Xi Jinping Has Further Boosted the Military-Industrial Group of China
Xi Jinping Has Further Boosted the Military-Industrial Group of China
By Arthur Ding, K. Tristan Tang
Executive Summary:
Since at least the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has promoted military-industrial officials, whose presence at the vice-ministerial level has grown since the 20th Party Congress in 2022. They represent a potential emerging faction within the Chinese Communist Party.
Military-industrial officials are an unusually cohesive group, as their educational background and the industrial operational models of the defense industry are likely to foster a shared identity, mutual trust, and a high degree of homogeneity within their interpersonal networks.
The military-industrial group has formed a unique Chinese-style military-industrial complex within the 20th Central Committee, with officials holding key roles in resource allocation, policy planning, regulation, local coordination, and opinion transmission, allowing them to significantly control the development of the defense industry.
Editor’s Note: Five tables referenced in this article can be viewed in the original version, which can be found on The Jamestown Foundation’s website here.
On June 28, Huang Qiang (黄强) was appointed as the party secretary of Jilin Province. Formerly secretary-general of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (国防科工委) and deputy director general of the National Defense Science and Technology Bureau (国防科工局), Huang’s promotion marks a further development for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) group of military-industrial leaders (Xinhua, June 28). Alongside Hao Peng (郝鹏) in Liaoning and Xu Qin (许勤) in Heilongjiang, all three provincial Party secretaries for the major industrial bases in Northeast China now have backgrounds in the defense industry.
Supreme leader Xi Jinping has provided consistent support to the defense industry in recent years, and has increased his reliance on officials from defense industry backgrounds—as seen in the curricula vitae of Central Committee members unveiled at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th Party Congress in October 2022 (The Diplomat, September 12). These developments represented a culmination of personnel decisions that date back to at least the 19th Party Congress in 2017, when Xi’s emphasis on the importance of military-industrial officials began to become observable. Research to date has tended to analyze this rising group of military-industrial personnel from a technocratic perspective (see China Leadership Monitor, December 1, 2022; February 29). Owing to the significant differences between military-industrial officials and technocrats in general, however, the PRC’s military-industrial group merits attention as a growing force within both the defense industry and the CCP Central Committee, and has the potential to one day emerge as a key faction within the PRC’s political system.
Structural Dynamics Suggest Emerging Military-Industrial ‘Faction’
For the purposes of this article, the “military-industrial group” refers narrowly to those individuals who developed their careers in defense industry corporations or the “Seven Sons of National Defense (国防七子)” universities before being promoted to the vice-ministerial level. [1] It excludes those who merely studied at Seven Sons universities without either teaching at those same institutions or subsequently joining defense industry corporations, and those who joined the defense industry only after being promoted to the vice-ministerial level. The decision to set the rank at the vice-ministerial level is based on the understanding that officials at this level are “central management cadres (中管干部)” whose transfers and promotions are regulated by the Central Organization Department (People’s Daily, September 16, 2014). The transfer of personnel to the defense industry later in their careers is primarily done for résumé-building purposes or for oversight. As such, these personnel differ significantly from those who gained early experience in the defense industry during their tenure as grassroots or mid-level officials.
The military-industrial group has the potential to develop into a faction. This is because the educational background and industrial operational models of the PRC’s defense industry are likely to foster a shared identity, mutual trust, and a high degree of homogeneity within their interpersonal networks. There are two dynamics that underpin this emerging group.
First, most of these officials graduated from the Seven Sons universities. These institutions, established in the 1950s and 1960s, are oriented toward the defense industry. As such, their historical and institutional connections provide students with greater career opportunities in the industry than those from other universities. Often, key state-owned defense companies have agreements with—or are major contributors to—Seven Sons universities (Harbin Engineering University, June 11; Beijing Institute of Technology, August 25, 2022). The higher prevalence of graduates from these schools over other universities who join the industry is borne out in the statistics (CSET, December, 2020). This has resulted in a higher level of connectivity among these officials compared to graduates in other industries or fields (Takungpao, October 16, 2023). These institutions also foster a strong sense of belonging and honor among their students. This is achieved in part through the celebration of the technical defense achievements of earlier Chinese scientists, notably those involved in Mao’s “Two Bombs, One Satellite (两弹一星)” project that was focused on building the country’s first nuclear weapons, ICBMs, and satellites (Northwestern Polytechnical University, June 7, 2023).
