IS-Sahel’s Nigeria Claims Signal a New Jihadist Frontier
Jacob Zenn
Executive Summary:
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) recently claimed its first attacks in northwestern Nigeria, reportedly killing nineteen security personnel in Sokoto and Kebbi states.
This expansion reflects converging regional conflict theaters and an escalating rivalry with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), as both groups exploit weak border controls and local networks such as Lakurawa.
Northwestern Nigeria is now officially part of Islamic State’s (IS) Sahelian operational strategy, serving as a valuable propaganda tool despite increasing U.S. counter-insurgency involvement in the country.
Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has long operated primarily across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The group emerged from the Algerian and Sahelian jihadist milieu before pledging allegiance to Islamic State (IS) in 2015. It has since become one of the IS’s most lethal African affiliates, relying on mobile assaults, ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and intimidation of civilian populations in the Sahel (ACLED Data, January 13, 2023). ISSP’s recent claims in Nigeria are therefore a turning point.
In late May, ISSP claimed an attack for the first time in its history in northwestern Nigeria. According to the claims, its fighters ambushed Nigerian Army patrols in Sokoto and Kebbi states, including in an ambush near Runji village in Illela Local Government Area (LGA) of Sokoto State. The attacks reportedly killed 18 soldiers and one police officer (MEMRI; X/@brantphilip, May 28; Premium Times, May 29). One month earlier, the al-Qaeda-affiliated and Sahel-based Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) released a video purporting to show the capture of an ISSP member in Nigeria, further indicating ISSP’s presence in the country (X/@war_noir, April 8).
ISSP’s presence in Nigeria reflects the nature of Sahelian jihadists’ cross-border operations. In Nigeria, ISSP has focused on cooperation with local jihadist or bandit networks, such as Lakurawa (see Terrorism Monitor, May 1). This group has likely begun rebranding its attacks in states like Sokoto and Kebbi as official ISSP operations. Moreover, the ISSP and JNIM attack claims in Nigeria reinforce the conclusion that the Sahelian, Lake Chad, and northwestern Nigerian conflict theaters are converging. Both ISSP and JNIM are exploiting weak border control, community grievances, and fragmented security responses to expand their reach into Nigeria (ACLED, March 1, 2025).
The ISSP claims in Nigeria also fit within the context of the group’s rivalry with JNIM. Since 2019, both groups have competed for territory, recruits, resources, and legitimacy, with the rivalry spreading from Mali and Burkina Faso into Niger and the Nigerian borderlands (see Terrorism Monitor, June 12). JNIM had claimed attacks in Nigeria prior to ISSP’s claims in May. ISSP may therefore have considered it necessary to show its presence in the country as well, especially since the two groups have begun to clash in Nigeria’s northwest (Reuters, April 9; X/@BrantPhilip, May 26). IS had also concealed the foreign fighters from Arab countries, the Caucasus, or the West in Islamic State in West Africa Province’s (ISWAP) ranks in northeastern Nigeria, but now regularly shows such fighters. This demonstrates that IS is now more explicit about its global recruitment, training, and logistics, which extend to Nigeria through both ISWAP and ISSP (X/@Sazedek, May 25).
Nigeria’s northwest is now officially part of IS’s Sahelian operational strategy and accompanying propaganda. ISSP’s claims suggest that the northwest is no longer only a theater of “banditry.” Further, with the United States now more involved in counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria—including through U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric and U.S airstrikes on Nigerian jihadists—IS sees the propaganda and operational value in presenting not just northeastern, but also northwestern, Nigeria as part of its global operations (Punch, April 26).
This article was originally published in Terrorism Monitor.
Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor, Senior Fellow on African and Eurasian Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. He is the author of Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria (Lynne Rienner, 2020) and has published widely on militant movements in leading academic journals. Zenn holds degrees from Georgetown Law and the Johns Hopkins SAIS Nanjing Center and has studied Uyghur and Persian in China and Uzbekistan.