Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (right) meeting with Libyan leader and warlord Khalifa Haftar (left). (Source: The Libya Observer)
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Executive Summary
GRU Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov has been tasked with taking over Russia’s operations in Africa from the Wagner Group. Proven and effective, he will be a formidable threat to Western interests in the region.
Yevkurov is a Muslim Ingush from Russia’s North Caucasus region and the current Russian deputy minister of defense. Yevkurov is a trusted functionary with a distinguished career, adept at both diplomacy and military operations.
After making a name for himself in the Yugoslav wars, Yevkurov served in the Second Chechen War and proved himself an efficient administrator, leading Ingushetia back from the brink of civil war and economic collapse from 2009–2018.
With the mysterious death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his top aides in an August 2023 plane crash near Moscow, in many ways, Russia’s Wagner Group experiment came to an end (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 12, 2023). Shortly before this, in June, the private military company and its infamous leader shocked the world by leading an abortive mutiny (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 11, 2023, July 24, 2023). There was, however, much to salvage in the wake of Wagner’s demise, especially in Africa. In the Sahel and beyond, a mix of cooperation, intimidation, and manipulation succeeded in establishing Russian influence at the expense of France and the United States.
The task of reorganizing Wagner operations in Africa and restoring obedience to the Kremlin has been given to Russian military intelligence (the GRU). [1] More specifically, Wagner is now in the hands of GRU Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov, a Muslim Ingush from Russia’s North Caucasus region and the current Russian deputy minister of defense. A trusted soldier with a distinguished military and political career, Yevkurov will oversee Wagner’s successor in Africa—the newly created Russian Africa Corps (Afrikanskiy korpus).
Yevkurov was born in Tarskoye, an Ingush village now within the borders of the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania. However, he grew up in the Ingushetian town of Malgobek. Possessing both diplomatic and military skills, Yevkurov has acted on behalf of Russia in Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and other parts of the North Caucasus and has focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Like nearly all Ingush, Yevkurov is a Muslim, and specifically, he is a follower of the North Caucasian Kunta-Haji Kishiev branch of the Qadiri tariqa (school) of Sufism (see North Caucasus Weekly, April 10, 2009). However, as a former Soviet officer, Yevkurov remains an advocate of official secularism, which he does not see as being in conflict with one’s own personal observance of Islam.
Kosovo and Chechnya
Yevkurov began his military career in 1982 with the Soviet Naval Infantry and earned his airborne wings several years later. He remained in the military after the Russian Federation succeeded the USSR, coming to international attention as an officer in May-June 1999 while serving with the Russian peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Russian troops were part of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) there, but demonstrated their independence in an operation that nearly brought NATO and Russia to blows and earned Yevkurov the title of “Hero of the Russian Federation.”
A GRU special forces major at the time, Yevkurov led a team of 18 GRU commandos into Kosovo in May 1999 in a secret operation. The effort was designed to pave the way for a Russian seizure of the Serbian-held Slatina Airbase just ahead of the arrival of a NATO column and Kosovo-Albanian militias. Under NATO pressure, Serbian forces were withdrawing from Slatina (part of Pristina International Airport), which was the only airstrip in Kosovo capable of handling large military transports. Once Yevkurov had established the way, a small Russian force of 15 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and 200 paratroopers raced over 300 miles through the mountains of Bosnia and Kosovo to arrive at Slatina only hours ahead of unsuspecting British and Norwegian troops. Upon arrival, Western forces were astonished to find the base in Russian hands (RIA Novosti, February 17, 2017; Russia Today, June 11, 2019).
A potentially explosive standoff followed, but was defused after British Lieutenant General Mike Jackson disobeyed an order from American NATO commander General Wesley Clark to use force to expel the Russian troops. [2] Within days, Russian and NATO troops began to cooperate by allowing both forces to use the airbase. The daring operation revived a demoralized Russian army and signaled to NATO that post-Soviet Russia was still a force in Europe and was willing to take political and military risks to prove it. The incident became the subject of a fictionalized film, The Balkan Line, in which Yevkurov served as an adviser.
