As “Cossack” Casualties Grow, Ideology Becomes More Important to War Effort
Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has inflicted unprecedented losses on Russian forces, with significant casualties disproportionately affecting regions with large Cossack populations. The Russian government, however, romanticizes Cossack history across society to increase militarization in Russian society.
The war has been infused with religious and ideological significance, particularly through the Russian Orthodox Church’s legitimization of the conflict, glorifying an imagined romanticized Cossack past and emphasizing Orthodox Christian values.
The romanticization of the past infuses the war with a sense of destiny and purpose and fosters a new, ultra-violent Russian generation, setting the stage for future instability regardless of the war’s outcome.
October saw an average of around 1,500 casualties for the Russian Armed Forces in their war against Ukraine, making it the worst month for Russian casualties since the beginning of the war in February 2022. Overall, Russia has seen almost 700,000 soldiers killed or wounded in the war (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 10). There are growing signs of desperation from Moscow, including using elderly volunteer soldiers and foreign troops from North Korea (see EDM, October 14, October 24 [1], [2]). Estimates based on the monitoring of the probate registry in Russia, however, put the number of dead at 77,143, which has uneven distribution across the country, especially among the predominately non-ethnically Russian regions (Mediazona, accessed November 19). In the uneven distribution of deaths among various Russian populations, there has been little discussion on the high death toll from the regions with large “Cossack” hosts (see EDM, July 13, 2022; Russia File- the Wilson Center, January 24). As of November 19, of the 13 regions with over 1,500 confirmed fatalities, eight of them were regions with sizeable Cossack movements, including the Orenburg, Kuban, and Don hosts (Mediazona, accessed November 19). Moreover, this inference is supported by obituaries on host websites mourning the loss of “heroes of the special military operation” (e.g., Orenburg host September 18; October 9; October 18). In the face of such enormous losses, the Cossack resolve and integration into the Russian army, which keeps the troops from turning their weapons on Moscow, continues in an effort to normalize the militarization of Russian society.
The main ideological means of ensuring Cossack integration into the Russian army and resolve to fight seems to be a regression to an imagined romantic past of Cossack heroism and glory. The role of organized religion, exemplified by the Cossacks of the “Storm” assault detachment presenting the Metropolitan of Stavropol and Nevinnomysk with a special letter of gratitude, is essential to this mission (Kazachestvo.ru, October 24). The soldiers thanked the cleric for his “versatile assistance to soldiers on the front line. … Your help is important on the road to victory. After all, victory is won not only on the front line but also in the rear.” Additionally, the significance of the Orthodox religion for the Cossack movement was demonstrated in the occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast in August when Cossack troops, led by Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society Vitaly Kuznetsov, erected a Cossack bowed cross in response to the Ukrainian ban of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Kuznetsov declared, “Cossacks are warriors of Christ and defenders of the Russian Orthodox Church” to emphasize this sentiment (VsKO, August 21; see EDM, September 3, October 9).
There is also a broader-reaching attempt to sacralize the Cossack movement within Russian society. One instance of this is the veneration of the return of Cossack relics from Australia to the museums of the Ural Cossack army, which was boasted as a landmark event for the Ural Cossacks for generations to come (Kazachestvo.ru, October 23). Social activities celebrating an imagined glorified past in Russia and among all Cossacks are also becoming more prevalent across Russia. The Black Sea Cossacks located in Crimea recently held a “reporting circle,” which invited politicians such as the head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergei Aksenov, and priests such as military cleric Grigory Koshshiuk. The meeting claimed that “the task of the Cossacks has always been to defend the borders of our state. And now the Black Sea Cossacks, like many generations of their ancestors, defend Russia and the Orthodox faith.” Substantively, this celebrated the 18,500 Cossacks in the form of 25 Cossack volunteer units and the over 3,000 Black Sea Cossacks involved in the war (VsKO, October 26). Similarly, this regression to an era dominated by religious thinking within Russian society is also evident in a proposal from Muslim Kuchiev, an assistant to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, to remove Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution from schools. Kuchiev made the statement at a September All-Russian Parents’ Committee meeting, saying, “Everyone knows this is an erroneous theory as it goes against religion.” Mishushtin was supported in this proposal by the “Orthodox oligarch” and sponsor of the Cossacks, Konstantin Malofeev (Meduza, September 20).
Other institutions in Russia that explicitly venerate war and military service also project the past. Among the many changes that have occurred in Russia since the beginning of the invasion has been the expansion of the system of Cossack Cadets Corps to new parts of Russia (see EDM, September 30). In a meeting between Kuznetsov and Vladimir Zotov, an assistant to the Moscow mayor, regarding the state plan for Russian Cossacks from 2021–2030, Kuznetsov promised to take their cooperation “to a new level.” One hint of what this might have meant came as Zotov was described as the founder of the “Cossack Cadet Corps named for Shokolov” (VsKO, October 25). Expanding the Cossack Cadet Corps would align with other developments across Russia in youth militarization (see EDM, February 13, March 7, September 9). Simultaneously, the regime fosters a competitive spirit amongst Cossack Cadet Corps organizations through the elaborate celebration of the “best Cossack corpus” competition (VsKO, October 24).
The role of the Russian Orthodox Church in legitimating the war in Ukraine plays a role in the strong emphasis on religious glory among the Cossack movement in the Russian military (see EDM, June 28, 2022). One of the possibly unintended consequences of this move, however, has been the infusion of religious and sacred meaning into the invasion—a choice that means that Russian President Vladimir Putin would presumably face much higher costs if he settled for anything less than maximalist victory goals from the Russian Orthodox Church. Such an ideology instilled in these ways of overly romanticized past matters as it reads destiny into history and imbues the war with teleological meaning, making the chances of a negotiated peace more remote. It also implies a new, ultra-violent, and angry generation of Russians who will influence the world regardless of the war’s outcome.
This article was originally published in Jamestown Perspectives.
Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network. His current interests are the connections between sport and politics, Cossack movements in Russia and Ukraine, and far-right activity in Russia.