Cossack Resilience in Face of Ukrainian Gains
Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
As Ukrainian missile strikes expand across Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin has framed the war as a Western test of Russia’s “resilience,” drawing attention to the structures the Kremlin relies upon to bridge the civil-military divide and reinforce societal cohesion.
The state-sponsored Cossack movement has become part of Moscow’s wartime messaging, with battlefield claims, public ceremonies, and official recognition used to portray Cossack formation as evidence of Russian strength rather than decline.
Beyond combat, Cossacks serve as instruments of domestic cohesion by promoting sovereignty, national identity, and public order, reinforcing the Kremlin’s efforts to preserve stability amid uncertainty over Russia’s long-term ability to sustain the war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently framed Ukraine’s strikes on Russian territory as an attempt by the West to test Russia’s “resilience,” highlighting the Kremlin’s growing focus on the country’s ability to withstand pressure from the war (Kommersant, June 28). A striking example was Kyiv’s successful strike on Moscow on June 18, which caused deaths and damage to infrastructure (Vedomosti, June 18). This raises questions about the sources of Russian resilience and the country’s capacity for a whole-of-society response. One of the main structures bridging the civil-military divide, the Russian Cossacks, has sought to demonstrate this resilience (see EDM, October 30, November 13, 2025, March 19). As the focus of the war shifts to the Russian mainland, the structures underpinning the resilience of the Russian state deserve greater attention.
Recent developments involving the state-sponsored Cossack movement offer two important insights. First, the Cossacks’ recent activities allow the Kremlin to push back against the narrative that it is losing the war against Ukraine by portraying Cossack formations as active participants in battlefield successes. This is most evident in the claim that the “Cossack Platov brigade is advancing in the [special military operation’s (SVO)] Kramatorsk–Sloviansk direction” (Kazachestvo, June 4). Kramatorsk is part of Ukraine’s heavily fortified defensive belt in Donetsk oblast and one of the few areas where the Russian army continues to seize villages (Voennoe Delo, June 18). The Cossack publication further claims that, since May, the motorized rifle brigade has destroyed nine drone reconnaissance command posts, five Ukrainian Armed Forces shelters containing personnel, five field supply depots, three unmanned ground robotic systems, and Starlink antennas (Kazachestvo, June 4).
The Kremlin has reinforced this narrative by publicly recognizing Cossack formations and their role in the war. Ataman (leader) of the Orenburg Cossacks Igor Tsyganov celebrated the fourth anniversary of the founding of the BARS-6 “Forstadt” unit, stating, “Four years in combat is a time filled with courage, fortitude, and sincere brotherhood” before wishing that its “armor shall remain indestructible,” along with other patriotic platitudes (Kazachestvo, April 16). Tsyganov also congratulated the BARS-15 “Yermak” battalion, formed from Orenburg and Volga Cossacks, on its fourth anniversary, while additional Cossack volunteers were dispatched to reinforce the unit (Kazachestvo, May 15; VsKО, June 17). Presidential Envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District Yuriy Chaika also met with commanders of the Cossack “Terek” reconnaissance battalion and Ataman of the Terek Cossacks Anton Trushev to discuss the battalion’s activities and treatment of wounded personnel with a Cossack identified only by the nom-de-guerre “Garry.” Chaika also presented him with a personal letter of thanks from Putin, underlining the importance the Kremlin assigns to such structures as part of its broader approach to resilience (Kazachestvo, June 15). Those outside Russia may argue that Russia is losing the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin continues to project a different narrative through its public promotion and recognition of Cossack formations.
Second, the Cossacks played a prominent role in promoting Russia Day on June 12, which commemorates the 1990 adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Putin congratulated the Russian Cossacks on the holiday in a formal message (VsKO, June 12). Chaika likewise offered his congratulations, describing the holiday as “a bright symbol of the inviolability of our sovereignty, responsibility for the country’s fate, and pride in its centuries-old history” (VsKO, June 12). The parallel messages from the country’s leadership highlight the Cossacks’ status as a national organization and their role in promoting civic Russian identity, including in the North Caucasus.
Russian national artist and State Duma representative Denis Maydanov emphasized this role. He stated that “without Cossackdom, modern Russia would not exist” and lauded their historical contribution to expanding the state’s borders. Maydanov argued that the Cossacks’ contribution to the state extended beyond the kinetic aspects of their service to include safeguarding traditional values, leading him to hail the Cossacks as the “elite” of the Northern Military District (VsKO, June 12). The Cossacks’ broader functions, including maintaining public order and strengthening ties between the state and society, may contribute to Russia’s resilience as the war increasingly affects the country’s domestic front (see EDM, June 3, 4). As an ultra-loyal force capable of rapidly responding to emerging situations, the Cossacks’ role in sustaining the Putin system and reinforcing state resilience has become more important than ever.
Displays of resilience by the Cossacks are assuming greater importance as battlefield conditions evolve. Two major questions concern how long Russia can continue fighting in Ukraine given its massive military losses and economic damage, as well as the consequences of a potential Russian defeat (Carnegie Politika, February 16; see EDM, June 4). The home-guard-style structures, such as the Cossacks, play a fundamental role in shaping responses to both challenges. On the one hand, the Cossacks help dispute narratives that Russia is losing the war. Given that the leader of Russia’s Communist Party recently warned of the risk of another 1917 and that another Communist deputy from Buryatia has warned that Russia is on the brink of a social “explosion,” this role is significant (Vedomosti, April 23; Window on Eurasia, June 13; see EDM, June 24). On the other hand, the Cossacks continue to promote and embody Russian unity, allowing the Kremlin to project stability and resilience in the face of external pressures.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.