Alleged Coup Exacerbates Armenia’s Political Crisis
Onnik James Krikorian
Executive Summary:
The Armenian government allegedly foiled an attempted coup involving two prominent archbishops and several nationalists. The opposition, Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II, and the Armenian Apostolic Church deny the allegations.
The announcement comes as tensions between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the church have boiled over, with the premier seeking to remove Karekin II as head of the church.
Yerevan’s allegations have been used to justify the arrest of Samvel Karapetyan, a prominent Russian-Armenian businessman, and several opposition-aligned parliamentarians. The government has also moved to nationalize Karapetyan’s Electric Networks of Armenia.
Economists and civil society groups warn that the government’s actions to combat what it views as hybrid threats emanating from Moscow could further damage the investment climate and erode public confidence in the democratic system.
The recent turmoil comes as the June 2026 elections loom, and Pashinyan will likely rationalize the conflict with the church and opposition as a means of stripping Russia of key assets in the country.
Less than a year before crucial parliamentary elections, political tensions in Armenia continue to rise (see EDM, May 21). For over a month, an acrimonious war of words has been waged online between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the country’s spiritual leader, Catholicos Karekin II (also known as Ktrij Nersessyan) (see EDM, June 23). Pashinyan accuses Karekin II of interfering in the country’s politics and fathering at least one illegitimate child despite a sacred vow of celibacy. Such claims, including others of corruption and autocratic rule, predate Pashinyan’s premiership and have shadowed the spiritual leader since his inauguration as Catholicos in October 1999.
In large part, the Catholicos and the Armenian Apostolic Church had remained aloof from politics especially prior to Pashinyan rising to power in 2018. That status quo, however, has changed dramatically. As Karekin II and the church have become more active in Armenian politics, they have capitalized on a dissatisfied populace to put pressure on Pashinyan in the run-up to the June 2026 elections (see EDM, May 14, June 5, 2024, June 23). In response, the Armenian premier has sought to remove Karekin II as the current Catholicos, fomenting further instability throughout the country.
In 2020, Karekin II openly called for the release from custody of Robert Kocharyan, Armenia’s second president and Pashinyan’s archrival(Azatutyun, April 15, 2020). The Catholicos also called for Pashinyan’s resignation following Armenia’s defeat against Azerbaijan following the Second Karabakh War the same year (Meduza, July 4). In 2022 and 2024, Karekin II permitted senior clergy, including Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, to participate in and, in some cases, lead protests aimed at toppling the embattled premier (see EDM, May 14, 2024). The protests also involved the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D), the main parliamentary opposition, forming Kocharyan’s Hayastan (“Armenia”) bloc in the National Assembly.
At the end of June, the situation escalated further when Archbishop Galstanyan and a dozen others were arrested on suspicion of planning a coup against Pashinyan’s government. Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-born billionaire and Russian citizen, spoke out in support of the Catholicos, stating that he would also work toward ousting Pashinyan. Soon after, he, too, was detained and charged with planning to violently usurp power. Unlike Galstanyan, however, the charges against Karapetyan were accompanied by little proof (Civilnet, June 17).
The opposition continues to question the evidence against Galstanyan. Some opposition members contend that a detailed schedule for an alleged uprising planned for later this year had the actual dates obscured by a strip of paper when it was posted on a pro-Pashinyan website (Civic.am, June 24). In photographs published by the National Security Service (NSS), those dates were visible and dated 2024, not 2025 (Azatutyun, June 25). Moreover, among some of the alleged weapons seized were firecrackers, hunting rifles with legal permits, and empty ammunition cartridges (Caliber, June 25). The names of Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan (former president and prime minister), Archbishop Galstanyan, Karapetyan, and others were also present on a list of supposed interim administration figures in the event of a new government. Whether the coup attempt was credible or not, in its first-ever public report released in January, the NSS had warned of the credible danger of a possible attempt to destabilize the government in 2025 (see EDM, October 7, 2024; Armenpress, January 23).
More dramatic developments soon followed. At the very end of June, Mikayel Ajapahyan, another prominent archbishop, was also sought by law enforcement for comments he had made over the years calling for a military coup in the country (Azatutyun, June 27). Ajapahyan, who also participated in protests last year, claims that he was not informed of the warrant or summoned to turn himself in (see EDM, June 5, 2024). Instead, police and masked special forces used overwhelming force to raid the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, where Ajapahyan was leading an annual meeting. The bells of cathedrals in Etchmiadzin, Yerevan, and Gyumri rang out to alert the faithful to gather in his defense, though only 1,500 reportedly showed up (News.am, June 27, July 3). Eventually, the security forces withdrew, and Ajapahyan journeyed from Etchmiadzin to Yerevan, where he turned himself in. Both Galstanyan and Ajapahyan are in pre-trial detention and reportedly share the same cell in the isolation wing of the NSS’s high-security facility (Civilnet, June 27).
The opposition claims that the detentions to date represent a move by the government to neutralize any political competition in the run-up to next year’s vote. Opposition politicians also allege that these arrests were made to appease Azerbaijan and Türkiye ahead of a possible peace deal, which both Karekin II and the Armenian Apostolic Church oppose (see EDM, June 23). Still, others note that those arrested, including Karapetyan, are believed to be linked to Russia, and the recent arrests mark an attempt to neutralize Moscow’s influence in the country (Armenpress, June 20).