By 2000, Yevkurov was deeply involved in the Second Chechen War (1999–2009) as commander of the 217th Guards Airborne Regiment. His personal courage was displayed during a reconnaissance mission when he and his escort came across a group of Russian prisoners being held by Chechen insurgents. Having dispersed their guards, Yevkurov and his men found themselves surrounded by Chechen reinforcements. Yevkurov laid down covering fire, allowing wounded paratroopers and 12 Russian prisoners to escape before carrying a wounded soldier to safety. [3]
Leader of Ingushetia
After serving as deputy head of the intelligence department of the Volga–Ural Military District, Yevkurov was appointed by then-President Dimitri Medvedev on October 30, 2008, to a five-year term as the third leader of the Ingush Republic (within the Russian Federation). Yevkurov replaced the deeply unpopular Lieutenant General Murat Zyazikov, under whom the republic was spinning out of control. In addition to economic challenges and entrenched corruption, Yevkurov was faced with a deteriorating security situation involving Islamist militants, organized crime, urban gun battles, suicide bombings, and decades-old blood feuds (Gazeta.ru, March 12, 2009). Most importantly, Yevkurov was expected to restore order and bring Ingushetia back from the brink of all-out civil war. In this, he succeeded, but the effort was difficult. In 2019, Yevkurov stated that, “For five years I woke up in the morning, picked up a machine gun and went to fight. Scold me as you wish, but agree [on] one thing: we have emerged from the war” (Novaya Gazeta, June 26, 2019).
Force was not the Ingush leader’s only weapon, however. Negotiations and appeals to the common interests of the Ingush were offered as alternatives to repressive violence. Yevkurov even promised to intercede on behalf of the militants if they turned themselves in (Caucasian Knot, July 19, 2014). As for the practice of blood feuds, Yevkurov acknowledged their ambiguous status in Islam: “Shari’a does not deny blood feud; Shari’a even welcomes it. But at the same time, Shari’a welcomes forgiveness more” (Novaya Gazeta, April 19, 2018).
Yevkurov’s efforts to restore order in Ingushetia did not please everyone. During a wave of assassinations, Yevkurov was himself targeted by a suicide bomber on June 22, 2009. As Yevkurov’s motorcade drove down the highway outside the provincial capital of Magas, his security detail failed to follow protocol and allowed a Toyota with Moscow license plates to approach his armored Mercedes. Packed with explosives and metal shrapnel, the Toyota driver detonated a directional bomb as he came alongside the Ingush leader’s car, instantly killing a police escort and inflicting serious wounds to Yevkurov, his cousin Ramzan (the driver), and his brother Uvais (former head of security). The survivors were transported for urgent surgery to Moscow (where Ramzan died), and Yevkurov suffered severe damage to his skull, lungs, and liver, as well as two fractured ribs and burns to his face (Interfax, June 22, 2009; RIA Novosti, June 23, 2009). Demonstrating enormous strength, Yevkurov was back at work in September 2009.
Identifying corruption as a major cause of the Ingush republic’s unrest, Yevkurov began his tenure by sacking the existing cabinet and forgoing a ceremonial inauguration as the republic’s president. He secured a federal aid package worth nearly $1 billion over six years to help develop the republic’s stagnant economy, asserting that this was the key to diverting youth from extremism. However, the issue of corruption persisted and eventually included accusations against Yevkurov himself and his extended family. Ingush society is built around teip-s (clans) governed by councils of elders. The practice of prioritizing assistance to fellow members of a specific teip can, unfortunately, also encourage the institutionalization of corruption, nepotism, and other abuses. Confronted in a 2019 interview with his inability to rein in corruption, Yevkurov wearily responded: “Well, where can I get other Ingush?” (Novaya Gazeta, June 26, 2019).
As the republic’s president, Yevkurov was also forced to deal with the volatile confrontation between traditional Ingush adherents of Sufist Islam and the growing number of Salafists, who adhere to the “authentic” Islam practiced by the first four generations of Muslims. Yevkurov angered the traditionalists by challenging the prevailing view in Russia that Salafism was synonymous with terrorism. In 2016, for example, he disputed claims by Imam Adam Shakhidov, who was an adviser to Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov on religious issues, that two leading Ingush preachers were dangerous Salafists leading believers into extremism. He stated, “If a person does not infringe on anyone’s interests, does not impose his views on anyone, does not call for extremism or other radical measures, then he should be allowed to observe the spiritual practice that is closest to him … We should be trying to unite people rather than to divide them” (Lenta.ru, May 17, 2016; Ingushetia.ru, May 19, 2016; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 27, 2016). In Yevkurov’s view, peaceful Salafists were merely exercising their religious rights. Jihadists were another matter: “I don’t consider them Muslims. Why? Because the devil in their soul has simply won. They kill each other, even in sacred places, they kill each other, hiding behind interpretations of Islam…” (Caucasian Knot, July 19, 2014).
