIIE pavilion.
The six branches report to the VPST’s international arm, the Organization for the Development of International Cooperation in Science and Technology (ODISTC). ODISTC follows the institutional lineage of the sanctioned Office of Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which is designated for supporting Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program and military procurement. Its leader, Hossein Roozbeh, teaches at Imam Hossein University, the main military academy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and is reportedly affiliated with the IRGC’s Quds Force (Langar Khabar, February 1, 2022; Global Fight Against Terrorism Funding, April 4, 2023). CIHIT’s own brochures describe activities that open clear evasion channels, such as exporting dual-use goods to the PRC and third countries, and “facilitating the supply of materials and components” for Iranian firms (ODISTC, February 11, 2021). A WHOIS registration lookup of its domain (ihit[.]cn) ties it to Beijing Shouneng Haoye Engineering (北京首能昊业工程), a front for Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, whose Shanghai expo hosts several Treasury-designated petrochemical firms. [1] 13 of the 16 Iranian companies on the Beijing iHiT’s site are sanctioned, and roughly a quarter of the 62 firms promoted by the Suzhou-based China–Iran Trade Promotion Center are on entity lists for their roles across Iran’s steel, mining, petrochemicals, power infrastructure, and maritime logistics industries.
The Chinese side is also at risk. Corporate records, procurement notices, and industry profiles show that Nanopolis hosts numerous national bodies responsible for standardizing technology for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Party-state’s space and talent programs (Suzhou Municipal Government, March 29, 2023; SIMIT, May 30). Representatives of iFLYTEK (科大讯飞) and CloudWalk Technology (云从科技), both on the U.S. Entity List over national security and human rights concerns, attended the 2016 CAS–VPST signing in Tehran, which established the Silk Road Science Fund to support joint PRC–Iran research and exchanges in fields including nanotechnology, cognitive science, medical equipment, IT, and artificial intelligence (AI) (Fars News Agency, October 15, 2021). CIHIT’s Iranian commercial manager holds degrees from Beihang University (北京航空航天大学), one of the entity-listed “seven sons of national defense” (国防七子). Another managerial figure in the Iranian hubs holds ownership in a Chinese government-designated “Little Giant” (小巨人), that is, a manufacturer of critical component technologies, and in this case, pogo-pin connectors used in radar and aerospace gear.
The clearest case of CIHIT’s role in sourcing dual-use technologies is its courtship of Nanjing Quankong Aviation Technology (AllController; 南京全控航空科技), a high‑tech manufacturer specializing in motion‑simulation systems and control technologies, especially multi‑axis (3/6‑degree‑of‑freedom, 6‑DoF) motion platforms. At a March 2023 seminar CIHIT hosted with AllController, director Ghorbanali offered the center as a “bridge for communication” for AI and IT, while the Chinese company demonstrated its motion platforms to its Iranian guests (AllController, March 15, 2023). While lower-payload motion platforms serve recreational purposes, such as race car simulators or theme park rides, these dual-use platforms are strictly regulated by global and U.S. export controls. In the aerospace and defense industries, they serve clear military functions by providing high-fidelity flight and combat vehicle simulation training, as well as allowing the testing and calibration of precision guidance systems and sensor payloads. In AllController’s case, the company openly boasts military-grade certifications and PLA science awards, and its founder, Xiang Tiewu (相铁武), once led the UAV division in a research institute under the Central Military Commission (China Daily, December 8, 2021).
Figure 1: Amir Ghorbanali seen at a seminar held by AllController
United Front and Convicted Criminals Facilitate Relationship
The relationships between the Iranian and PRC sides are managed in part by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system, which seeks to coopt those outside the Party or, failing that, neutralizing any risks they might cause it. As part of the united front’s remit of enhancing the Party’s power, it works to cultivate non-Party elites and run a hybrid tech-transfer apparatus that combines legal, illegal, and extralegal channels (Joske and Stoff, 2020). [2] The 2023 seminar was co-hosted by a body under the China Association for Science and Technology, a “people’s organization” (人民团体)—part of the united front system—that is heavily tied to military industries and answers to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a central united front body.
Since President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran in 2016, senior united front-linked officials have cultivated sanctions-circumventing ties with the VPST. Among them are former minister of science and technology and long-time chairman of the China Zhi Gong Party Wan Gang (万钢), former CCP International Liaison Department head Song Tao (宋涛), and former United Front Work Department head Liu Yandong (刘延东) (People’s Daily, January 23, 2016; Ministry of Science and Technology, October 2016; Xinhua, April 22, 2017; ILD, November 16, 2019).
The Iran–China High-Level Business Forum in November 2023 may demonstrate the united front’s explicit role in covering intelligence, covert tech-transfers, and the CCP’s approach to tactical alliances for these purposes. The event was co-hosted in Shanghai by CIHIT and Wujie SaaS (无界公司), whose founder, Tang Qingnan (唐庆南), is a convicted fraudster behind the PRC’s largest suspected pyramid scheme, worth renminbi (RMB) 3.8 billion ($618 million), according to Party-state media (NetEase, June 21; Baidu Baike/唐庆南, accessed June 24). Even though Tang was to finish his ten-year prison term only a few months before the event, his company Wujie was the only Chinese co-host, and the forum gave Tang direct access to then-first vice president Mohammad Mokhber, sanctioned as a former IRGC officer (Wujie SaaS, November 8, 2023)
Figure 2: Tang Qingnan and Iran’s VP Mohammad Mokhber at the 2023 Iran–China High-Level Business Forum in Shanghai
Conclusion
Iran’s tech-transfer system with the PRC is now coordinated at the top but structured to evade scrutiny in ways that serve the interests of both governments. The iHiT platforms are its open face, brokering introductions, financing, and certification, steering Iranian firms toward dual-use suppliers like AllController. The covert face is a scattered web of small Chinese firms with civilian-sounding scopes that ship drone engines and parts below the reach of export controls (China Brief, April 3). Neither could operate inside state-owned parks, CAS institutes, and PLA-linked firms without the Party-state’s direction and support.
On June 19, the first Chinese commercial ship since the blockade docked at Chabahar’s Shahid Kalantari Port with 409 containers of industrial cargo, from vehicle parts to drilling equipment and steel pipe (Mehr News Agency, June 20). The iHiT network is built to handle the high end of that traffic.
By volume, the pipeline still falls short of what Tehran wants and Beijing could deliver. In 2021, the iHiT in the PRC had concluded only $2.5 million across more than 15 export contracts over six years (FARS, October 15, 2021). Each new branch, joint lab, and cooperation agreement signed since, however, has lowered the cost of the next deal and tied Iranian procurement more tightly into Chinese military-industrial supply chains. With the memorandum with the United States proposing a $300 billion Reconstruction and Development Fund for Iran, the networks built in the PRC to evade sanctions are now positioned to spend the proceeds of lifting them.
This article originally appeared in China Brief. Check it out here!
Tuvia Gering is a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Diane and Guilford Glazer Israel-China Policy Center.
Notes
[1] WHOIS is an open-source domain name, website, and IP registry.
[2] Alex Joske and Jeffrey Stoff, “The United Front and Technology Transfer,” in China’s Quest for Foreign Technology, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2020), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003035084/china-quest-foreign-technology.