Karapetyan’s detention adds some credibility to those claims. Born in Armenia, Karapetyan made his fortune in Russia, currently valued at $4.1 billion. He worked with the likes of Russian state-owned Gazprom and engaged in property development, banking, and commercial retail (Forbes, accessed July 7). The billionaire was only somewhat involved in Armenia’s business scene in the early 2000s, operating his chain of Tashir Pizza restaurants, before significantly expanding his business interests in the 2010s, including the electricity distribution network (Eurasianet, November 2, 2017). During that time, he maintained close relationships with previous administrations and the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Armenian and Azerbaijani media have often named Karapetyan along with other Russian-Armenian businessmen, such as Ruben Vardanyan, the former de facto state minister of the now-defunct Nagorno-Karabakh breakaway region. He is now on trial in Baku for “charges of crimes against peace and humanity, war crimes, terrorism, and financing terrorism” (Azertac, July 8). Ara Abrahamyan (also referred to as “Abramyan”), president of the Union of Russian Armenians, is another similar figure who has been named as potentially seeking to destabilize Armenia on Moscow’s behalf (BBC News Azerbaijan, October 28, 2015; Aravot, November 4, 2015). Abrahmayan also supported Galstanyan’s protests last year through the Ararat Alliance Institute (News.am, June 15, 2024).
Against this backdrop, the Russian Foreign Ministry has said it is closely following Karapetyan’s case, who is now a Russian citizen. Abrahamyan is also following the trial and has warned that any actions against his colleague could adversely affect the investment climate in Armenia (Azatutyun, June 25; ArmInfo, July 4). In particular, all eyes have been fixated on the future of the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), which Karapetyan acquired from the Russian energy company Inter RAO in 2015.
The issue of energy in Armenia is a sensitive matter. In recent years, Yerevan has sought to diversify its relations away from Moscow, aiming to neutralize the Kremlin’s ability to exert significant influence in the country (see EDM, July 22, 2024). Following Karapetyan’s arrest, Pashinyan moved quickly and announced the government’s intention to nationalize ENA. On July 8, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed a presidential decree that paved the way for the nationalization of ENA (Arka, July 9). Opposition members and analysts claim the move is an attempt to punish Karapetyan and warn other business owners to stay away from politics with elections on the horizon.
Karapetyan’s Russian ties also highlight a possible geopolitical angle. Last year, a local analyst with government ties suggested nationalizing the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and seizing control from Gazprom if the Russian company failed to fulfill its contractual obligations (Carnegie Politika, May 21, 2024). The government is doing exactly that with Karapetyan’s ENA. Economists warn that the action could be tied up in legal proceedings and international arbitration for years, further exacerbating an already unfavorable investment climate in the country (Civilnet, July 2).
Undaunted, in June, Pashinyan declared that ENA had caused an energy crisis in Armenia with the aim of fomenting public discontent before the elections (Azatutyun, June 18). A draft bill was then hastily presented to the National Assembly. After warnings that quickly nationalizing the ENA could trigger a larger crisis, however, Pashinyan conceded that he will pursue the seizure slowly, with the recent presidential decree representing the next step in that process (Azatutyun, July 1). For his part, Karapetyan plans to sue the government for what he has called “illegal expropriation.” He is believed to have invested at least $700 million in the enterprise since acquiring it.
Pashinyan’s government has warned that Armenia is increasingly facing hybrid threats from Moscow, as the Kremlin seeks to strengthen its waning regional influence. As such, Yerevan is already taking steps against Russian television stations for “openly unfriendly, often hostile propaganda” against the government (Civilnet, July 4). Civil society activists, however, warn that attempting to counter hybrid threats that intend to destabilize the country, undermine democracy, and erode trust in institutions could backfire and, in fact, achieve the same results, especially if forceful means are used (Civilnet, June 18).
In July, the government banned the entry of ethnic Armenian Karen Igityan, a Russian citizen who had lived in Armenia and lectured at the Russian-Armenian University in Yerevan (Tert.am, July 5). Earlier, Pashinyan had signaled his concern about foreigners without Armenian citizenship involving themselves in domestic politics and harboring “radical views.” He made those comments at the end of June while introducing Andranik Simonyan, the new head of the NSS (TASS, June 30). Simonyan’s predecessor was apparently dismissed after failing to detain Karapetyan. Yerevan has already warned Russia not to interfere in Armenia’s internal politics (Radar.am, July 4).
In downtown Yerevan, however, thousands have protested for Karapetyan’s release with the participation of his family, the Apostolic Church clergy, and the ARF-D parliamentary opposition (Azatutyun, July 4). Karapetyan also appears to have announced that he could become a third force in politics before the elections, something that many Armenians would welcome given their disillusionment with Pashinyan’s government and the existing opposition (Azatutyun, July 5).
The conduct of next year’s elections will stand as an important barometer of Armenia’s democratic credentials. European leaders are anxiously watching the turmoil unfold in the country. Yet, even during her visit to Armenia at the end of June, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, did not comment on the country’s political developments at all, instead focusing solely on a new partnership agenda (Azatutyun, June 30). French President Emmanuel Macron was more blunt, openly supporting the Pashinyan government in light of the alleged coup attempt (Rfi, June 29; PanARMENIAN, June 30). Meanwhile, Armenian Prosecutor-General Anna Vardapetyan has already requested that parliament move forward with the prosecution of a Kocharyan-aligned member of parliament on coup charges. Another two have already had their immunity removed, albeit on other charges (Armenpress, July 7, 8).
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist and consultant from the United Kingdom who has been based in the South Caucasus since 1998. He has worked for British regional, national and international media and covered the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since 1994. He has also worked in a consultancy capacity for international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations on conflict, minorities, media, social vulnerability, and countering violent extremism in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. He regularly writes articles and analysis for a variety of regional and international publications.