The Border Issue
In 2018, Yevkurov and Ramzan Kadyrov signed an agreement defining their mutual border. Under the Soviets (who deported both the Ingush and Chechen populations to Central Asia from 1944 to 1957), the line was shifted frequently. This was, however, of little importance until the breakup of the Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) in 1991.
At that time, Chechnya sought independence, while the Ingush joined the new Russian Federation. Yevkurov regarded the new demarcation as a simple and necessary administrative measure and thus failed to seek public input. He was thus surprised by the angry demonstrations that followed when many Ingush became convinced he had ceded large tracts of their ancestral lands to Chechnya. However, much of the opposition was fueled by clan rivalries and pre-existing land disputes related to the redevelopment of Magas (TASS, October 17, 2018; Novaya Gazeta, June 26, 2019).
After months of unrest, Yevkurov shocked many in his administration by stepping down on June 24, 2019. He stated, “Because we are divided today, each of us faces a choice. Personal interests—or the interests of the native republic … I urge all interested parties to make their choice. I made my choice” (Novaya Gazeta, June 26, 2019).
The Wagner Mutiny
President Vladimir Putin appointed Yevkurov as deputy defense minister one month after he stepped down from his role as Ingush president. This coincided with Yevkurov’s promotion to lieutenant general. In December 2021, he was further promoted to colonel-general (RBC.ru, December 8, 2021).
After the Wagner mutineers took the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don unopposed in June 2023, Yevkurov and GRU major-general Andrei Averyanov were filmed conversing outdoors with Prigozhin, apparently as his prisoners. A transcript reveals an uncomfortable discussion, with the Wagner leader complaining Russia’s military leaders were sending “his guys” into a “meat-grinder” and announcing his intention to “get” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valeri Gerasimov. In the video, Prigozhin grumbles repeatedly that Yevkurov is addressing him with the informal “ty” rather than the formal “vy,” implying Prigozhin’s inferiority (Meduza, June 24, 2023). Nonetheless, the incident was a humiliating moment for both Yevkurov and Averyanov—and no doubt required an explanation to Putin later on.
Africa Corps
Following Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, Yevkurov was sent to Syria to encourage officials there to advise Russian Wagner fighters to either leave Syria or join Russia’s forces (Asharq al-Awsat, August 28, 2023). In December, Yevkurov received his latest assignment: command of the GRU’s new Russian Africa Corps and oversight of its absorption of former Wagner fighters (Vedomosti [Moscow], December 22, 2023).
Yevkurov was joined in September by the same GRU major-general, Andrei Averyanov, who had been a part of his conversation with Prigozhin months earlier. Yevkurov and Averyanov set out on a tour to meet the leaders of African countries where Wagner operated, including Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic, in order to reassure them of Moscow’s continued support. Averyanov is the former chief of the GRU’s 29155 unit and specializes in covert operations, including sabotage and assassinations. He also appears to have been designated Yevkurov’s number two in the Africa Corps and has seen prior service in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Ukraine, Moldova, and Crimea.
Conclusion
Yevkurov’s Africa Corps will have no armored divisions and will be forced to fight a very different war from its German namesake. Under GRU leadership, the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging. General Averyanov’s presence ensures that information manipulation and covert activities will continue to play a large part in expanding Russian influence in Africa. Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors. Tackling Islamic State (IS) operatives in Africa may also take on a new intensity following the March 22 IS terrorist attack in Moscow (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 26).
Yevkurov is not a buffoonish “chef” like Prigozhin. Unlike the latter, he has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries, especially in leadership positions. Proven and effective, a Muslim operating in Muslim parts of Africa, he will be a formidable threat to Western interests in the region.
Notes:
[1] The official title of this agency is now Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Glavnoje upravlenije General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii), but the older and simpler GRU designation (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie, Chief Intelligence Office) is still commonly used.
[2] Anthony King: The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.79-80; Mike Jackson: Soldier: The Autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson, London, 2008, pp.292-295.
[3] Robert Bruce Ware: “Chechenization: Ironies and Intricacies,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 15(2), Spring/Summer 2009, p. 166.
This article was originally published in Militant Leadership Monitor. Check it out here (requires a paid subscription)!
Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto’s Dept. of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations in 2000 and is a former Research Associate of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.