Second, the PRC’s defense industry is fairly closed off. The “block logic” that characterizes the PRC’s broader bureaucratic system is also present in the defense industry, resulting in research and development being largely confined to specific defense companies or research units. An article published in 2017 by the Center for Advancing Military-Civil Fusion Programs (军民融合项目促进中心) lamented the industry’s “confining nature of closed concepts, the constraints of the planning system, the limitations of monopolistic structures, the restrictions of policy standards, the impediments of [few] access points, and the siloing of information channels (封闭观念的禁锢、计划体制的束缚、垄断格局的限制、政策标准的制约、准入门槛的阻碍和信息渠道的隔离)” (Development and Reform Commission of Gansu Province, December 26, 2017). This makes it difficult for other companies or universities to participate in core research, meaning that while interactions and collaborations between research institutes and factories within the defense industry are relatively frequent, they are less so with entities outside this ecosystem. Therefore, such a closed industrial environment tends to foster a rich understanding and strong level of interaction among insiders, more so than for those in other sectors.
Military-Industrial Officials From the 19th and 20th CCP Central Committees
Among the two most recent Central Committees’ 409 members, a total of 21 have had a background in the defense industry (see Table 1). Out of 17 members elected to the 19th Central Committee, 11—roughly two-thirds—were re-elected to the 20th Central Committee, along with the election of an additional four new members.
In terms of rank, the highest position held by military-industrial officials in the 19th Central Committee was that of Central Committee member. However, in the 20th Central Committee, four members were promoted to the Politburo: Vice Premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, and Chongqing Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun.
Regarding positions held within the Central Committee, three individuals have previously worked in the Office of the Central Commission for Military–Civil Fusion Development (中央军民融合发展委员会办公室) [2] or the Communist Youth League. These include Lei Fanpei, though his position as deputy director of the former is based on external media reports only (Epoch Times, February 2, 2023). There has been no formal announcement from state media, though he continues to be present in state media reports as part of the rank of ministerial-level officials (CASC, June 14, 2023).
In terms of positions held within the State Council, many ministries have installed military-industrial officials in key roles. Notably, in the 20th Central Committee, individuals who effectively control military-industrial resources and related industrial sectors within the State Council include Vice Premiers Zhang Guoqing (in charge of industry) and Liu Guozhong, State Councillor Wu Zhenglong, Minister for Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong, and Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng (see Table 3).
At the local level, a total of 21 military-industrial officials have held the positions of Party secretary or governor in 14 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions across the two most recent Central Committees. This represents a trend of negative growth, however, as military-industrial officials held top or deputy positions in 13 localities during the 19th Party Congress, but only in six following the 20th Party Congress. For example, in Hunan, Jiangsu, and Hebei, military-industrial officials held positions during the 19th Central Committee but not in the 20th Central Committee. In contrast, provinces such as Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Shaanxi continue to have military-industrial officials in office (see Table 5). The fact that military-industrial officials are in top positions in these three provinces is important, however, as they are home to research companies and institutes that are vital to the country’s defense industry. For example, Heilongjiang has the Harbin Aircraft Industry Group (HAIG; 哈尔滨飞机工业集团), Liaoning Province has the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Group (DSIC; 大连船舶重工集团), and Shaanxi Province has the Fourth and Sixth Research Institutes of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC; 中国航天科技集团). However, given that a number of military-industrial personnel who previously held positions in local governments are either being promoted or retiring—such as Wu Zhenglong, who was promoted from Jiangsu Province to secretary-general of the State Council, and Lin Duo, who retired from his post in Gansu Province—Xi Jinping may need to ensure that military-industrial personnel remain in regions most closely tied to the defense industry.
Military-industrial officials have been elected to positions within the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST; 中国科学技术协会), the National People’s Congress (NPC; 全国人民代表大会), and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议). In the 20th Central Committee, military-industrial officials serve as vice chairpersons and vice presidents in both the NPC and CPPCC, while CAST has been predominantly led by military-industrial officials during both the 19th and 20th Central Committees (see Table 4).
