Emphasis on Battlefield Execution Supports 2027 Goal
K. Tristan Tang
Executive Summary:
Recent PLA Daily discussion of “battlefield execution,” which concerns the capability of front-line commanders to implement higher-level operational intent, suggests senior officers are concerned about balancing the autonomy of commanders with political control over the military.
Articles on “battlefield execution” show that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still recognizes deficiencies in its joint operations capability. Its release of several logistics-related measures and regulations this year indicate it views logistics as a core component of sustained battlefield execution capability.
Battlefield execution likely relates to the 2027 centennial goal for military building, namely the development of a certain level of joint operations capability.
In the past two years, analysts writing in the PLA Daily have begun to discuss what they call “battlefield execution” (战场执行). After the topic was introduced in February 2025, PLA Daily published a second Military Forum (军事论坛) article on the topic on June 4 of this year (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025, June 4). [1] Official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings describe battlefield execution as the bridge that connects “operational intent” (作战意图) with operational effects, translating a superior commander’s expected operational outcome into realized outcomes. In other words, it is the key to generating a unit’s combat power, thus directly affecting the strength of operational capability. [2]
The PLA’s recent emphasis on battlefield execution suggests that the PLA still recognizes deficiencies in its joint operations capability, and the need to hone operational processes for warfighting. This entails improving the PLA’s ability to execute, which involves the will, timeliness, resources, methods, results, and other factors required to complete a mission. [3] It is likely related to the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, which requires the Chinese armed forces to complete joint operations training reforms and establish a certain level of joint operational capability.
Gaps Remain in Joint Operations Capability
In June, the PLA continued to advocate for the establishment of a normalized joint training mechanism (常态化联合训练机制), aligning with the recent trend of promoting joint training and showing that the PLA’s training reforms remain underway and incomplete (China Brief, January 24, January 26; CLSC Quick Look, February 12).
The PLA Daily reiterated the PLA’s understanding of contemporary warfare; namely, that it should be understood as systems warfare under informatized and intelligentized conditions. It also noted that the modern battlefield space has become complex and the operational tempo has accelerated. In the PLA’s view, these developments have created new challenges for battlefield execution capability, with realistic training as the key to improvement. The closer training comes to actual war, the more the PLA believes it can integrate the operational effectiveness of all units and ensure that command, coordination, and control personnel can promptly understand a commander’s intent during wartime (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025, June 4).
Discourse around battlefield execution takes place in the context of remaining gaps around joint operations capability. The recent PLA Daily article outlined the need to implement an all-element, integrated model of capability generation, establish a normalized joint training mechanism, organize multi-service and multi-branch coordinated training around joint operations, and improve units’ “system-of-systems confrontation capability” (体系对抗能力). It also called for standardized operating manuals that cover the full operational process and clarify responsibilities, authorities, rules of action, and coordination requirements (PLA Daily, June 4).
Logistics Key to Sustaining Battlefield Execution
Logistics are critical to ensuring the PLA can sustain battlefield execution without interruption throughout a conflict. According to the PLA Daily, any delay on the modern battlefield can lead to missed opportunities and affect the entire operating environment. The military therefore needs all levels to act with a unified intent and plan (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025). Developing a logistics information system and implementation of modularized support that can flexibly combine resources according to operational missions would enable the PLA to achieve the necessary material requirements, inventory conditions, and transportation status in real time to rapidly adapt to operational needs (PLA Daily, June 4). This includes units’ requirements for ammunition, fuel, and other supplies; available stocks in logistics depots; and the location and status of transport assets and deliveries.
This year, the PLA has issued several regulations related to logistics support. At first glance, these measures appear to focus on anti-corruption safeguards, but they could also substantially improve logistics operations. Examples include full-process oversight measures for military fuel support (军队油料保障全流程监管措施), military health supervision regulations (军队卫生监督规定), methods to improve the efficient use of storage resources, and improvements in the throughput capacity of administrative troop transportation (PLA Daily, January 27, February 7, May 23, May 25). These measures involve stronger management of logistics materials and medical capacity, as well as improved data collection capabilities and situational awareness.
