Beijing Argues Japan’s Rearmament is Illegal
Sense Hofstede
Executive Summary:
Beijing has begun arguing that the rearmament of “vanquished nation” Japan is illegal under international law, by referring to legal documents that ended the Second World War.
The timing and wording suggest the most important factor was Tokyo’s revisions to its defense policy and expansion of investment in military hardware, rather than Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan.
The effectiveness of Chinese lawfare targeting Taiwan in the UN system should compel similar vigilance for Beijing’s push against Tokyo.
On April 20, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) criticized the Japanese government for its proposed reform to the country’s constitution. The previous week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi had told lawmakers in her party that “the time has come” for constitutional reform, which many understood as a desire to amend Article 9, under which “the Japanese people forever renounce … the right of belligerency of the state.” Guo Jiakun, in only the most recent comment from a Chinese official criticizing Japan’s evolving defense posture, characterized Takaichi’s plans as a “new militarism” (新型军国主义) (Xinhua, April 20). Such comments frequently invoke the uglier chapters of East Asia’s history, including some made in response to a recent incident where a Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) member was arrested after scaling the wall of the Chinese embassy compound in Tokyo armed with a knife (Japan Times, April 15).
Guo Jiakun’s comments are part of a lawfare campaign aimed at Japan that began at the end of last year. Much of the Western discourse has centered on remarks Takaichi made in parliament in November 2025, where she said a Taiwan contingency involving the use of force could constitute an “existential risk” for Japan (Nikkei, November 7, 2025). [1] Beijing’s action, however, is more likely to have been determined by fears of a regional shift in the balance of power. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has reason to worry about the changes to the region’s security landscape that an upcoming review of Japan’s Three Security Documents and investments in the JSDF could bring about (The Diplomat, November 18, 2025; Japan Times, January 9).
Fighting ‘Remilitarization’
The most striking new argument made by PRC officials is that Japanese “remilitarization” (再军事化) is illegal under international law. Guo first appealed to international treaties and documents on December 22, 2025, in response to a Xinhua reporter’s question about potential changes to Japan’s nuclear weapons policy (MFA, December 22, 2025). Calling them “documents with international legal effect” (具有国际法效力的文件), he argued that according to the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender Japan should “completely disarm” (完全解除武装) and not “maintain such industries as would enable the country to rearm for war” (维持能使其重新武装的产业) (MFA, December 22, 2025). The same phrasing was repeated in the People’s Daily under the authoritative penname “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) in late December (People’s Daily, December 28, 2025). These comments occurred several weeks after Takaichi’s initial Taiwan comment and followed a question on a different topic.
Beijing moved from rhetorical admonition to economic coercion in the first few months of 2026. On January 6, the PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced stricter controls on the export of dual-use items to Japan, explicitly stating that “the Japanese leader recently made erroneous remarks about Taiwan” (日本领导人近期公然发表涉台错误言论) as justification for the move (MOFCOM, January 6). The following month, MOFCOM started to weaponize these controls, targeting Japan’s defense industry for its role in the country’s “remilitarization” and citing rearmament, the removal of arms export controls, the development of offensive combat capabilities, and attempts to revise nuclear weapons policy as evidence. MOFCOM added 20 companies to its export control list, and a further 20 to a watch list (MOFCOM, February 26).
A “Zhong Sheng” commentary on the sanctions followed, appealing to the defense of international law and the post-war international order. It repeated verbatim the MFA’s list of the international legal documents supposedly banning Japanese rearmament (People’s Daily, February 28). A separate commentary under the byline “Huanyu Ping” (寰宇平) appeared in March following the incident of the knife-carrying embassy wall-scaler, offering a long exposé on Japan’s supposed “new militarism” and containing a third appearance of the phrase in an authoritative People’s Daily commentary (People’s Daily, March 17). [2] In fact, use of the term “new militarism” has increased rapidly since the incident at the PRC embassy in Tokyo (Propaganda Scope, accessed April 20).
