Ukraine Needs Its Own Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
Ukraine Needs Its Own Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
Pavel Luzin
Executive Summary:
Ukraine’s current military strategy, particularly in its use of long-range drones and limited supplies of advanced missiles such as ATACMS and Storm Shadows, faces critical constraints in effectively striking key targets on Russian soil due to their short ranges.
To effectively hit critical targets on Russian soil, particularly on key Russian arms manufacturing hubs, Ukraine would require a new class of intermediate-range ballistic missiles with greater range and heavier warheads.
Developing this capacity, with the help of international support in missile technology and production capabilities, could significantly alter the trajectory of the conflict by diminishing Russia’s ability to replenish its military arsenal over time.
On October 19 and 20, Ukraine targeted two Russian factories essential to its military-industrial complex. It first attacked the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod oblast, which produces sophisticated explosives. The next day, drones hit the Kremniy-EL plant in Bryansk oblast, which produces microelectronics and electronic components for military use. While the damage to Kremniy-EL was significant and the manufacturing was temporarily ceased, the damage to the Sverdlov Plant did not affect its operations (Lenta.ru, October 20; Kommersant, October 21). For months, media and experts in the United States, Europe, and Ukraine have been discussing the restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles against targets on Russian territory as well as Germany’s rejection to supply Ukraine with the Taurus cruise missiles. Two fundamental and unsolvable problems exist, however, even if the restrictions and rejections are lifted. The range of these missiles—190 miles (300 kilometers) for ATACMS and 300 miles (500 kilometers) for Taurus—will not get very far into Russian territory and there is a limited quantity of these weapons. The Storm Shadow cruise missiles, on the other hand, do not have any restrictions on use. They play a critical role in combat but cannot become a strategic game changer because there is also a limited quantity and they only have a range of just 350 miles (560 kilometers).
Due to these limitations, the discussion on how to aid Ukraine would be more useful if policymakers were focused on providing it with the necessary technology, components, parts, and machine tools for the manufacturing of a ballistic missile with a range of at least 620 miles (1000 kilometers). These efforts can be conducted in the same way existing assistance is provided through aiding the production of Ukrainian long-range drones, including jet-powered attack drones that cover shorter ranges.
Inevitable Asymmetric Approach
Since the beginning of the war in February 20022, Russia has fired more than 5,000 long-range cruise missiles with a range from 190 miles (300 kilometers) to more than 1,500 miles (2,500 kilometers) and tactical ballistic missiles with a range of about 300 miles (500 kilometers). By comparison, however, the total number of ATACMS and Taurus missiles ever produced is less than this number, meaning that no matter how many of these weapons Ukraine receives, it cannot combat the sheer quantity of the Russian armory (MBDA-Systems.com, December 6, 2010; Lockheedmartin.com, August 14, 2017; Washington Post, July 22, 2023).
The United States and Germany cannot, even hypothetically, transfer all their remaining ATACMS and Taurus missiles to Ukraine without significantly weakening their own defense capabilities. Between this and the fact that Russian forces in the occupied territories of Ukraine and on their own soil are spread out and dispersed, Ukraine will probably continue to use the missiles available to them only against the highly valuable targets such as long-range air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare systems, etc.
Even if the total production capacity of ATACMS, 500 missiles a year, had been achieved in 2023 and continues to sustain this level of production, and all these missiles were being supplied to Ukraine, an immediate result on the ground would be impossible to see (Washington Post, July 22, 2023). The collection of targets that Ukraine could strike to effectively combat Russian aggression is just too large—even this many ATACMS would not be able to hit all of them. Because of this, Ukraine will likely continue to focus on what Russia cannot afford to replace any time soon, and on the main such systems are deployed in the occupied territories of Ukraine and thus in a reasonable range to target. Ukraine can neither extend its list of targets nor use missiles on the same scale as the Russians. Therefore, Ukraine’s approach would continue to have to be asymmetrical, especially regarding the long-range strikes against Russian territory.
What Can be Done?
Ukraine is capable of hitting targets on Russian territory using long-range drones. Just in the last month, Ukraine has destroyed several military warehouses that held artillery shells, missiles, bombs, and drones. On October 22, Kyiv hit three distilleries that produce ethanol, which is used in explosives production, in Tula and Tambov oblasts (The Moscow Times, October 22). The main obstacle for Ukraine is that long-range drones have warheads with a mass of tens of kilograms. This mass can be enough to create sufficient destruction in cases when the drones target caches of explosives, but this is not enough to destroy factories themselves. Several tens of such drones must accurately hit any single factory to destroy it or at least cease manufacturing for a substantial period. This is hardly possible, however, because even jet-powered drones have limited speed, and most of them can be intercepted by kinetic or electronic warfare systems. ATACMS, Taurus, and Storm Shadow missiles are also not helpful in this situation because the key factories in Russia’s military-industrial complex are located beyond their ranges.
These critical factories could become potential targets if Ukraine were to adopt an asymmetric approach. The number of these production centers is limited, and their destruction will have an adverse effect on major arms manufacturing chains. For this purpose, Ukraine needs missiles with a warhead mass of no less than 400–500 kilograms (880–1,100 pounds) and a range of 620 miles (1,000 kilometers) or farther. Additionally, the production rate of these missiles should be high enough, at least several dozen a year, to affect Russia’s arms production and deter it in the long term.
Simply speaking, Ukraine needs an intermediate-range ballistic missile. These missiles could utilize liquid propellant which is easier to produce but are easier to target before they take off, taking a long time to fuel before launch. Alternatively, a Ukrainian intermediate-range ballistic missile could use solid propellant, which is more sophisticated and effective but also more expensive. If it is possible to add a booster stage, this could even utilize the Ukraine-made Hrim-2 tactical ballistic solid-propellant missile, which is in its final stage of development.
Of course, Russia’s military-industrial complex consists of more than 1,300 facilities, but the number of its key facilities is much lower. For example, Ukrainian strikes could be focused on the following sites (Kommersant, June 20, 2023; Newstula.ru, September 15, 2023; Rostec.ru, April 14, 2021; Dmzdubna.ru; Kazanpowder.ru; Ktrv.ru; Sverdlova.ru Uecrus.com; Vzavod.ru, accessed October 24):
The list could be expanded by adding other factories that produce, for example, air defense or electronic warfare systems. Nevertheless, the number of key arms-manufacturing facilities hardly exceeds 30 locations, and most of them are far beyond the range of missiles that the United States, Germany, and other Ukrainian allies could hypothetically supply. However, destroying the aforementioned plants would cut Russia’s military-industrial complex off at the source and devastate Russia’s ability to arm its military to fight against Ukraine.
This article was originally published in Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Pavel Luzin is a visiting scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is also a regular contributor at The Jamestown Foundation. He is a specialist in international relations and an expert on the Russian Armed Forces. Much of his research and writings focus on Russian foreign policy and defense, space policy and non-proliferation studies.