Kazakhstan Reinforces Multivector Foreign Policy
Alexander Kim
Executive Summary:
Kazakhstan has awarded Rosatom the contract to build its first nuclear power plant, signaling continued collaboration with Russia while simultaneously exploring future partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and France for additional plants.
Astana, under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, is shifting from broad multivector diplomacy to a more focused, strategic neutrality that prioritizes regional development and carefully calibrated relations with Russia, the PRC, and the West.
Initiatives such as intensified defense efforts, a refusal to back Russian territorial claims in Ukraine, and diplomatic engagements with Western leaders signal Astana’s evolving view of Moscow as less of an ally and more of a potential threat.
On June 14, Kazakhstan announced that Russia’s Rosatom had won the bid to lead the international consortium in building the country’s first nuclear power plant (Government of Kazakhstan, June 14). Kazakh officials promptly added to this announcement that the second power plant is likely to be built by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). Moreover, a few days later, following Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s remark that “Kazakhstan needs two or three nuclear power plants,” two top managers of the Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency met with their counterparts at Électricité de France (EDF) to discuss another potential partnership (The Astana Times, June 20).
For many observers, this decision is seen as fitting into Kazakhstan’s recalibrated multivector policy, where Astana carefully balances and navigates the interests of its partners and neighbors. This move was praised as “threading a diplomatic needle” and “a nuclear diplomacy” (Eurasianet; The Times of Central Asia, June 16). In reality, however, as Kazakhstan seeks greater sophistication in its relations with its powerful neighbors, it may risk losing this delicate balance. While President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping, who visited Kazakhstan shortly after the decision on the nuclear power plant was made public, appeared satisfied with the current “golden period of bilateral relationship,” Astana’s decision to assert equidistance from its largest partner, Russia, may lead to increased difficulties in relations with Moscow (President of Kazakhstan, June 16).
On the surface, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy may appear to have remained unchanged over the past 30 years. It has consisted of a peace-affirming and economically pragmatic multivectorism that carefully balances relations with Russia, the PRC, and the West. Since Tokayev took office in 2018, however, there have been significant shifts in how Kazakhstan navigates the geopolitical landscape.
Under Tokayev, the country’s diplomacy has been professionalized and transformed into a sharper strategic instrument. His vision of Kazakhstan as “a middle power” prioritizes a more targeted allocation of the country’s resources, moving away from the broad, globally focused initiatives of former leader Nursultan Nazarbayev to concentrate on tangible progress at home and within Kazakhstan’s immediate neighborhood (Euronews, May 28, 2024; see EDM, July 3).
This approach grants Kazakhstan a greater measure of strategic autonomy, as it draws a deliberate distance from the gravitational pull of larger powers. Some may call it a “newfound neutrality” or, as recently noted by Kazakh analysts Zhangeldi Agybay and Zhengisbek Tolen, “an evolution toward a pragmatic multilateralism rooted in neutrality, diversification, and the country’s place as a regional hub” (The Diplomat, April 21, 2025).
Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s leadership has found it essential to swiftly and consistently demonstrate the new implicit language of foreign policy regarding its historically close ties with Russia. Tokayev publicly refused to recognize Russia’s new territories in Ukraine during interactions with Russian officials in 2022 (RIA Novosti, June 18, 2022). He similarly supported Russian perspectives in 2024 when engaging with Western counterparts, remarking on “Russian invincibility” in a press conference with former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (RIA Novosti, September 16, 2024).
Kazakhstan’s diplomatic maneuvers align with this careful strategy. For example, ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Kazakhstan on November 9, 2023, Tokayev hosted French President Emmanuel Macron on November 1 (Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, November 1, 2023). Putin’s next visit to Kazakhstan was scheduled for November 27–28, 2024 (President of Russia, November 27, 2024). Tokayev, meanwhile, proactively embarked on a European tour, visiting France on November 4–5 and Serbia and Hungary on November 18–21, 2024 (President of Kazakhstan, November 6, 19, 21, 2024).
The soft power of strong partners is also meticulously balanced. While Russia’s prestigious MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) University opened a branch in Kazakhstan, Astana had previously invited Chinese universities to participate, with Beijing Language and Culture University also establishing a branch (Government of Kazakhstan, March 14, 2024; MGIMO, November 27, 2024).
These examples illustrate the growing complexity of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic strategy. As Kazakhstan actively asserts its multivector approach, it subtly distances itself from Russia—its primus inter pares partner—which continues to press Astana for a more explicit display of loyalty.
One of Russia’s active Telegram military correspondents, Igor Dimitriev, published a post that got almost 300,000 views, noting bitterly that Russia seems to be losing the game in Central Asia (Telegram/russ_orientalist, June 7). He wrote:
Even the memory of the brief euphoria that accompanied the entry of the [Collective Security Treaty Organization forces] into Kazakhstan in January 2022 is gradually fading. It seemed then that Russia was the guarantor of stability, the arbitrator, the center of power. Now there is nothing left of this feeling … Kazakhstan is confidently following its own path, forming its own security strategy … a paradigm where Russia is seen not as an ally, but as a potential threat (Telegram/russ_orientalist, June 7).
Kazakhstan also has intensified its defense efforts. The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Dauren Kosanov, will oversee the modernization, digitalization, and expansion of the capabilities of the Special Operations Forces, as well as the enhancement of ideological training (President of Kazakhstan, June 8). An important element that has drawn criticism from Russian military commentators is the creation of territorial defense units. At the end of June, Tokayev signed a law creating a national system of territorial defense, formalizing these units and integrating them into the country’s broader security architecture (Zakon.kz, June 30).
Russia’s involvement in Kazakhstan’s strategic affairs is not widely accepted within the country. When Rostam won the bid to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, Kazakh officials felt compelled to justify the decision and dismiss any political motivations. The head of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, Almasadam Satkaliev, reassured local journalists that there would be no dependency on Russia, stating, “They will come, build, and leave” (Vlast, June 14). This was in stark contrast to the markedly warm meeting between Tokayev and Xi the following day, where they announced a “golden period” in their relations (President of Kazakhstan, June 16).
The politics of neutrality are hard to follow. In Mongolia, where democratic principles are more established, the parliament rejected the policy of “permanent neutrality” as less adaptable than multivectorism or the Third Neighbor Policy (Jang and Kim, “Mongolia becoming a permanent neutral nation? Focusing on the debate and challenges of the permanent neutral nation policy,” 2023). For Kazakhstan, whose balancing between Russia and the PRC is becoming increasingly complex, an intense diplomatic instrumentalization may not be the best option. Building one’s own international weight and strengthening ties with a third power, particularly the West, unsurprisingly, offers a more effective diplomatic strategy.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Alexander Kim is an expert on Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian region.