Beijing provided more details about supposed violations of postwar norms and rules after Tokyo announced new placements of Type 12 anti-ship missiles. It appears to suggest that the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender prohibit Japanese possession of offensive missile systems. MFA spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) stated that Tokyo’s fake appeal to self-defense and counterattack (“防卫” “反击”的幌子) covered the installation of offensive weapon systems that “far exceed the domain of ‘self-defense’ and ‘exclusively defense-oriented’ categories” (远远超出“自卫”和“专守防卫”范畴) (MFA, April 1).
Using Taiwan Statements to Assert Illegality
In response to Japanese comments on a potential Taiwan contingency, the PRC argues that any change in Japan’s defense posture would go against the UN Charter. As with the response to “remilitarization,” Beijing has consciously used historical memory and international law to bolster its messaging. Takaichi’s November 2025 statement in parliament was soon framed in the context of the post-war international order. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, PRC ambassador Fu Cong (傅聪) claimed that Takaichi broke with a post-1945 precedent of non-intervention and pacifism. Fu not only accused Tokyo of the “wild ambition” (野心) to intervene in a Taiwan scenario but also claimed that this was the first time that Tokyo had threatened China with armed force since World War II (首次对中国发出武力威胁) (Mission of the PRC to the UN, November 21, 2025). On April 27, PRC envoy Sun Lei (孙磊) told the UN Security Council that Japanese militarism historically invoked pretexts to “launch wars of aggression” (对外发动侵略战争) and that Tokyo’s recent moves “pave the way for military expansion” (为军事扩张铺路) (Mission of the PRC to the UN, April 27).
Individuals’ support of Taiwan is similarly portrayed as illegal and a violation of Tokyo’s international commitments. On March 30, the MFA announced “countermeasures” (反制措施) against Japanese legislator Furuya Keiji, a close ally of Takaichi, under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (反外国制裁法) for his frequent interaction with Taiwan (Xinhua, March 30). The statement accused Furuya of collusion with Taiwanese separatists, violation of the “one-China” principle and Japan’s commitments regarding Taiwan, and infringement of Chinese sovereignty. Another “Zhong Sheng” commentary repeated the assertion of illegality and complained about “collusion” (勾连) between right-wing Japanese forces and Taiwanese separatists who are “gradually moving away from the ‘exclusively self-defense’ policy” (一步步突破“专守防卫”原则) (People’s Daily, April 7). Sanctions are a new development, but they follow past PRC attempts to define Taiwan as an internal matter. Efforts in the United Nations, meanwhile, complicate the ability of Japan or other countries in the region to adequately prepare for a Taiwan contingency.
Invoking ‘New Militarism’ to Block Regional Role for Japan
Japan’s attempts to amend its constitution have barely begun, yet PRC media and government commentary claim that the “real threats” of “new militarism” are “already reality” (Xinhua, April 19, April 24). A People’s Daily editorial in March argued that the Japanese political right has pushed new militarism with the intention of restoring its pre-war status, while the MFA has blamed the embassy compound intruder and other issues on the “poisonous legacy” (流毒) of Japanese history (People’s Daily, March 17; MFA, March 24). A scholar at the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), an MFA-backed think tank, has similarly argued that the JSDF has been poisoned by right-wing militarism (People’s Daily, March 31). An MFA spokesperson has also called on the international community to be vigilant, echoing claims made several days prior by their counterpart at the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND, March 26; MFA, March 31).
This talking point is likely part of a broader strategy to delegitimize Japan’s regional security role. The main newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) claimed that efforts to “speed up the creation of out-of-area strike capability” (暴露其加速构建防区外打击能力的战略野心) were downstream of Japan’s “right-wing forces” (右翼势力) who have “never relinquished their militaristic dreams” (从未放弃军国主义旧梦) (PLA Daily, March 24). Shaping Northeast Asia also serves the interest of neighboring Russia, which would see its access to the Pacific affected by a stronger Japan. Understandably, Moscow does more than increase joint military exercises with Beijing around the Japanese archipelago (MERICS, May 7, 2025).