Authentic Military-industrial Faction Yet to Appear
Analysis of the interpersonal networks of military-industrial officials in the Central Committee after the 20th Party Congress indicates that many share educational or professional backgrounds. Looking at the group more closely, NPC Vice Chairman Zhang Qingwei could be a central node in this network. Due to his nearly three-decade career in the aerospace sector, most officials from the aerospace or aviation sectors have connections to him. For instance, Chongqing Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun, Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, Deputy Director of the Central Military-Civil Fusion Office Lei Fanpei, and Minister of Industry and Information Technology Jin Zhuanglong have all served as his deputies at various times. Another central figure may be Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing. Current State Councillor Wu Zhenglong and Shaanxi Governor Zhao Gang have previously worked alongside him (Economic Daily, December 31, 2017). Zhang and Wu worked together at the Chongqing Municipal Committee of the CCP between 2013 and 2014, while Zhang and Zhao worked together at China North Industries Group from 1993 to 1995, and again at China North Industries Corporation from 2011 to 2013 (Economic Daily, July 29, 2017; CPC News, October 24).
The military-industrial group has also formed a Chinese-style military-industrial complex within the 20th Central Committee. Currently, military-industrial officials occupy significant administrative and industrial roles, oversee major provinces that are home to crucial parts of the military-industrial sector, or participate in the operations of the top-level bodies (the NPC and the CPPCC). These officials have the capacity to promote the development of the military-industrial sector, through such methods as resource allocation (State Council Vice Premier), policy planning (Minister for Industry and Information Technology), regulation formulation (National People’s Congress), policy execution (local government), and opinion transmission (CPPCC). Although the PRC operates under the one-party rule of the CCP, a large and complex bureaucracy means that the regime is far from unitary, and various interest groups still wield substantial power. As such, the ability to shape and wield regulations and public opinion is still important. This is particularly relevant for military-industrial officials, as they participate in the operations of the NPC and CPPCC as Central Committee members rather than merely as nominally retired individuals. This implies that they have a special status compared to other vice chairs.
Some obstacles currently preclude the assignation of a “faction” to this group, however. No military-industrial officials have been promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC)—the very highest CCP body. They, therefore, do not meet the necessary criterion for a faction under the standard academic definition. This could change in 2027 following the 21st Party Congress. Apart from the relative cohesion of the group noted above, the logic of the CCP’s norms surrounding the age of officials suggests that this is a distinct possibility. Three military-industrial officials in the current Politburo will still be under 67 years old in 2027, which theoretically qualifies them for promotion; and out of the 23 current Politburo members (excluding Xi Jinping), ten meet the conventional age eligibility criterion to become members of the PBSC in 2027, resulting in a competitive situation of ten officials vying for six positions. Notably, Chongqing Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing, and Liu Guozhong hold significant political positions and control substantial resources, making them well-positioned for such a promotion.
Conclusion
The personnel arrangements of the 20th Central Committee reveal that the development of the PRC’s military-industrial group has become even more robust compared to the 19th Party Congress. This strengthens the military-industrial sector’s advantage in the overall allocation of resources and policy focus and suggests that the country’s military technology and equipment production capabilities may be further enhanced than ever before. Whether this group of officials will grow to wield more significant power will depend on a number of factors, but future personnel movements will be a key indicator, with the makeup of the 21st Central Committee in 2027 likely to reveal the group’s relative power within the Party-state system.
This article originally appeared in China Brief. Check it out here!
Dr. Arthur S. Ding is a Professor Emeritus at National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan. He now teaches part time at both the NCCU and Taiwan’s National Defense University. His research focuses on China security related fields, including China’s defense, party-military relations, as well as China’s defense industry. Dr. Ding holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame.
K. Tristan Tang is a Research Associate at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). His research focuses on the China’s defense industry, the People’s Liberation Army, and Chinese foreign policy.
Notes
[1] The Seven Sons of National Defense are a group of seven universities with close ties to the People’s Liberation Army. Students tend to focus on research that has military applications, and graduates often go on to work in the PRC’s defense industry. The seven institutions are: Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (北京航空航天大学), Beijing Institute of Technology (北京理工大学), Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (南京航空航天大学), Nanjing University of Science and Technology (南京理工大学), Northwestern Polytechnical University (西北工业大学), Harbin Institute of Technology (哈尔滨工业大学), and Harbin Engineering University (哈尔滨工程大学).
[2] This commission is alternatively translated as the “Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development” (see Xinhua, October 16, 2018).