The PLA also emphasizes resilience in its logistics capacity. It seeks to ensure that wartime logistics systems can continue to sustain necessary operations even after enemy strikes, thereby maintaining a certain level of battlefield execution. The June PLA Daily article argued for the need to build a decentralized and networked material distribution system and establish a rapid repair mechanism to ensure that damaged equipment can quickly return to operation (PLA Daily, June 4).
Emphasizing Autonomy and Flexibility of Front-Line Commanders
The ability for front-line commanders to independently plan actual implementation measures according to higher-level objectives, rather than simply follow higher-level orders, is critical to the PLA’s understanding of battlefield execution capability. Since the purges of senior PLA officers in 2025 and 2026, the PLA has continued to strengthen political control and compliance with higher-level orders. In theory, one could reasonably infer that this would lead to political control having more sway over battlefield execution capability—especially following 2025 discussions regarding the “center of gravity” (作战重心) in military operations, where the process for changing an action plan placed greater emphasis on obtaining approval from higher levels (China Brief, October 17, 2025, [1], [2], March 18, April 16). In practice, however, this has not been the case.
Front-line commanders still clearly hold the responsibility for turning higher-level operational objectives into detailed task lists and operational indicators. At the same time, the PLA makes clear that these commanders must conduct command and control according to actual conditions, employ multiple operational methods, adapt to the enemy and the situation, and independently use operational forces to achieve the higher-level operational purpose (PLA Daily, February 6, 2025).
This approach will likely appear in specific regulations that define clear authorities for on-the-spot decision-making (临机处置权限) and delineate the scope within which units may act. If carried out, higher levels would only set principled requirements for operational objectives, while each executing unit would make independent decisions on tactical methods. This aims to improve units’ ability and proficiency in completing missions within a regulated framework (PLA Daily, June 4).
This arrangement still oscillates between strengthening political control and ensuring operational capability. While the PLA now seeks to strengthen political control, effective battlefield execution demands a degree of regulated autonomy for front-line commanders. This autonomy remains limited to specific wartime areas, rather than giving commanders freedom to act as they wish.
Conclusion
Although the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community states that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027,” the PLA maintains its 2027 centennial goal for military modernization (ODNI, March 18). The recent discussion of battlefield execution capability in the PLA Daily likely represents a conceptual and component-level discussion under this objective.
The two PLA Daily articles on battlefield execution have only explained its requirements. Even when they discuss current battlefield execution capability, they only show that it remains under construction and has not yet produced clear progress. Other PLA Daily reporting likewise indicates that joint operations training reforms remain underway and that logistics work continues to improve, without showing major progress or results. Given the approaching 2027 centennial goal for military modernization, the PLA will likely conduct some form of large-scale exercise, training drills, or conference on battlefield execution capability or joint operations capability to demonstrate results.
This article originally appeared in China Brief Notes. Check it out here!
K. Tristan Tang is a co-founder of the Taiwan Defense Studies Initiative (TDSI) and serves as Project Lead for Wargaming, as well as the designer of KTT’s Wargame. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research and a Nonresident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at the Pacific Forum. In addition, he serves as an Associate Fellow at the Secure Taiwan Associate Corporation and an Associate Fellow at the Center for China Studies at National Taiwan University. His research focuses on China’s defense industry, the People’s Liberation Army, and Chinese foreign policy.
Notes
[1] In May of this year, the PLA Daily adjusted its website settings, with general readers now only able to access report pages from 2026. Older articles may appear in search results, but the full text is unavailable. The February 6, 2025 article was reviewed by the author before this change.
[2] Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], ed., Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2011), p. 64. The relevant entries are “operational purpose” [作战目的], “operational intention” [作战意图], and “operational decision” [作战决心].
[3] Academy of Military Science [军事科学院], ed., Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terminology [中国人民解放军军语] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2011), p. 96.