Russia backs the PRC’s claims regarding the 1945 order. After a recent round of regular strategic consultations between PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in December, the MFA said that both sides reached a high degree of consensus on the Japan question and see the need to “protect the results of the World War II victory obtained at cost of life and blood” (维护用生命和鲜血换来的二战胜利成果) (People’s Daily, December 3, 2025). The readout from Wang Yi’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referenced Russia–PRC coordination to prevent Japanese right-wing forces from damaging regional peace and stability and their attempts to “remilitarize” (People’s Daily, December 4, 2025). Even after Beijing had sharpened its lawfare campaign against Tokyo starting in January, the MFA claimed that “the Chinese and Russian position on issues related to Japan are highly similar” (中俄在涉日问题上立场高度一致), though Russia is yet to target Japan with economic or other sanctions (MFA, February 3).
Conclusion
Officials continue to push the international law argument, although it has been seen less in recent times. A more recent “Zhong Sheng” commentary from April 10 on the “offensive turn” (进攻化) of the JSDF only mentioned Japan’s constitution, not international law (People’s Daily, April 10). The MFA has also largely stuck to attacking these developments as violating Japan’s domestic “self-defense” policies (MFA, April 15). It has not disappeared entirely, however; for instance, it reappeared in a PRC Ministry of National Defense press conference on April 17. Asked about Japan’s defense budget increase and broader weapons export policy, spokesperson Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang (张晓刚) not only again brought up the supposed violation of “provisions of documents with international legal effect” (具有国际法效力文件的规定) but also extended his own interpretation of the constitutionality of the Japanese government’s policies (MND, April 17). On April 28, 11 days later, the legal argument returned to the MFA, too, as part of a broadside against PM Takaichi (MFA, April 28).
The PRC has an interest in preserving a post-World War II international order; it is now defining this order more actively than ever before (Institut Montaigne, January 7). Xi Jinping’s recognition of its usefulness is clear in the narrative shift regarding China’s wartime role from victim to victor. [3] Recent anti-Japanese actions gain inspiration from the comfortable Chinese position in the 1945 international system that Washington, D.C. and Nanjing originally designed for the Republic of China (ROC). Beijing not only sees Taiwan’s “retrocession” (光复) to China after the war as an important component of that postwar settlement but also prefers the pre-Cold War vision of a regionally subordinate and militarily weak status for Japan (China Brief, October 28, 2025).
Western analysts and the U.S. government have frequently called out Chinese lawfare campaigns that “distort” and “mischaracterize” international law as it pertains to Taiwan (German Marshall Fund, March 24, 2022; Reuters, September 15, 2025). Research and awareness of similar designs targeting Japan are lacking, however. This is partially because the issue is relatively fresh. The many years of lawfare targeting Taiwan’s position within the UN system has shown how effective such efforts can be over time. Japan’s increasingly active role is central to the balance of power in Northeast Asia. [4] It is therefore important for countries in the West to keep an eye on the attempts by Beijing to limit this from happening.
This article originally appeared in China Brief. Check it out here!
Sense Hofstede has been working since March 2026 as the Head of the Brussels Office of AMO’s China Team and China Projects Analyst based in the EU capital.
His work centers on the way China’s Leninist party-state shapes Beijing’s place in the world. He is a specialist in the link between the political systems and foreign policies of China, Singapore, and Taiwan, with a particular interest in Chinese foreign policy, China-Taiwan relations, and the Indo-Pacific.
Notes
[1] In the original Japanese, Takaichi said, “武力行使伴うなら存立危機事態なり得る.”
[2] Zhong Sheng commentaries are thought to represent the views of the Party leadership, as the name is a homophone of “voice of the center.” Huanyu Ping, meanwhile, is a pen name for commentaries on global affairs. As the China Media Project points out, the name “translates something like ‘universal peace’ … [and] the last character ping (平) is a homophone for ‘commentary,’ or pinglun (评论)” (China Media Project, October 28, 2025).
[3] Chang, Vincent K. L. “Recalling Victory, Recounting Greatness: Second World War Remembrance in Xi Jinping’s China.” The China Quarterly 248, no. 1 (2021): 1152–73. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741021000497.
[4] Green, Michael J. Line of Advantage: Japan’s Grand Strategy in the Era of Abe Shinzō. Columbia University Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.7312/gree20466.